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Studies of regulatory choice have focussed primarily upon the 
origins and impacts of regulation. Though the form of the regulatory 
legislation influences the magnitude and distribution of the costs and 
benefits from the implementation of the regulation, few of the studies 
of regulatory choice have addressed the choice of regulatory form. 
The form of regulatory legislation can be thought to consist of the 
legislature's choice of regulatory policies and instruments and the 
degree of substantive and procedural discretion afforded the 
administering agency by the legislature. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to suggest and justify a 
three-sector model of the choice of regulatory form, wherein a 
representative legislature, an administrative bureaucracy, and 
participating interest groups interact to define public policy. The 
model will be developed formally and hypotheses as to the choice of 
regulatory form will be derived, largely through partial equilibrium 
analysis. These hypotheses will suggest that the structure of the 
regulated industry and the aggregate nature of the preferences of the 
interest groups involved in the decision process will determine, in 
large part, the form of the regulatory legislation. 
The hypotheses will be operationalized to facilitate the 
application of empirical data. Empirical data will be of the form of 
vii 
legislative case-studies of various federal regulatory statutes. In 
these case-studies I shall examine the Toxic Substances Control Act, 
the Consumer Product Safety Act, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics 
Act, and the Civil Aeronautics Act among others. Evidence from these 
case-studies will be focussed to support the operational hypotheses 
derived and the model from which they were developed. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction. 
Government regulation is often bemoaned as one of the premier 
evils of our time, responsible for everything from a decline in 
economic growth to an increase in the price of gasoline. Two 
presidential candidates have run successfully on campaign platforms 
which included as principal elements promises to drastically reduce 
the intrusiveness of federal regulation. 
What are the origins of regulation? What are the processes by 
which regulation is chosen and administered? Why does regulation take 
the form it does? 
Economists have explored the choice of regulation from a 
perspective of rational individual decision-making. Regulation, 
according to such a view, is a result of private-interest politics, 
and its form results from the interplay of these interests.l The 
processes and institutions of choice, however, are rarely considered. 
This area has instead been the domain of political science. Political 
scientists have examined the pathways of regulatory decisions and have 
specified the influence that the structure of political institutions 
has upon the choice of regulation. 
To be sure, the problem in answering such questions is partly 
definitional -- what do we mean by regulation? Some economists define 
regulation as a method of redistributing wealth or rights between 
competing segments of society. Indeed, regulation, according to this 
definition, can be viewed strictly as a tax. We need not know the 
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goals of regulation but only the winners in the struggle for wealth 
redistribution. 
Alternatively, regulation can be seen as two-dimensional, 
consisting of a policy and an instrument. Regulatory policies are the 
objectives of the governmental action. Such objectives may range from 
achieving price stability for domestic crops to the protection of 
public health from an unreasonable risk associated with toxic 
substances. Regulatory instruments are the tools or techniques 
associated with the regulatory policy, employed to implement the 
policy. Instruments commonly observed to carry out policy objectives 
are taxes, tariffs, zoning, and licensing. 2 Regulatory choice is then 
the governmental choice of regulatory policy and instrument. With 
such a definition in mind we can seek the answers to some of the 
questions suggested earlier. In particular, why does regulation take 
the form it does? What are the keys to understanding instrument 
choice? 
An understanding of instrument choice is important for more 
than just the scientific interest inherent in understanding the world 
about us. Economic theory provides us with a battery of efficient and 
welfare-maximizing techniques for the implementation of regulatory 
policy. But these incentive-based instruments are rarely the 
alternatives considered by Congress for implementing regulatory 
policy. A comprehensive study of instrument choice may suggest the 
reasons for such non-welfare maximizing choices, and can suggest 
conditions under which economically efficient choices will be made. 
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Indeed, the derivation of economically efficient instruments for the 
implementation of policy objectives is a sterile intellectual 
enterprise if we do not understand the preconditions in public 
organizations necessary for their acceptance. 
The core of the American national regulatory process is, of 
course, the Congress, the President and the bureaucracy. Any model of 
regulatory choice should capture the interaction of these two 
institutional actors. Further, the behavior of each of these actors 
is influenced by the politics of American democracy wherein interest 
groups wield considerable influence. The approach I undertake herein 
is to examine the choices of these three actors and the influence of 
each upon the other to pursue the study of regulatory instrument 
choice. 
In the model to be developed legislators are assumed to pursue 
their own ends by their (and the legislature's) choice of regulatory 
policy and instrument. A legislator's activity consists of choosing a 
position on the regulatory choice and a voting strategy relative to 
the legislature which will best attain his/her chosen position. 
Legislators pursue two principal goals through their choice of 
position on regulatory issues. First, they seek their continued 
tenure in office and second, they seek policies which satisfy their 
perceptions of 'good public policy'.3 The pursuit of each goal is 
influenced by the unique structure of the legislative institution. 
The institutional structure induces certain behavior in the pursuit of 
these legislative goals which establish a stable network of 
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interactions and procedures and ultimately influence the outcome of 
the regulatory choice. 
The most important structural influence upon the Congressional 
policy process is that it is shaped by the history of the American 
republic. The framers, in an attempt to guard against the tyranny of 
the majority, created a Congress in which 'interests' have a major 
impact upon the policy process. There are two sets of 'interests' of 
primary importance to the legislator as a result of incentives and 
constraints enforced by the legislative institution. The first is the 
legislator's electoral constituency. By requiring the legislator to 
seek frequent re-election from distinct, single-member constituencies, 
the institutional structure defined in the Constitution influences the 
legislator to seek satisfaction of his/her constituent's preferences 
for regulatory policy. The second is organized interest groups with a 
stake in the regulatory choice. Interest groups, through the highly 
decentralized decision process evident in the committee system of 
Congress, possess numerous access points with which to influence the 
decisions at each stage of the regulatory choice. 
Therefore, in taking a position on a regulatory choice (policy 
or instrument) the critical considerations for the model congressman 
are which position will first, maximize the approval of his/her home 
district, second, which position will maximize the campaign resources 
acquired from organized interest groups and, third, which position 
fulfills his/her perceptions of 'good public policy'. An additional 
consideration as well for instrument choice is which instrument, for 
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the given policy choice, will provide a maximum of political 
opportunities (e.g. casework) for the legislator. 4 Casework is a 
non-controversial technique for the congressman to provide 
'representation' and service to constituents and interest groups and 
through which the congressman can enhance his/her electoral fate. 
Each legislator will make trade-offs between these considerations in 
choosing his/her regulatory position. The proper choice of policy and 
instrument positions on regulatory questions, and the proper choice of 
voting strategy associated with this regulatory position, will 
maximize the legislator's benefit from the regulatory choice. 
Interest groups in the model are assumed to pursue their own 
ends through regulation and do so through their lobbying activity. 
Interest groups lobby their 'friends' within the decentralized 
decision network of the committee system toward this benefit. Such 
lobbying activity by groups consists primarily of the provision of 
campaign resources to these friendly legislators. Of particular 
interest are interest groups which are business associations. 
Business interests represent an important influence upon the 
regulatory choice process, as the members of such associations, 
generally profit-maximizing firms, are the frequent targets of federal 
regulation. Of importance here is the impact of a particular 
instrument choice upon the net profitability of a firm. Profitability 
may vary with the stage at which the proposed regulatory policy 
affects the choices of the regulated firm, and with the market 
structure of the industry to be regulated. Consequently, the firm 
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possesses preferences over the instrument choice which are translated 
into lobbying activities. The impact of the instrument choice upon 
the profitability of the firm, and hence, more generally, upon the 
market structure of the industry, determines in large part the 
acceptability of such choices to the legislature. 
The bureaucracy, responding to the mandate and incentives of 
the Congress, chooses specific regulatory policies and instruments to 
administer subject to binding legal and procedural constraints imposed 
by the Congress and the courts. The agency will make such choices 
with deliberate caution and will seek to minimize the conflict arising 
from the economic and social environment in which it operates. 
As is true of Congress, the most important features of the 
agency's economic and social environment are those imposed by the 
American Constitution Agencies are created and given legislatively-
defined missions through normal legislative processes, and they must 
return to Congress for reauthorization and appropriations at periodic 
intervals. Since the Congress, as indicated earlier, is designed to 
be fairly sensitive to organized interests, the groups inside and 
outside the government which may be adversely affected by the proposed 
activities of an agency will generally have access to, and influence 
with, various congressional bodies which can influence the operation 
of the agency. That the agency is therefore sensitive to the 
preferences of important groups in its environment should come as no 
surprise. As described by Ferejohn (1981), 
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The general point is that every agency is located in a 
context that permits the appeal of specific agency decisions by a 
variety of parties and that, in some cases, the very existence of 
the agency itself can be called into question by certain groups. 
For this reason if an agency head wishes to achieve programmatic 
or personal goals he or she must be aware of the necegsity of 
maintaining the capacity to make effective decisions. 
The head of the administrative agency is thus modelled as an expected 
utility maximizer choosing regulatory policies and instruments so as 
to jointly maximize his/her benefit from the regulatory choice and 
minimize the conflict anticipated from such choice. 
The choices of legislators, bureaucrats and interest groups, 
and the influence of the choices of each on the other are modelled , as 
outlined above, in chapter 3. From this analysis we can begin to 
confront the questions of regulatory form and instrument choice. 
In chapter 4 we derive from the model hypotheses which address 
the question of regulatory instrument choice. The hypotheses suggest 
that Congress will be sensitive to changes in the preferences of 
interest groups involved in the regulatory choice and will tend to 
choose the instruments preferred by such groups. Moreover, Congress 
is proportionately more sensitive to the preferences of wealthy 
groups. Similar hypotheses are found to be true of the instrument 
choice of administrative agencies. 
Furthermore, it will be shown to follow from the model that 
Congress will generally prefer to regulate the productive choices of 
firm behavior via a command and control instrument when the structure 
of the industry is such that the firms possess differing 
(heterogeneous) production technologies. When the regulation applies 
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to other than the productive choices of the firm or when the group{s) 
to be regulated is not of the form of a business association, the 
aggregated preferences of the interested groups determines the 
instrument choice. In such a case Congress is much more likely to 
choose a command and control instrument when the preferences, over the 
regulatory choice, of the interest groups involved are homogeneous. 
Congress will also seek to divide issues into sub-issues over which 
the interest groups with a stake in the sub-issues have homogeneous 
preferences for the choice of instrument (and indeed policy). 
Further, it will be argued that Congress will be more likely to 
delegate the choice of instrument to the bureaucracy when the 
preferences over the instrument choice of the groups to be regulated 
are heterogeneous. Similarly, procedural guarantees will be delegated 
to the agency when the preferences of the groups involved are 
homogeneous. 
In chapter 5 a mirroring principle of agency structure will be 
deduced and discussed. The impact of the process of regulatory choice 
in general upon American politics and society will be discussed as 
well. Also, the hypotheses of chapter 4 will be employed to offer a 
systematic explanation for the failure of federal environmental, 
health and safety programs. 
Chapters 6 thru 10 present evidence for the model of the 
regulatory process and its propositions in the form of case studies of 
a variety of federal regulatory programs. The case studies will focus 
largely upon federal environmental, health and safety programs 
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established in the legislative acts listed in Table 1. Chapter 10 
will specifically employ evidence drawn from the regulatory case 
studies of chapters 6 thru 9 to test the hypotheses developed in 
chapters 4 and 5 and to test a number of alternative hypotheses. 
Chapter 2. to which we now turn. summarizes and compares the 
literature on regulatory choice and sets the stage for our exploration 
of instrument choice. 
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TABLE 1 
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Footnotes to Chapter 1 
1. The literature on regulatory choice will be reviewed and 
summarized in chapter 2. 
2. Briefly, instruments in this framework may be categorized 
into four general categories for analysis: 
a) command and control instruments - individualized 
instruments which regulate behavior through constraints on 
the choice sets of actors (for example; price limits, route 
setting, quotas and effluent emission levels), 
b) informational instruments - instruments which regulate 
behavior through a recharacterization of the good or service 
in transaction (examples are warning labels, formula 
disclosures, advertising controls and ingredients 
disclosures), 
c) incentive-based instruments - universal instruments 
which regulate behavior through an alteration of incentives 
for action (examples are taxes, subsidies, marketable 
permits, marketable ration coupons), 
d) public provision- instruments which regulate behavior 
through competition from non-market provision of goods 
and/or services (an example is the regulation, through 
competition, of electrical power pricing by the TVA. 
3. See Fenno (1973) for a discussion of legislative goals. 
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4. Casework is taken here broadly to mean both constituent and 
interest group service. 
5. From Ferejohn (1981). 
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Chapter 2 . Theories of Regulatory Choice. 
2.1 Introduction 
Theories of regulatory choice have generally been theories of 
interest aggregation, modelling the choice of regulation as the result 
of the influence various groups have upon the decision-making body; as 
these theories focus upon different participants in the regulatory 
process, and upon particular stages of the regulatory process, so do 
the explanations they offer for the choice of regulation. Rarely do 
these theories extend their analysis to encompass all stages or all 
participants. 
Not surprisingly, the literature on regulation centers much of 
its attention upon the behavior of the regulatory agency and its 
relationship with the regulated group and the public (a notable 
exception is the new public choice literature to be discussed). In 
this chapter we shall review some of the more important theories of 
regulatory choice, compare and contrast their conceptual frameworks, 
and probe for weaknesses which we can hopefully address in later 
chapters. 
2.2 Theories of Regulatory Origin 
Looking first at the origin of regulation, we can identify two 
traditional interest theories. These theories differ as to whether 
the impetus for the regulation was derived from public or private 
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interests and whether public or private interests were served. Though 
these theories of regulatory origin do not distinguish the origins of 
regulation from ongoing regulatory decision-making, we can employ the 
public vs. private interest framework for our analysis of the 
literature. 
Public Interest Theories 
Public interest theories of regulatory origin presuppose that 
"regulation operates to cure market failures by substituting the 
expert planning decisions of an administrative agency for the 
defective allocations of the failed market" (Levine 1981: 1). 
Regulation is a result, then, of Downsian political entrepreneurs or 
entrepreneurial public interest groups which advocate, defend and 
manage regulatory issues in the public interest (Posner 1974).1 
We can derive a public interest model of regulatory origin 
from the literature embracing the public interest approach. Such an 
exercise will allow us to more easily describe the assumptions 
implicit in this approach and will enable us to enumerate the problems 
entailed in these assumptions. 
In order to explicitly develop a public interest theory we 
need to assume that regulatory issues are supported by electoral-
minded politicians seeking to maximize their votes on election day. 
Such politicians choose policy platforms, from the universe of policy 
issues, with which to obtain votes from an attentive, though 
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unorganized, electorate. Alternatively the model can be couched in 
terms of public interest groups seeking power within the decision-
making apparatus, bringing regulatory issues favored by the public to 
the attention of our vote-maximizing politician. In either case, the 
newly elected politician seeks to implement his policy platform upon 
taking office. 
In this view public officals are not primarily concerned with 
public matters, but rather are private individuals trying to maximize 
their own utility. Politicians therefore compete with each other for 
electoral support which keeps them in office. From this it follows 
that legislators will attempt to assemble electoral coalitions of 
support. Thus, in the public interest view, the number of votes a 
politician receives is strictly a function of the net welfare gain he 
delivers (or promises to deliver) to his constituency. Public 
officials then seek to maximize the net welfare of their constituents 
through their choice of public policy, 
V V(W) 
where V is the number of votes accorded the politician and W is the 
welfare of the politician's constituency. The politician chooses the 
regulatory policies which maximize W and thus, in turn, maximize V. 
This simple model implicitly makes four rather stringent 
assumptions: first and foremost, that there exists a public interest 
(that each voter possesses well defined preferences over regulatory 
issues); second, that the social choice problems associated with the 
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aggregation of voters' preferences are solved (i.e. that vote-
maximizing platforms exist); third, that the politicians, voters and 
interest groups are maximizing in a world of certainty and of complete 
information; and fourth, that the social choice problems of the 
legislature are solved. 
Regulation in the public interest is thus a result of the 
operation of the "invisible hand" in the political marketplace. 
Voters cast their ballots for policy platforms which are transformed 
into government policies in their interest. 
Harbeson (1967), acknowledging that some members of society 
may benefit more from regulation than do others, sugggests that "the 
important fact is that the public interest was served by ••• 
regulation" (pp. 242). The group public interest approach of 
Harbeson, though similar in its basic premises to the private interest 
theories to be discussed, assumes that the debate over the regulatory 
legislation is characterized by a struggle between a diffuse majority 
favoring regulation and a powerful minority resisting regulation (see 
also Bernstein 1955: 81). The origin of regulation is still seen to 
be the public interest (and the model and assumptions given above are 
still generally applicable) but it is now discussed in terms of group 
conflict (see also Fainsod, 1940; Fainsod and Gordon, 1941; Leiserson, 
1942; Herring, 1936; Wilson, 1974) .2 
Friedlaender (1969) and Martin (1974) present a twist on the 
group public interest theory by arguing (as do proponents of the 
private interest approach) that the intent of the Interstate Commerce 
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Act of 1887 was "to cartelize the railroads" (Martin 1974: 370) as 
this practice would contribute to national development goals and would 
thus serve the public interest, broadly construed (Friedlaender 1969: 
12-16 see also Harbeson 1972). 
Early regulatory studies, though implicitly taking the group 
public interest origin perspective, focused largely on the formal 
organizational and operating structure of administrative agencies 
(Cushman, 1941; Blachly and Oatman, 1940). Regulation in response to 
major economic problems was an experiment to be corrected through 
trial and error. Administrative efficiency and due process matters 
were therefore paramount, as administrative regulation's primary 
mission was to equitably settle conflicts between groups (on this 
point see Wilson, 1974; Schultze, 1977; Owen and Braeutigam, 1978). 
Private Interest Theories 
In a revisionist account of the origins of regulation Kolko 
(1965) posits a private interest model of regulation in many ways 
similar to the group public interest model described. Kolko argues 
that regulation is not conceived in the public interest, but rather is 
born from a desire by capitalists to establish and preserve monopoly 
positions. In order to seize control of the apparatus of government, 
the capitalists exploit populist sentiment which favors controlling 
monopolies thereby eliminating market forces which reduce their 
profits. 3 
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Hilton (1966), Hoogenboom and Hoogenboom (1976), MacAvoy 
(1965) and Spann and Erickson (1970) each argue that railway 
regulation stabilized an unstable cartel situation and thus benefited 
the industry. Interestingly, such arguments are quite similar to the 
discussions of Friedlaender (1969) and Martin (1974) but take, of 
course, a much more cynical outlook. 
Group private interest theories, not accepting the premises of 
the public interest theories, present a view of the legislative 
process much more in line with political science studies of 
legislative-group interaction (Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 1963; Bentley, 
1908, 1967; Dexter, 1969; Schattschneider, 1960 and Truman, 1971). 
However, the behavioral models implicit in the group private interest 
arguments and the assumptions maintained by such are virtually 
identical to the implicit model and assumptions of the group public 
interest approach. Indeed, it could be argued that the public 
interest theories can be viewed as special cases of private interest 
theories. Further, despite differences in outlook, each of the group 
theories predict a similar outcome for the regulatory process: that 
the process will ultimately be dominated by the interests of the 
regulated group. 4 
By focusing only upon the origins and effects of regulation 
the group theories of regulatory origin fail to adequately consider 
many other aspects of the regulatory process. They also fail to 
adequately describe the behavior and influence of each major actor in 
the process. The group theories generally confine attention to the 
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legislator (or regulator) and to the conflicting interest groups, 
ignoring the influence of the bureaucracy, state and local 
governments, and the president. Further, such a focus ignores the 
choice of regulatory form, the topic to which this manuscript is 
addressed. 
The concept of interest in such theories is also quite often 
vague and indeterminate. Even relatively small and well-organized 
groups possess a wide diversity of interests and few group theorists 
consider adequately the mechanisms necessary to insure translation of 
these interests into some regulatory form (for a notable exception see 
Mitnick, 1975). As a result of such indeterminacy group theorists do 
not, in general, offer a comprehensive theory adequate to explain 
regulatory origin and the regulatory process. 
lloreover, by :assuming away the preference aggregation problems 
for the public, interest groups, and regulatory decision-making bodies 
the group theories of regulatory origin ignore problems thought to be 
quite severe by the literature on social choice. The role of the 
political institutions which serve, in part, to provide a mechanism 
whereby preferences are aggregated are frequently not considered. 
The model of regulatory choice developed in subsequent 
chapters, though taking neither the public nor private interest 
perspective, makes an attempt at modelling the three major 
participants in the regulatory choice process (the legislature, groups 
and bureaucracy) in an institutional framework. Through such a 
framework we will address the preference aggregation problems of the 
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legislature and seek a more precise definition of interest. Most 
importantly, the model to be presented focuses primarily upon the 
choice of regulatory form, its impacts and origins. 
2.3 Economic Theories of Regulation 
Economic Theories 
The perspective that regulation is sought by industry for its 
own protection and, not surprisingly, that it subsequently serves this 
purpose is the general conclusion of the economic approach to 
regulation. Economic theories of regulation are different, however, 
from the group theories of regulation just discussed, in that they set 
out specific assumptions about the nature of the incentives and goals 
of regulators and argue that these goals are pursued rationally by 
providing benefits to selected private groups (Abrams and Settle, 
1978; Jordan, 1972; Moore, 1961; Plott, 1965; Posner, 1971, 1974; 
Rainey, Backoff and Levine, 1976; Stigler, 1971). 
Stigler (1971), in perhaps the most famous of these 
approaches, introduces the economic framework of supply and demand to 
the study of regulation by suggesting that 
The potential uses of public resources and powers to 
improve the economic status of economic groups ••• provide a 
scheme of the demand for regulation. The characteristics of the 
political process which allow relatively small groups to obtain 
such regulation provide(s) a theory of supply of regulation (p. 
3). 
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Economic groups, in Stigler's view, will seek to employ the 
coercive powers of government to obtain protection from the rigors of 
competition (this, as we have seen, is not a novel view). The 
principal thesis of the economic theories is then identical to the 
results of the private interest theories from which the approach was 
spawned, in "that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry 
and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit" (Stigler, 
1971: 3). Regulation is a commodity supplied by government to private 
groups. 
The essential commodi.ty being transacted in the political 
marketplace is a transfer of wealth, which can take the form of 
"direct subsidy of money • • • control over entry by new rivals 
affect(ing) substitutes and complements ••• (or) price-fixing• 
(Stigler, 1971: 4-6). Constituents and groups comprise the demand 
side of the market and their political representatives comprise the 
supply side. Economic theories, though, tend to focus upon the 
characteristics of the groups on the demand side. 
By explicitly considering the differential costs of 
information and organization between small compact groups and a 
diffuse public, the economic theories hypothesize a diminishing return 
to group size in politics. Such a hypothesis asserts that beyond some 
point, it becomes counterproductive to further dilute the per capita 
transfer to the group. As a result it is expected that the regulatory 
process will be dominated by small (usually producer) groups. 
Posner (1974) builds upon Stigler's use of supply and demand 
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analysis to the origins of regulation, modifing it to encompass the 
economic theory of cartels into the political process (pp. 344-346). 
Regulation is thus equivalent to cartelization, in that each provides 
enforceable rules of behavior on the industry. Similarly, Jordan 
(1972) argues that the actual effect of regulation is to cartelize an 
industry or to "sustain the economic power of an industry" (p. 153). 
Economic theories generally have 1 ittle to say about the 
supply side. They ignore the influence and structure that the 
political institutions of choice offer to the choice of regulation 
(Joskow and Noll, 1978; Mitnick, 1980). The political institutions of 
choice - the Congress, the President, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, 
and state and local governments - are each responsible to different 
electorates, and thus possess different incentives and serve different 
interests. Each institution interacts with the other institutions of 
choice in a unique and well-defined fashion to develop public policy. 
Each political institution has specific and limited powers over the 
choice of regulation, and each suffers from preference aggregation 
problems unique to that institution. 
Regulatory organizations in the economic theories, however, 
are not complex structures. Regulation in this view is rather a 
commodity to be auctioned off to the highest bidder(s) and is not seen 
as the result of collective action (Joskow, 1977). The simplistic 
approach adopted by the economic theories, although it is their 
primary attraction, is also their greatest defect. By ignoring the 
intricacy of the political institutions of choice, and thereby 
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ignoring the many and varied incentives born of this intricacy, the 
economic theories do not supply us with a coherent predictive theory 
and thus do not yield refutable hypotheses (Joskow and Noll, 1978; 
Mitnick, 1980). 
Similar in many of their basic premises to the interest 
theories surveyed in the previous section, the economic theories are 
also similar to the interest theories in that they are largely 
concerned with regulatory origin and the impact of regulation. 
Interestingly, regulation in the economic approach, as stated, is just 
a means of supplying benefits to a particular group. However, by 
ignoring the structure and influence of the political institutions of 
choice the economic theories cannot address the central issue of this 
study -- the choice of regulatory form, which may, indeed, have a 
great impact on the incidence and magnitude of the benefits attainable 
from regulation. 
Public Choice Theories 
Public choice theories of regulation, while explicitly 
modelling the behavior and incentives of the various actors involved 
consider in much greater detail than did the economic theories the 
structure of the political institutions. The decision-makers in these 
theories are, moreover, explicitly political, and rationally pursue 
their own self-interest by their choice of public policy (Buchanan and 
Tullock, 1962; Downs, 1957; Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1975; Fiorina, 
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1977a, 1981, 1982; Fiorina and Noll, 1978, 1979b; Hayes, 1978; Lowi, 
1964; Mayhew, 1974; McKie, 1970; Niskanen, 1975; Peltzman, 1976; Riker 
and Ordeshook, 1973; Ripley and Franklin, 1976; Russell and Shelton, 
1974; Salisbury, 1969; Shepsle and Weingast, 1980; Weingast, 1978a, 
1978b, Weingast and Moran, 1981; Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981). 
Peltzman (1976) formalized and significantly extended the 
arguments of the economic theories of regulation; unlike in the 
economic theories, however, Peltzman's regulator is explicitly 
political and is central to his model. Peltzman posits a simple 
model, that the aim of politicians is to maximize votes, 
V = V(Il,D) 
where V is the number of votes, II is the net-benefit to those 
favored, and D is the dead weight loss associated with a particular 
policy (Becker, 1976: 245-246). Interest groups seeking regulation 
are net-benefit maximizers, 
II = (T-K-C(n)) /n 
where: 
T = total dollar amount transferred to the beneficiary group. 
K = dollars spent by beneficiaries in campaign funds and lobbying 
to mitigate opposition. 
C(n} = cost of organizing both dire9t support of beneficiaries 
and efforts to mitigate opposition. This organization cost 
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increases with n. 
n = number of potential voters in the beneficiary group 
(Peltzman, 1976: 214-215). 
The regulator, in Peltzman's model, chooses K as well as T, and the 
interest group is merely modelled as the reaction function above. 
Peltzman then employs a partial-equilibrium analysis of the 
politician's maximization problem to derive a series of empirical 
implications, most notable of which is that "regulation will tend to 
be more heavily weighted toward 'producer protection' in depressions 
and toward 'consumer protection' in expansions" (p. 227). 
Peltzman's work provided the bridge between the group interest 
and economic theories of regulation and the public choice theories of 
regulation by its attention to a political rather than an economic 
actor. Niskanen (1975) and Weingast (1978) model the choice of 
regulation as a collective choice by a representative legislature. 
Weingast postulates that a legislator attempts to maximize his 
probability of reelection, which is assumed to be a monotonically 
increasing function of his district's net benefits function (Shepsle 
and Weingast, 1980; see also Fiorina, 1981 and Weingast, Shepsle and 
Johnsen, 1981): 
Pr.(N . (x)) 
J - J - . 
N.(x) = b . (x) + c.(x) - k . (x) - t.T(x) 
J J J J _ J 
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where: 
Pr. legislator j's probability of reelection. 
J 
N. (x) =the net benefits to district j from a government 
J 0 
activity. 
x = vector of characteristics describing the government activity. 
b . (x) =benefits of the government activity to district j. 
J - . 
c.(x) =direct program expenditures in district j. 
J - . 
k . (x) external or indirect costs of a program. 
J - . 
t . = tax share of total tax bill which district j pays. 
J 
T(x) = total tax bill for governmental activities. 
This framework is a simple extension of Peltzman's analysis: the 
legislative district is the interest group to which benefits will 
accrue and is modelled, again, not as an independent actor (or 
collection of actors), but as a reaction function. 
Elsewhere, Weingast (1978a), like Niskanen (1975), has offered 
several descriptive assumptions about the legislature which constrain 
and influence the behavior of the legislator assumed above: 
Following their electoral success, representatives are designated 
as members of the legislature. Public policies for the political 
economy result from representatives pursuing their induced goals 
within the confines of the legislative rules. The committee 
system, which dominates policy development, is the main feature 
of the legislature (p. 11). 
Weingast sets up a formal model of the institutional rules 
governing the committee system: representatives are generally assigned 
to the committee they desire, legislation must come from the proper 
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substantive committee and is subject to majority rule, and oversight 
is delegated to the appropriate committee (pp. 12-13). Weingast then 
employs this framework to discuss his "political cycles" theory of 
regulation. 
The public choice theories, though extending the analysis of 
the economic theories by considering some of the features of the 
political institutions of choice, are still largely concerned with the 
origins and impacts of regulation. Fiorina (1981, 1982) provides an 
interesting departure by examining the delegation of regulatory policy 
authority by the legislature to the bureaucracy: WUnder what 
conditions do legislators adopt specific mandates (e.g. parts of the 
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts) rather than vague and platitudinous 
wish lists (e.g. The Communications Act of 1934)?w (p. 2). 
In addressing the delegation question Fiorina builds upon 
Shepsle's and Weingast's (1980) model of legislative behavior and 
relates the incidence of costs and benefits of regulation to the 
delegation of substantive authority by the legislature. w ••• other 
things equal, delegation preferences (for the legislator) are less 
likely in the CB/DC (concentrated benefits and diffused costs) case 
than in the opposite DB/CC (diffused benefits and concentrated costs) 
case" (p. 26). 
The Peltzman-Weingast-Fiorina approach, of modelling the 
choice of regulation as exclusively a legislative choice, however, 
excludes the influence of the actions and choices of other important 
actors in the choice process -- largely interest groups and the 
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bureaucracy (Mitnick, 1980). The choice of regulation could be 
conceived of as the result of a multi-institutional game wherein each 
institution interacts with the others (choosing stragies vis-a-vis the 
other institutions) to make policy, and where within each institution 
the individual members of the institution interact to solve the 
institution's collective choice. The public choice models take into 
account the actions of interest groups only as a reaction to 
legislative policies and altogether ignore the choices and influence 
of the bureaucracy. 
Bureaucratic Theories 
Bureaucratic theories of regulatory choice, naturally enough, 
model the choice of regulation as the output of administrative 
agencies, but invariably focus only upon the top administrative 
officials. The 'administrator' pursues his goals rationally and his 
behavior is structured by the constraints of the administrative 
organization and by the incentives of the institutional setting. 
Downs (1967), Niskanen (1971, 1975) and Tullock (1965) have 
applied the rational choice framework to bureaucratic behavior. 
Bureaucrats are assumed to be rational, taking action consistent with 
their goals and constraints. Variations of the bureaucratic approach 
have been developed by DeAlessi (1974), Eckert (1973), Hilton (1972), 
Mitnick and Weiss (1974), Noll (1971a, b, c), Noll, Peck and McGowan 
(1973) and Russell and Shelton (1974). Their theories of bureaucratic 
choice of regulatory policy have primarily sought to identify the 
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goals which bureaucrats pursue and their behavioral incentives, and 
from these predict the outcomes of the regulatory policy. Bureaucrats 
have been assumed to seek to develop policies which will not be 
reversed by the Congress or the courts (Noll, 1971a); to preserve the 
regulated interest (Noll, 1971a); to achieve status in the federal 
bureaucracy or ease of working conditions; to expand their future 
reward opportunities (Eckert, 1973); or to fulfill the interest of the 
regulated industry (Mitnick and Weiss, 1974) or the interests of the 
public (Eckert, 1973). 
Regulatory officials are thus viewed as utility maximizers. 
Their "utility is a function of numerous items," (Eckert, 1973: 83) 
many of which we outlined above: 
= 
where: 
Uk = utility of the regulatory official 
GOALSk = a vector of relevant goals which the regulatory 
officials aspires to 
x = regulatory policy chosen by the regulatory official. 
There are many problems with the rational-choice bureaucratic 
approach, many of which are similar to the problems associated with 
the other kinds of models we have discussed. The bureaucratic 
theories do not incorporate the complexity of organizational behavior 
and do not address the problems of preference and policy aggregation 
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in an organizational setting. Moreover, the bureaucratic theories 
model the regulatory process as the choice of some idealized 
regulatory administrator, and do not capture well the nature of the 
legislative or interest group input to the process (Joskow and Noll, 
1978: 59). 
The economic approaches to modelling regulation discussed in 
this section all suffer from similar shortcomings. The structure and 
influence of the political institutions of choice is either largely 
ignored, as in the economic theories, or is only partially embraced, 
as in the public choice and bureaucratic approaches. The influence 
and impact of the choices and strategies of the major institutional 
actors acting in concert to create regulatory policy is thus not 
addressable in these models. Further, the problems associated with 
the aggregation of preferences within and between the political 
institutions is, for the most part, not considered. 
2.4 Evolution Theories 
Life Cycle Theories 
Bernstein (1955) introduced the life-cycle theory of 
regulatory agencies in an attempt to explain how regulation, which was 
originated in the public interest, could cease to be effectively 
implemented or, indeed, could be transformed to serve the interests of 
the regulated industry. Wfhe history of commissions reveals a general 
pattern of evolution more or less characteristics of all,~ and each 
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undergoes "roughly similar periods of growth, maturity and decline" 
(Bernstein, 1955: 74). Variations of the life-cycle theory have been 
presented by Cary (1967), Downs (1967), Friendly (1962), Jaffe (1954), 
McConnell (1966), Moore (1972), Redford (1952), Shepherd (1974) and 
Tullock (1965) • 
Bernstein specified four general periods of development: 
gestation, youth, maturity, and old age. Gestation involves the issue 
formation, access and decision stages of policy formation in a fashion 
similar to the group public interest models described in section 2.2. 
During its "youth" the agency energetically crusades to fulfill its 
legislative mandate in a highly charged conflictual environment. As 
the agency approaches "maturity" its energy is abated and it 
increasingly relies on precedent and routine, the agency seeks to 
avoid trouble and as .congressional and public support for its mandate 
wanes the agency "finally becomes a captive of the regulated groups" 
(pp. 86-91) • Finally, in "old age" the agency develops a working 
agreement with the regulated groups to maintain the status quo in 
their interest. 
Weingast (1978a) has offered a revision to the life cycle 
theory. In what he terms a "political cycles" model of regulation 
Weingast argues that changes in the outlook of reguiatory agencies 
(whether they are pro-consumer or pro-industry) correspond to changes 
in the attention and direction the legislature gives to these agencies 
as a result of changes in the preferences of the electorate. 
The life-cycle theories generally suffer from a lack of 
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clarity of purpose. The lack of clear definitions and explicit 
modelling hinder any empirical support for such theories (Joskow and 
Noll, 1978: 61). Indeed, the major shortcoming of these theories is 
that they fail to be supported by empirical evidence (Mitnick, 1980). 
Incrementalist Theories 
Ackerman and Hassler (1981), Krier and Ursin (1977), Stewart 
(1975), and Wilson (1980) have advanced another evolutionary theory of 
congressional choice of regulation. Regulation, in their view, is an 
experiment to be perfected by trial and error. The result is that the 
form of the regulatory mandates passed by Congress changes 
incrementally over time. 
Congress, upon observing the defects inherent in the New Deal 
regulatory agencies, sought to correct such defects by prescribing 
specific and narrowly defined regulatory mandates for the new 
regulatory agencies of the 1970's. However, as with the life cycle 
theories just discussed, the major problem with these theories is 
their lack of empirical support. We shall return to this point in 
chapter 10. 
With the exception of Weingast (1978a) the evolutionary 
theories are not developed from explicit and well formulated models of 
individual behavior. This is not to say that such theories could not 
be derived from models such as those outlined in previous sections; 
models such as described for the group public interest and 
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bureaucratic theories implicitly underlie these stories. However. the 
evolutionary theories therefore suffer from a lack of clarity and 
coherency and do not. as a result. yield unambiguous refutable 
hypotheses. 
2.5 Organizational Approaches 
Behavioral Theories 
Variations of the behavioral approach of Cyert and March 
(1963) in the context of the regulatory agencies have been developed 
by Altshuler and Thomas (1977). Baldwin (1975). Evans and Pinkett 
(1975). Joskow (1972. 1973. 1974). and Pugh (1971). These approaches 
assume that the regulator (administrator) will be a rational utility 
maximizer. as in the bureaucratic theories. However. these approaches 
focus primarily upon the relational. procedural. and organizational 
factors so often ignored by the bureaucratic theories. 
Joskow has applied the behavioral approach to the interaction 
of regulatory agencies and regulated firms (1974). to the decision by 
regulated firms to petition the regulatory agency for a rate change 
(1973), and to the rate-making decision processes of regulatory 
agencies (1972). Agencies, in Joskow's view, seek to minimize the 
conflict encountered from other organizations in their environment 
(see also Hilton. 1972). The agency establishes its organizational 
structure, regulatory instruments and decision procedures so as to 
minimize this conflict. By minimizing conflict the agency achieves an 
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equilibrium Hwhich satisfactorily balances the conflicting pressures 
from the external environment" (p. 297). 
Joskow is primarily concerned with administration of 
regulation and ignores issues of regulatory creation. The legislature 
in defining the regulatory mandate for the agency often specifies. in 
fair detail. the regulatory instruments. decision-making procedures 
and organizational structure of the agency. Thus. though Joskow did 
develop and test a number of propositions regarding the interaction of 
the regulatory agency and the regulated firm. by not considering the 
role of the legislature he did not develop testable hypotheses 
regarding the choice of regulatory form. 
Baldwin (1975). on the other hand. employs a principal-agent 
approach to modelling the relationship between the legislature and the 
agency. The regulatory agency is an agent established by the 
legislature to effect bargains between competing groups. Baldwin 
describes the agency as sitting in the hot seat and as a result the 
agency seeks survival as its primary goal. 
It is not immediately apparent in the organizational approach 
how individual preferences are transformed into an agency's goals 
(Mitnick, 1980). The organizational models. by stressing the 
procedural and structural factors of bureaucratic behavior, and by 
identifying the role such structures play in solving the collective 
action dilemmas involved in regulatory decision-making. suggest that a 
melding of approaches may be fruitful to the study of regulation. In 
isolation, however. the organizational approaches do not provide us 
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with a comprehensive theory of the choice of regulatory form. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Though encompassing a wide range of approaches and 
methodologies the existing literature on regulatory choices does not 
provide us with a theory producing unambiguous and testable 
propositions concerning the choice of regulatory form: substantive and 
procedural authority and regulatory instruments. 
Existing theories generally focus upon a particular stage of 
the regulatory process or examine the behavior of a focal decision-
maker. Often these theories disregard the relevence of the structure 
of the political institutions of choice and ignore the problems 
associated with the aggregation of preferences in policy formation. 
In subsequent chapters we will develop a three-sector model of 
regulatory choice integrating several of the approaches discussed 
herein. The legislative model of the public choice theorists and the 
interest group model of the economic theorists will be incorporated 
with a bureaucratic-organizational model of administrative agency 
behavior to yield testable hypotheses on the choice of regulatory 
form. The approach will pay careful attention to the social choice 
problems involved in the aggregation of preferences within the 
1 egi sl a ture. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 2 
1. See also Berry 1977; Curry and Wade 1968. 
2. Wilson developed a typology of regulatory environments and 
predicted that regulatory behavior is likely to differ in various 
interest group contexts. Wilson argues that the extent to which 
costs and benefits associated with a regulatory issue are 
concentrated determines the nature of the groups activity. Thus 
Wilson's typology is in a sense a private interest approach as 
well. 
3. In an argument similar to Kolko's, Edelman (1964) argues 
that the unorganized public often is satisfied with a symbolic 
reassurance. This symbolic reassurance takes the form of the 
enactment of legislation creating a regulatory commission and 
including strong written assurances that the threat to the public 
interest will be averted. However, it is argued, the ultimate 
impact of commission policy is to distribute tangible (not 
symbolic) benefits to the regulated group (for a more recent 
application see Ackerman and Hassler, 1981). 
4. The mechanism by which public spirited regulation is 
perverted to private return will be discussed in a separate 
section. 
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Chapter 3 . ~Three-Sector Model of Policy Choice. 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to propose and examine a model 
of government regulatory policy and instrument choice . 1 The model is 
based upon the behavior of institutional actors in the decision 
process -- legislators. bureaucrats and interest groups. Each actor 
is goal-directed and each pursues his goals rationally within the 
confines established by institutions. The model is primarily 
concerned with how the interactions of these actors influence policy 
and instrument choice. 
We will first turn to the discussions of the original framers 
of the Constitution to provide a glimpse of the intended functionings 
of the institutions of choice. How the legislature has built its 
choice process upon the foundations provided in the Constitution will 
lay the groundwork for a formal development of the institutional 
structure of legislative choice. This formal development will allow 
us to establish the existence of a choice equilibrium for the 
legislature and to examine the impact of institutions on policy. 
Our attention will then turn to developing a behavioral model 
of a single legislator acting within a specified institutional 
structure. We will also examine behavioral models of interest groups 
and administrative agencies and discuss how the three institutional 
sectors interact to define policy choice. Testable propositions 
resulting from the analysis will be examined rigorously in subsequent 
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chapters. Implications for the conduct of government in America will 
be drawn and discussed later as well. 
THE MODEL 
The Institutions of Choice 
We shall be mainly concerned herein with choices of policy and 
instrument derived in part from the decision calculus of legislators. 
We shall first turn our attention to the historical origins of 
institutional arrangements. Institutional structure, often ignored by 
economic theorists of regulation, confines and influences the choices 
of legislators and hence has a dramatic impact on the legislature's 
choice of policy. We shall therefore examine the institutions of 
choice to define the ways in which the structure influences policy, a 
path which will lead to the very foundations of our political system. 
As was observed in chapter 2 theories of policy choice have 
almost universally been theories of interest group aggregation. 
Theoretical structures as diverse as Stigler's theory of economic 
regulation and Bauer, Pool and Dexter's conjectures on tariff policy 
2 development characterize policy choice as interest aggregation. This 
fact should not be surprising. 
The original intentions of the framers of the Constitution in 
defining the powers, the limits of such powers, and their intuition 
relating the exercise of legislature power to the institutional 
framework of Congress are best revealed in the Federalist papers 3 We . 
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shall return periodically to these papers in order to develop some 
insight into the operation of the federal system. Of those papers, 
numbers 10 and 51 are especially worth our notice as a prelude to 
understanding the constitutional convention's perceptions (and indeed 
the ultimate realization) of the role of Congress. An examination of 
these insights will enable us to account more explicitly for the 
impact of the institutions of choice on the development of policy. 
Such an exercise will relate the importance and uniqueness of the 
effects of the institutional structure on policy choice, which has 
generally been taken for granted or ignored entirely. 
In Federalist 10, James Madison outlined the dangers of what 
he termed "faction" and sought a cure: 
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-
constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed 
than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction ••• 
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether 
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united 
and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, 
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community. 
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: 
the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its 
effects ••• 
The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes 
of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be 
sought in the means of controlling its effects. 
Madison argues that the proposed government will allow control 
of the evils of faction and will prevent what he termed the tyranny of 
the majority, in Federalist 51 he makes explicit the guarantees of the 
new Constitution against tyranny of the majority: 
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To what expedient, then, shall we resort, for maintaining 
in practice the necessary partition of power among the several 
departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer 
that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are 
found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so 
contriving the interior structure of the government as that its 
several constituent parts may, be their mutual relations, be the 
means of keeping each other in their proper places ••• 
But it is not possible to give each department an equal 
power of self-defence. In republican government, the legislative 
authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this 
inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different 
branches; and render them, by different modes of election and 
different principles of action, as little connected with each 
other as the nature of their common functions and their common 
dependence on the society will admit ••• 
It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard 
the society against the injustice of its rulers, but to guard one 
part of the society against the injustice of the other part. 
Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of 
citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the 
rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two 
methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a 
will in the community independent of the majority-- that is, of 
society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so 
many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust 
combination of majority of the whole very improbable, if not 
impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments 
possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at 
best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent 
of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, 
as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be 
turned against both parties. The second method will be 
exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst 
all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the 
society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, 
interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of 
individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from 
interested combinations of the majority. 
These passages elaborate the framers' intentions to create a 
powerful legislature within which factions interested in public policy 
have access to decision processes. The institution of Congress was 
therefore carefully designed to enhance interest group participation 
and power in the policy process. It is not surprising therefore that 
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scholars studying the policy process characterize the choice of policy 
in terms of interest group politics. 4 Indeed many legislative studies 
have since borne witness to the fruition of the framers intentions for 
C f . 5 a ongress o 1nterests. 
Madison recognized that the policy process is framed by the 
institutions of choice. By designing an institution which offers 
legislators incentives to reconcile various conflicting interests, 
primarily by requiring frequent elections from distinct single member 
constituencies, the framers developed an institution wherein policy is 
developed through interest aggregation. 
The broad Congressional response to the institutional 
environment created by the original framers has been characterized and 
catalogued by many legislative scholars. 6 The primary response 
identified has been the establishment of formal and informal 
arrangements within the structure defined by the framers which aid in 
the attainment of the member's goals as they create public policy. 
Fiorina has posed a question and answer encompassing the general 
congressional response to their own institution: 
What should we expect from a legislative body composed of 
individuals whose first priority is their continued tenure in 
office? We should expect, first, that the normal activities of 
its members are those calculated to enhance their chances of re-
election. And we should expect, second, that the members would 
devise and maintain institu~ional arrangements which facilitate 
their electoral activities. 
For the twentieth century at least, Fiorina's electoral activities 
have been characterized by Fenno as goals consisting of the attainment 
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of "Re-election, (of) influence within the House, and (of) good public 
policy."8 
The professionalization of Congress in the twentieth century9 
is in part responsible for the primacy of the electoral motive. The 
Congress has sought institutional arrangements which serve to enhance 
the electoral activities of Congressmen. What is important to note is 
that such institutional arrangements can serve to facilitate the 
influence of actors external to Congress which are important to the 
electoral fate of Congressmen. 
Virtually since the beginning of the Union Congress has 
conducted its business through committees. The modern Congress is 
characterized by a stable system of standing committees with fixed 
jurisdictions and relatively unchanging memberships. This committee 
structure is at the heart of all congressional activities and it 
embodies the principle congressional response to the institutional 
incentives given by the Constitution.10 
Most congressional committees employ subcommittees to process 
their work, and in fact the substantive work of Congress is largely 
done in subcommittees. This fact serves to increase the number of 
access points available to interest groups to the policy process. 
Furthermore the devolution of power inherent in the present 
subcommittee system and the new rules requiring that the key positions 
of power in the subcommittees be spread among different members has 
created a Congress wherein substantive power over policy making is 
greatly diffused and the corresponding access points for interest 
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group representation are multiplied even beyond the perceptions and 
intentions of the framers. Congress has further adopted informal 
rules of behavior, norms, and formal rules of procedure and process 
which heighten this devolution of power and insures each member a 
prominent influence in the direction of policy in some substantive 
11 
area. 
That the standing committees and subcommittees of Congress are 
critical in determining the substantive impact of Congress on policy 
(and also in determining which interests will have the most access to 
the policy process) is readily evident. Representatives of bureaus 
and interest groups know this and cultivate their contacts with 
individual members and staff members on committees and subcommittees 
important to them (Dodd and Oppenheimer, 1977; Fenno, 1966, 1973a, 
1973b; Goodwin, 1970; Ornstein, 1975; Ripley, 1969; Huitt, 1973; 
Matthews, 1960; Ripley and Franklin, 1976). 
The structure of the legislative decision process is an 
important element in the attainment of the re-election, influence, or 
good public policy goals of each legislator. The reorganization of 
the House and Senate's committee structure and the new rules of 
assignment adopted in the seventies guaranteed a broader base of power 
throughout each chamber and gave each member a greater ability to 
influence policy in some substantive area. This devolution of power 
facilitates the ability of members to · achieve the goals suggested by 
Fenno as important to legislators. The choice of institutional 
arrangements and the impact of such arrangements are carefully 
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selected by legislators to their own benefit, and, naturally enough in 
association with such ends, have an impact on the choice of policy and 
instrument. 
Thus, by examining the seeds of the legislative institution 
and the fruits of such planting today we have been able to briefly 
describe how a complex institutional framework for policy decision and 
the actions of goal-directed legislators acting within this framework 
lead to a decision process which outwardly resembles a forum for 
interest group aggregation. What has further been examined is that 
the process (and therefore the policy outcomes) is institution 
specific and is not robust to changing institutional frameworks. The 
framers intended the choice of policy to be influenced by interests, 
the course of legislative development has been to heighten this effect 
and add to the influence of interest groups over policy development. 
A theory of policy and instrument choice should capture, at 
least, the important aspects of the institutions of choice and the 
interactions of institutional actors. It has been asserted here that 
these factors have a dramatic impact upon the course of policy. It 
will in turn be shown that these factors are not static nor 
untouchable in a theoretical framework. 
3.2! Model Of Legislative Choice 
Turning first to Congress, we will be concerned only with the 
re-election and policy goals described by Fenno; it will also be 
assumed that the institutional structure defined by the Constitution 
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and the congressional response to such are parameters (taken as given) 
to the individual legislator. The attainment of the member's goals 
will therefore be a function only of his/her policy and instrument 
choices (though strictly speaking the choice of structure is 
endogenous as well for the legislature, but on any given policy choice 
for the individual legislator the choice of institutional structure is 
exogenous) . 
12 The legislative decision structure outlined above can be 
captured formally in the following framework. This framework reflects 
the centrality of the committee system in the legislative decision 
process, the rules of legislative behavior, and vote aggregation. 
Shepsle13 develops a framework for legislative choice which, 
by its very structure, avoids the aggregation problems of the Arrow 
14 paradox. Shepsle termed such an equilibrium, naturally enough, a 
structurally induced equilibrium. 
As does Shepsle, let N = {1,2, ••• ,!} be a finite set of 
m legislators and X a compact, convex subset of R , where X is the 
policy choice set. 
Also define finite coverings on N, the set of legislators, and 
on the basis vectors of X, E = {e1 , ••• ,em}, where ei is the unit 
t . h . th d" t" vee or 1n t e 1 1rec 1on. 
Definition: Call the family of sets C = {C.} a 
J 
committee system if and only if it covers 




Call the family of sets J = {Jk} a 
jurisdictional arrangement if and only if 
it covers E. Each Jk e J is a subset of 
basis vectors called a jurisdiction. 
These two definitions capture the fragmentary nature of 
congressional decision-making to which Fenno referred15 and will 
enable us to capture the impact of such structural arrangements in the 
decisions on policy and instrument. These definitions describe how 
the committee system divides up labor within the legislature over 
substantive policy areas. Each committee consists of members in the 
set C. and exclusively processess policies in its jurisdiction. 
J 
Shepsle notes almost in passing that jurisdictional 
arrangements decentralize "decision-making by limiting the social 
comparisons that are permitted.nl6 What should be noted however is 
that this limitation of comparisons is the key ingredient to his proof 
of the existence of a structure-induced-equilibria. 
0 For a given status quo, p eX, and for any jurisdictional 
arrangement, 0 Jk e J, say Jk = {e1 , ••• ,ek}, p may be compared with any 




p, = {p. :p 
1 
The set of feasible proposals is 
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That is, proposed perturbations in the status guo are feasible 
if and only if the changes are contained within a single jurisdiction. 
Thus, members may submit legislation for the agenda only if it is a 
feasible proposal before the member's chamber, and committees deal 
only with legislation within their jurisdiction. 
For a given committee system C and jurisdictional arrangement 
J, define the mapping f:C-7J. In general, f is a correspondence, 
associating with each committee C. eC a set of jurisdictions in J. It 
J 
will be assumed here as in Shepsle17 that f is a single-valued 
function. Define also the correspondence g:CxX-7X. The 
correspondence g associates with each committee C.eC and status quo 
J 
p0 ex the set g(C . ,p0 ) = {peX:p=p0+~ A.e .• e.ef(C.)}. Thus for each 
J l- 1 1 1 J 
status quo point p0 • g(C . • p0 ) defines the set of changes falling 
J 
within C.'s jurisdiction. 
J 
Thus, constraints on the choices available to each committee. 
0 g(C . ,p ) for a given status quo and jurisdiction limit the comparisons 
J 
with which the committee as a decision-making unit must contend. 
Further, the parent chamber frequently retains authority to monitor 
and modify committee proposals. 
0 peg(C.,p ). 
J 
Suppose a C.eC proposes some 
J 
Definition: For any proposal peg(C . • p0 ), the set M(p)~ consists of 
J 
the modifications the parent chamber (N) may make in p. M(p) is 
said to be an amendment control rule . 18 
It should be noted here that committees acting in their 
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b' b 
oversight capacity are governed by a closed rule, M(p )=0 (where p 
b' b b is the agency's choice of policy), as long asp eg (Cj,p0 ), that is 
the committee is not required to seek a majority approval of its 
actions in its oversight capacity. 
Such a system of congressional oversight enables committee 
members to wield great influence over the course of policy chosen by 
agencies within their oversight jurisdiction. This fact adds greatly 
to the ability of committee members, especially chairmen, to pursue 
their personal goals, and similarly adds to the influence of groups 
interested in the choice of policy. 
Shepsle provided an analysis of alternative amendment control 
rules and several existence proofs of equilibrium for structures as 
defined above. Shepsle utilized the following assumptions in the 
19 
existence proofs: 
1. The preferences of each ieN on the alternative set X are 
represented by a strictly quasi-concave, continuous real-valued 
function. 
2. The committee system C = {C1 , ••• ,Ct} is arbitrary except that tsm 
3. The jurisdictional arrangement is simple, so that 
J = {{e1 },{e2 J, ••• ,{em}}, and is nonoverlapping--
f(C.) n f(C.) = 0 for all C.,C.eC. 
1 J 1 J 
4. The amendment control rule is a (not necessarily proper) subset of 
germaneness. 
As noted by Shepsle, these assumptions define an arbitrary 
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committee system consisting of committees with nonoverlapping simple 
jurisdictions. These assumptions may, in fact, be very strenuous as 
together they define a very specific and unique committee system. 
Assumptions 2 and 3 may be especially hard to support as the committee 
system in the legislature is not arbitrary and committee jurisdictions 
do, in general, overlap. However, we will make these assumptions for 
simplicity as they do not influence the results of the model to which 
this thesis is addressed. 
The existence of a structurally induced equilibrium (SIE) was 
resolved with a theorem wherein Shepsle employs a fixed-point argument 
found in Shepsle (1979) and Kramer (1972) to establish the result. 20 
The above formalization of the institutional structure of 
Congress establishes the existence of an equilibrium to the policy 
process and defines the structure of Congress in such a fashion as to 
enable us to parameterize the central characteristics of the decision 
process in a model of legislative choice. 
That such a structurally induced equilibrium can exist with a 
more specific bicameral legislature, representing more precisely the 
structure of Congress, can be readily displayed upon the proper 
definition of the informal, though enforceable, norms of behavior for 
co-operation between chambers. 21 
The theorem of Shepsle establishes the existence of a 
correspondence mapping legislative preferences to legislative 
outcomes, i.e. 
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where S is the correspondence which maps the preferences of the 
members. r. to the legislative choice, p. We shall return to this 
functional characterization in the formalization of the legislative 
choice problem. It should be noted. however. that the function S may 
not be unique valued. 
What we have shown in the previous twelve pages is that the 
Constitution established a legislative decision structure which serves 
as a forum for interest group influence in policy decision-making. 
Also. we have traced the congressional response to the Constitutional 
structure which has primarily consisted of adopting a committee format 
for processing decisions along with formal and informal rules of 
procedure and behavior to facilitate such processing. It has been 
suggested that these institutional arrangements are derived from the 
goals of congressmen and are designed to serve their purposes. Lastly 
we borrowed an organizational format from Shepsle through which we can 
formalize the institutional structure and its impact on policy. Such 
a formalization has enabled us to define a functional form for the 
impact of the institutional structure which we can now employ in a 
model of how individual legislators behave within this institution. 
This is the important contribution of the discussion of 
institutional structure. By defining how policy is to be developed 
the institutions define the outcomes of the choice process. We can 
employ (in functional form) this inherent predictability of 
legislative outcomes, arising from the institutional constraints. in 
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our discussion of legislative behavior (though at present the 
functional form developed is not unique- valued). Indeed, without 
such predictability the individual legislator would be at a loss to 
predict the influence of his/her actions on the policy outcome, and as 
such would not be in a position to choose a course of action. 
It should be remembered that the choice of policy and 
instrument are inexorably linked; we cannot describe the process by 
which one is chosen without also describing the process by which both 
are chosen. In the discussions herein the joint choice of policy and 
instrument will often be referred to as the choice of policy. This is 
for the sake of brevity, not for the exclusion of the choice of 
instrument. I will return to the choice of instrument explicitly in 
chapter 4. 
Legislative Behavior 
The model of policy choice being developed here has, as its 
premise, that the primary beneficiaries of the choice of policy and 
instrument are the members of the legislature. The legislature will 
define institutional arrangem ents which facilitate the attainment of 
their personal goals. The legislature will also provide strict 
incentives for other institutional actors who have a choice in policy 
-- mainly the bureaucracy (as we will see) 
smooth and easy pursuit of member goals. 
which enhances the 
Legislators are assumed to pursue their own continued tenure 
in office and are assumed to have preferences over the outcomes of the 
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decision process. They seek to enhance their re-election chances by 
satisfying interested factions and their local district constituents 
through their choice of policy and instrument. Interest groups and 
constituents possess resources the legislator can employ in his/her 
re-election bid. Interest groups can supply votes, campaign workers 
and campaign funds. while constituents supply votes in accordance with 
their policy preferences. 
More specifically, legislators acting within the confines of 
the institutional structure make policy and instrument choices so as 
to achieve their personal goals which we assume. as suggested by 
Fenno, are primarily their continued tenure in office and the 
attainment of good public policy. The choice of policy and instrument 
affects the attainment of such goals through different mechanisms, and 
we will examine a few. 
The paramount concerns for the legislator in achieving re-
election are first, the characteristics of his/her district and how 
his/her choice of policy matches the aspirations and preferences of 
his/her constituents back home. Assuming we can apply the median 
voter hypothesis22 and ignoring the voters' aggregation problems. 23 
the legislator could increase his/her electoral chances if his/her 
choice of policy more closely matched the preferences of the median 
voter for his/her district. 
Second, the characteristics and preferences of groups active 
in the policy debate influence our legislator's chances of achieving 
re-election. As we discussed, the framers established and Congress 
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embraced institutional structures which enhanced the influence of 
interest groups and in so doing magnified these interest groups' 
influence in the electoral chances of the legislators. The committee 
assignments, and committee jurisdictions for the legislature along 
with the preferences of the interest groups determine which groups are 
relevant to which legislators' electoral chances and vice-versa. That 
the preferences of these groups and their corresponding promises of 
electoral reward or punishment weigh heavily in the legislator's 
decision calculus should not, therefore, be surprising. 
Th . d h b d t f 11 b F. . 24 h 1r , as as een argue mos power u y y 10r1na, ot er 
activities of our legislator which are related to the choices of 
policy and instrument have a strong impact on his/her electoral fate. 
Such activities as casework -- intervening on the behalf of a 
constituent or interest group in the decision process of an 
administrative agency -- provide generally non-controversial 
techniques for increasing popularity. Instruments employed to 
implement policy choices vary in the degree to which they allow 
congressional intervention in the decision processes of the agency. 
Inasmuch , such 'flexible' regulatory instruments will be cherished 
over other, less 'flexible', instruments. 
This casework component of legislative policy making has been 
examined only recently, with a primary focus on the electoral 
connection (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1979a, 1979b; Fenno, 1978; 
Fiorina , 1977a; Mayhew, 1974; Parker and Davidson, 1979) and with a 
secondary focus on policy consequences (see mainly Fiorina, 1977a, 
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1982; and Fiorina and Noll, 1978, 1979a, 1979b). However, it is this 
secondary focus which is of concern here. Casework on the behalf of 
interest groups adversely affected by the actions of an administrative 
agency can enhance the electoral chances of the diligent congressman. 
The importance of such casework is reflected in the amount of personal 
time devoted by the congressman to such activity. Constituent 
casework may be the primary mission of the congressman's staff but the 
grievences of organized and important interests are the personal 
concern of the congressman. We shall construe casework or 
facilitation, then, to be with regard to interest groups herewith. 
The flexibility, or rather the accessibility for intervention, 
of the instrument is, therefore, of concern to the legislator. 
Command and control instruments implement the policy choice of the 
legislature on a case-by-case basis25 (see Stewart, 1975 and Breyer, 
1982). Each source of pollution is regulated independently, each new 
chemical is tested independently, each trucking route is assigned 
individually and prices set on a case-by-case basis. Thus, of the 
instruments categorized in chapter 1, the casework (facilitation) 
opportunities are generally greatest (all else equal) for command and 
control instruments which require the largest administrative machinery 
and are, in general, applied on a case by case basis which allows for 
numerous case by case interventions on the behalf of injured parties 
by the congressman. Other policy implementation techniques such as 
market incentives and information provisions are generally applied 
non-discriminately and often do not enhance the casework activity of 
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the legislator to as great a degree. The warning labels on cigarette 
packages are uniform for all cigarettes and not set individually by 
brand or manufacturer. the requirements of ingredient disclosure on 
packaged foods and over-the-counter drugs is applied uniformly for all 
such commodities and not individually for each. 
Therefore the facilitation opportunities for the congressman 
are maximized if the policy choice is implemented through a command 
and control instrument. The congressman's choice of instrument is 
influenced as well by the preferences of the interest groups involved 
and the electoral reward forthcoming from pleasing such interests. 
Other factors such as Constitutional feasibility and the structure of 
the group environment serve to mitigate this ceterus parabis 
preference for command and control instruments. 
The legislator is therefore assumed to pursue two substantive 
goals through his/her choice of policy guidelines and instrument for a 
given policy debate. his/her continued tenure in office and good 
public policy. The pursuit of these goals is influenced by the 
actions of other legislators. interest groups. and administrative 
agencies. and is subject to constraints defined by resources. 
constituency characteristics. and the institutional structure and 
arrangements of the legislature. 
The legislature chooses policy guidelines p and instrument 
guidelines q from the space of policy attributes X ~ ~ and from the 
space of instrument levels Y ~ R1• These represent the boundaries of 
action on each attribute or issue in the policy space for the 
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bureaucracy in its administration of the program mandated in the 
choice of p. 
It should be noted, to provide a context for the legislative 
choice, that the agency may choose any combination of attributes and 
issues of the mandated policy, p, for which to act upon, pb (thus, Xb 
the policy space for the agency is a subset of X). The choice of 
policy by the agency is therefore constrained by the guidelines chosen 
by the legislature; however, the agency does have a latitude of action 
within the boundaries established by the mandate of Congress. 
We are now in a position to pursue the development of the 
legislative sector of the 3 sector equilibrium model. Assume our 
legislator has a well defined utility function, ui, over his/her 
probability of being re-elected, PROBi, and over the legislature 
choice of policy, POLICYi (i.e . ui is continuous and twice 
differentiable in probability of re-election and policy as well as 
being strictly concave in each argument). This utility will be 
maximized for a given policy debate, as described in the above 
discussion, over choices of policy guidelines, p., and instruments to 
1 
implement the chosen policy qi. 
An implicit functional form for the probability of re-election 
for legislator i, given his/her choices of policy and instrument, pi 
and q., which captures the three influences; his/her district's 
1 
preferences, facilitation opportunities (casework) available prior to 
next election, and campaign assistance forthcoming from interest 
groups (these 'rents' acquired from lobbying groups can be positive or 
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negative) -- can be characterized in the following fashion: 
i PROB (p. ,q . ) 
1 1 
i i i m 
= PROB (IUNTS (p.,q.),FO (q.),d(p.,p.)) 
1 1 1 1 1 
i 
where RENTS (p.,q . ) represents the general resources which interest 
1 1 
groups promise the legislator corresponding to the legislator's 
choices of policy, p., and instrument, q .• RENTSi can be defined more 
1 1 
explicitly as the sum of rents collected from all groups j for choices 






L .. • J1 
As will be detailed shortly RENTSi is concave downward, continuous and 
twice differentiable in p . and q. (as well as ~ . . the interest groups 
1 1 J 1 
cost of providing one unit of lobbying L . . to legislator i). 
J1 










/ I \ 
at x .• 
1 
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In figure 1 the rents collected by legislator i are maximized 
The characterization of RENTSi as concave downward26 
implicitly assumes a unique xi for each choice of pi. The existence 
and characteristics of this function are determined from the 
aggregation of individual lobbying functions, L . . , which will be 
J1 
discussed in the section on interest groups. 
Returning to the characterization of PROBi, FOi represents 
legislator i's perception of his/her anticipated future rents from 
casework activities (facilitation opportunities), for a given policy, 
given the instrument chosen to implement the policy, q. Recall that 
it is assumed that command and control variety instruments provide the 
maximum opportunities for such activity reflecting the case-by-case 
nature of the instrument. 
The relevant preferences of the legislator's home electoral 
district are captured (again assuming the median voter hypothesis and 
assuming that an equilibrium to the district's voting game exist) by 
the term, d(p . ,p~) where d(-) represents the Euclidean distance 
1 1 
between the legislator's choice of policy, p., and the median voter's 
1 
m preferences, p., for his/her district. 
1 
Constituency impact on the behavior of legislators has been 
suggested to fall into two broad categories. First, there are those 
instances in which the interests of the district are explicitly 
articulated (or, more likely, a few specific individual or corporate 
constituents) to the legislator, in which instance this articulation 
has strong influence on the legislator's policy stance (LeLoup, 1977). 
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The second concerns instances where the district's interests are not 
explicitly articulated and reside principally in the legislator's 
mind. The legislator thinks that representing constituents is 
important and therefore attempts, usually by intuition rather than by 
data collection, to reflect the opinion of the constituency on a given 
issue or to hypothesize what the constituency would favor if it were 
asked to voice an opinion (Clapp, 1963; Cnudde and McCrone, 1966; 
Fiorina, 1975; Davidson, 1969). In either case, as discussed above, 
the legislator will be assumed to know the preferences of his 
electoral constituency and to know more specifically the ideal point 
of the median voter P~. for his constituency. 
1 
The probability of re-election, PROBi, is strictly concave, 
continuous and twice differentiable in RENTSi, FOi and d(-). This 
captures the implicit tradeoffs available to the legislator between 
pleasing interested lobbying groups and his/her electoral constituency 
through choice of policy. The formulation further captures the 
implicit tradeoffs available to the legislator between satisfaction of 
interest group preferences and the availability of facilitation rents 
derived through choice of particular instruments. 
Recalling the discussion of the institutional constraints upon 
choice of policy and instrument by the legislature, the 
characterization of the institutional structure and arrangements by 
Shepsle, as outlined previously, enables us to define a constraint set 
for the choice of policy by our legislator. Define the set P as this 
constraint set, where P is a function of the committee assignments C, 
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the jurisdictional arrangement for such committees, J, and the 
amendment control rules for legislative action, A. 
for legislator i is therefore confined to P, 
' 
pie P(C,J,A). 
The choice of p. 
1 
The earlier discussion established the existence of s:r-?p. 
We would like, however, to define the properties of S in order that we 
can employ this functional relationship in the development of our 
legislative model. If we view the legislature as defining an !-person 
voting game then an application of Kramer's sophisticated voting 
theorem27 can enable us to establish the properties of S. 
There is a set, A, of bills on the legislative agenda each of 
which has m-many opportunities to appear on the floor in some 
manifestation (this is constrained, of course, by the institutional 
structure, as discussed earlier). We can therefore define a set B = 
{1,2, ••• ,b} of bills which will at some time arise before the 
legislature. 
We have already made explicit that each legislator is assumed 
to have well-defined preferences for various outcomes that can be 
represented by an ordinal utility function ui (assumption I in the 
definition of S). The !-person game suggested above can be 
represented in extensive form by a tree, each of whose nodes 
represents the divisions on a particular bill, given result of earlier 
votes. A strategy for legislator i is a prescription of how to vote 
in each of the possible divisions (nodes) in order to achieve his 
62 
preferred outcome. 
Kramer (1972) defines a 'sophisticated' voting strategy in the 
following manner. First, by defining an admissible strategy, 
"formally, a strategy is admissible if there is no other strategy 
providing 
(i) in all contingencies an outcome at least as good; 
( ii) in some contingency a better outcome, where a contingency is 
"some combination of strategies of all voters but one". 
Kramer goes on to define, 
"A strategy is primarily admissible if there is no other strategy 
which produces at least as good a result in every contingency, and a better 
result in some contingency. 
A strategy is secondarily admissible if, on the assumption that all 
other players use only "m-arily" admissible strategies, it produces at least 
as good a result in every contingency, and a better result in some 
contingency. 
In general, a strategy is m-arily admissible on the assumption that 
all other players use only (m-1)-arily admissible strategies. tt28 
A sophisticated strategy is then an m-arily admissible 
strategy for all m<~. 
We need to also make the following assumptions on voter 
29 preferences 
Assumption I. Each voter's utility function is quasi-concave 
on A. i i i i That is, if U (x) L U (y) then U (tx+(l-t)y) ) U (y) for all 0 
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< t < 1. 
Assumption II. Each voter's utility function is additive. 
That is, i i i for each U there exist functions u1 , ••• ,Um such that at any 
feasible point x = (x1 ,x2 , ••• ,xm), 
+ ••• + i U (x ) • 
m 
As noted by Kramer this assumes that the legislator's 
preferences with respect to the various issues are separable from one 
another (we will make a similar assumption with regard to group and 
agency preferences). It should be noted that this assumes that the 
functions (to be defined later) which define the legislators' 
decision-calculi, POLICY and PROB, are therefore seperable as well. 
Given that the policy process described above satisfies 
Farquharson's axioms (see Farquharson, 1969 or Kramer, 1972), and the 
alternative space (as shown earlier) is compact, strictly convex and 
non-empty, then by a proof in Kramer (1972) we know that a 
sophisticated voting equilibrium exists for the process described. 
Lastly, we will assume that legislators are not indifferent between 
outcomes, as this will insure that the equilibrium not only exists but 
is unique (Kramer, 1972). More to the point, the characterization of 
the equilibrium as developed by Kramer is that the equilibrium point, 
x, will be the multi-dimensional median of the preferences of the 
legislators. 
As characterized, since we know that a unique equilibrium 
exists and is characterized as the multi-dimensional median, it is 
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easily established that the function S is therefore continuous (and of 
course trivially strictly convex). 
Proof: Suppose that S is not continuous. Then there exists a 
set of preferences such that a change in preferences by a member 
causes a discontinuous jump in the equilibrium (median), i.e. that for 
e>O there is not a o>O satisfying (c). 
Define S as follows: 
S: X e Rn -7 X* 
S(x*eRn:num(x.>x*)) = num(x.<x*.) for all i = 1 1- 1- 1 ••••• n. 
If a change from x to p is such that the median f(p) = f{x) then the 
function f is trivially continuous for such moves, i.e. 
d(x.p) < o-7 d(f(x).f(p)) 0 < e. for all e. 
If a change from x to p changes the median then, by definition of the 
median 
d(x.p) < o-7 d(f(x).f(p)) < 0 
and since this is true for all o>O then for all e>O(e=O) there exists 
o>O such that 
d(f(x),f(p)) < e = o whenever d(x,p) < o. 
Therefore no change in x(preferences) generates a discontinuity in 
S(x), the equilibrium. QED.30 
It has therefore been established that there exists a unique, 
continuous and strictly convex valued function S which maps induced 




The derivation and characterization of the function S which 
maps induced preferences to legislative outcomes was a necessary step 
in defining the objective functions of each actor in the three sector 
model. Each actor must possess a knowledge of how his/her actions 
will affect the outcome of the policy debate, as each actor is assumed 
to possess preferences over such outcomes. Deriving and defining the 
mapping from induced legislative preferences to legislative outcomes 
is a necessary first step to the construction of a function which maps 
initial preferences of legislators and the lobbying strategies of 
interest groups to the policy outcome of the legislature. 
Define a function, L, which maps the initial preferences of 
the legislature, rD, to the lobby-induced preferences {policy choices) 
of the legislature, r. An argument similar to the sophisticated 
voting equilibrium just discussed can be given wherein lobbying groups 
choose m-arily admissible lobbying strategies given their knowledge of 
S and define a sophisticated lobbying equilibrium from which we could 
establish the existence of L and derive its characteristics. However, 
such an argument, at this juncture, would indeed stray us too far 
afield from defining the model of legislative behavior. We need 
merely to outline the impact of lobbying behavior here and we will 
return to the problem of lobbying choice by interest groups in the 
next section. And thus without loss of generality, L will be assumed 
to exist and to be continuous 'and strictly convex. 
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A composite function, POLICY, which maps initial preferences 
of the legislature to the policy outcome for the policy debate, can be 
constructed as a composition of L, the function which maps the initial 
preferences of the legislature, rD. to the lobby-induced preferences, 
r and s. the function constructed earlier which maps legislative 
preferences, r. to a legislative outcome, p. 
POLICY :rD -7p. 
Assuming that the legislator possesses knowledge of the 
reaction functions of his/her collegues in the legislature, and of the 
implicit lobbying supply functions of groups, we can employ POLICY to 
examine how changes in a legislator's choice will affect the aggregate 
policy choice. Each legislator (and indeed each interest group) can 
therefore predict the effects of his/her actions on the behavior of 
all other actors and in aggregate on the policy (and instrument) 
choice of the legislature. 
Having thus assumed that each legislator possesses knowledge 
of the reaction functions for all other legislators and all interest 
groups, we can rewrite the equation for RENTS more explicitly, 
RENTSi \ L .. (r,fL .,B. ]L[) L. Jl Jl J• 
J 
where, 
r is the matrix of initial preferences 
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~-. is the cost of providing one unit of lobbying J1 
activity to legislator i by group j 
B . is the budget for lobbying activity for group j 
J 
(~ .. and B. will be discussed in the section 
J 1 J 
on group behavior), and 
]L[ is the matrix of lobbying activity of all other groups k, 
kf:j. 
The function POLICY can be written as an implicit function of 
institutional parameters and the policy and lobbying choices which 
define it, 
where 
POLICYi (p. : Jr[,L, J, C, A) 
1 
Jr[ is the matrix of policy choices of all legislators k, 
kf: j, and 
L is the matrix of lobbying strategies for all groups j. 
The problem for the legislator can now be written explicitly. 
Each legislator i is assumed to be acting as if he/she were 
with 
MAXIMIZING Ui(PROB, POLICY) 





where P is the constraint set for the choice of policy, as defined 
earlier, and Q is the constraint set for the choice of instrument for 
a given policy, Pi. This constraint set is defined by the 
characteristics of pi and the feasible (Constitutional, etc.) methods 
of implementing pi. 
This formulation captures the image of legislative behavior as 
depicted by Fenno and the institutional influences as described 
earlier. The model constructed is of "smart" legislators, i.e they 
choose policies and instruments in accordance with their goals and 
with knowledge of how their choices influence the legislative outcome. 
An equilibrium for the policy choice game in the legislature was 
characterized to enable us to not only define the legislative 
objective function(s) but to account for the impact of the 
institutional structure on policy. 
In sum, the individual legislator's choice of policy was 
described as being influenced by the preferences of the individual 
legislator for the policy outcome of the legislature and by how such a 
policy position affects his/her probability of achieving re-election. 
The legislator's probability of being re-elected (for the choice of 
policy) reflects the influence of organized interest groups and 
his/her electoral constituency on his/her electoral chances. The 
choice of instrument was described as being determined only by its 
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impact on the individual legislator's probability of achieving re-
election. This probability (for instrument choice) reflects the 
electoral benefits obtained from interest groups and the potential 
electoral benefits of casework activity for the given choice of 
instrument for the individual legislator. 
We shall turn our attention now to constructing models of 
interest group and administrative agency behavior before discussing 
the equilibrium of the three sector game, or the propositions on 
choice derivable from such a framework. 
3.3 Interest Group Choice Model 
The literature on interest group behavior is quite diverse in 
approach and widely varied in both content and focus (Bacheller, 1977; 
Bailey, 1950; Barber, 1965; Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 1963; Bernstein, 
1955; Berry, 1977; Buchanen and Tullock, 1962; Cochran, 1974; Cobb and 
Elder, 1972; Davidson, 1969; Dexter, 1969; Frolich, Oppenheimer and 
Young, 1971; Froman, 1963; Key, 1964; Kingdon, 1973; Lowi, 1969; 
Oppenheimer, 1974; Riker, 1962; Riker and Ordeshook, 1973; Rourke, 
1969; Schattschneider, 1960 and Wilson, 1973, 1980).31 However, each 
study reflects the common premise originally discussed by Madison 
(with the possible exception of Bentley, 1967), that interest groups 
are inevitably selfish and narrow, and that the emergence of interests 
resulted from human nature. 
Bentley (1967) perceived that government and policy were 
merely the result of the interactions of groups within the government 
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and outside government and that society was nothing more than as 
aggregation of groups. 
Truman (1971) in this tradition described the institutions of 
government and society as aggregations of groups, and saw individual 
citizens in terms of their group identification and membership. He 
pointed out that an individual is normally a member of several groups, 
and that this overlapping membership helps to control what Madison 
termed the "mischiefs of faction". In his political analysis of 
interest groups in the policy process, he focused on the importance of 
groups and of their access to political decision making. 
Schattschneider's study on tariff policy 32 returned to the 
premise of Madison, that the effects of faction were indeed evil. In 
his study of the tariff, he observed that groups able to afford and to 
maintain full-time experienced lobbyists in Washington had great 
advantages in influencing Congress. He noted that groups achieved 
access (a notion similar to Truman) through campaign contributions and 
"inside" connections. Schattschneider felt this pattern of influence 
badly distorted the process of representation, and attacked the 
operation of groups in the American political process on the basis of 
what he regarded as a profound upper-class bias and a distortion by 
groups of the public interest. 
Olson (1965) developed a theory concerned with the decisions 
of individuals about whether or not to join a given interest group. 
The free-rider problems discus.sed by 01 son preclude successful 
collective action except by very small and single-minded groups such 
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as trade associations. Although the problem of collective action has 
since been elaborated upon and is of general interest, I shall 
henceforth ignore the problems associated with the rise of groups and 
simply assume the groups exist and possess appropriate characteristics 
(to be discussed). 33 
A few general conclusions can be garnered from the literature 
outlined briefly above which will enable us to develop a model of 
group behavior for our discussion of policy and instrument choice. As 
suggested by Schattschneider, and reaffirmed by Olson, most of the 
active organized groups that lobby the government represent very 
narrow segments of society with highly focused interests. The few 
groups that represent more general interests tend to have memberships 
that encompass only a small portion of their theoretically potential 
constituencies. 
There exist many different types of interest groups -- ranging 
from the large and well-financed to the miniscule and impoverished 
employing many types of lobbyists -- ranging from full-time 
professionals to occasional amateurs. This collection of interest 
groups is not static. As issues and social and economic conditions 
change, the configuration of active and influential groups also 
changes. Further, the characteristics of each group change with the 
change in exogenous conditions and in response to changes in the 
legislature (as we suggested earlier). 
Table 2 summarizes the number, types and changes of lobbying 
organizations registered with the Clerk of the House to lobby in 
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Congress in 1951, 1961, 1971 and 1981. This captures the dynamic 
nature of the group environment, the variety of lobbying groups and 
the numerical predominance of business interests . 
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TABLE 2 
Lobbying Group Registrations: 1970-1980 
Number of Registrations by Year 
Type of Group 
Business Groups 
Citizens Groups 
Employee and Labor Groups 
Farm Groups 
Foreign Groups 



















There are several general features that characterize almost 
all lobbying activity. First, it should be stressed that the 
lobbyists' major task, according to Bauer, Pool and Dexter (1963), is 
mobilization of those who already believe rather than conversion of 
the infidels. Lobbyists seek out legislators whom they have 
identified as supporters and work to reinforce their views. 
As suggested by Schattschneider, interest groups may find that 
a particularly successful lobbying technique is to provide members of 
Congress the large amounts of funds necessary to retain a seat. In 
1974 interest groups gave $12.5 million to congressional campaigns, 
and in 1976 they gave $22.5 million. Though the provision of money 
for campaigns is the most important election-time service rendered by 
groups to friendly legislators, they can also be helpful by conducting 
registration drives and by providing campaign workers and campaign 
literature. 
Formally, we capture the essence of the literature on group 
behavior by assuming interest groups seek to maximize their own 
selfish net benefit34 from public policy. The groups achieve this 
maximization by choosing a lobbying strategy in the legislature 
subject to their budget constraint for such activity and the influence 
of the institutional structure. Such a characterization of interest 
groups, naturally enough, implicitly assumes that constituent members 
belong to one and only one group. 
We have constructed the function POLICY for each legislator 
and we can do so in a similar fashion for each interest group. 
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Similarly, we can construct a function INSTRUMENT for each group which 
is a well-behaved function of lobbying activity as well. This, again, 
implicitly assumes that the group is a 'smart' group possessing 
knowledge of each other actors reaction functions. 
As will be discussed shortly, the policy and instrument 
equilibrium for the agency (and the associated mapping functions) are 
readily characterized. The composition of these functions with the 
POLICY and INSTRU~ffiNT functions defined above yield the mapping 
functions we shall employ in the specification of group behavior. For 
expository ease let us call these mappings POLICYj and INSTRUMENTj for 
each group j. 
Interest groups, as indicated above, possess various points of 
access to the legislative policy process. These access points are a 
function of the institutional arrangements of the legislature (the 
committee assignments and jurisdictions) and the characteristics of 
the group (its size, wealth, scope, homogeneity of preferences, and 
its preferences). Each access point, according to its position within 
the institutional structure, provides a differing level of influence 
to the policy process and also defines the costs of lobbying for the 
group. 
It will be assumed that the cost of lobbying for a group at 
its access point is lower than at any other point(s) (i.e. the cost 
of providing one unit of lobbying is lower there than elsewhere). The 
influence provided to the group through its access in the policy 
process is implicitly accounted for in the equilibrium mapping 
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functions POLICY and INSTRUMENT. 
Define ~-. as the cost to group j of providing one unit of J1 
lobbying to legislator i. ~ -. is a function of the access of the J1 
group. Define B . as the groups lobby ing budget, and L . as the vector 
J J 
of lobbying provided. Let L .. be the specific amount of lobbying 
J1 
provided legislator i by group j. 
Let NBj be the implicit net benefit for the group of public 
policy as represented by the functions POLICYj and INSTRUMENTj. 
Therefore each group j, je[O, ••• ,J], is assumed to be acting as if it 
were 




SUBJECT TO ~jLj ~ Bj. 
Assume further that NBj is strictly concave in L., continuous 
J 
and twice differentiable. Also assume that the budget constraint is 
convex in L., continuous and twice differentiable. It should be noted 
J 
that tha assumption that NBj is strictly concave is a mathematical 
convenience. We could in fact consider single dimension interest 
groups which adopt corner (ali-or-nothing) solutions as policy 
objectives in the context of the model, however, for expository ease 
we shall assume that all groups are willing to make tradeoffs between 
policy preferences. 
It should be noted that these assumptions imply that RENTS are 
convex in ~ and twice differentiable, and that it can be shown that 
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RENTS are strictly concave and well-behaved in B. Lastly the 
assumptions imply unique maximizing points L' ., exist (and we will 
J 
• • assume that groups have bliss points p. and q . over policy and 
J J 
instrument). 
Of particular interest to the development of a model of 
regulatory instrument choice are interest groups in the form of 
business associations. Such associations represent an important 
influence upon the regulatory choice, as the members of such 
associations, generally profit-maximizing firms, are the frequent 
targets of federal regulation. Because constituent firms possess a 
readily identifiable stake in the regulatory choice profitability, the 
impacts of regulation are therefore more easily discernible and open 
to analysis. 
The activities of a firm which are subject to regulation can 
be categorized into four stages; pre-production and development, 
production, distribution, marketing and sales. The scope of such 
regulation may be industry- specific, or may extend beyond the 
parameters of a specific industry and affect the behavior of all firms 
in the economy. 
Business associations are generally composed of loosely 
affiliated firms which are engaged in similar economic pursuits and 
thus share similar interests with regard to governmental regulation. 
Trade associations such as the National Association of Manufacturers, 
the National Coal Policy Conference, and the American Farm Bureau 
Federation seek their members' joint benefit through their lobbying 
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activity in Congress. 
Firms, through their choices of lobbying activity, seek to 
maximize their net profits (benefits) from the governmental choice of 
regulation subject to their production technology and lobbying budget. 
If the regulation affects the production choices of the firm and there 
does not exist perfect homogeneity of production technologies for 
firms in the regulated industry, the regulatory instrument used to 
implement the regulatory policy may induce changes in the relative 
prices for firms in the industry. A redistribution of wealth may 
therefore result. Further, general equilibrium price distortions may 
result because the relative prices between industries (and their 
constituent firms) may be changed, thereby increasing further the 
redistribution of wealth. On the other hand, if all firms within an 
industry possess a uniform production technology then regulation of 
the firms' production choices may indeed be price distortion free. 
The market structure of the industry to be regulated and the 
stage(s) of firm behavior to be regulated therefore induce preferences 
for the firm over the instrument choice. Such preferences influence 
the legislative choice of regulatory instruments. 
Regulation can therefore be preceived as altering the 
profitability of the firms in the industry and may induce changes in 
demand and factor employment in a similar manner. It should be noted 
here that regulation can affect such changes in profitability and 
factor employment without affecting relative prices. 
In sum, interest groups are assumed to possess preferences 
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over policy and instrument choices and lobby to their benefit to 
attain their preferences. Business associations, representing 
affiliated firms, are an important variety of interest group in the 
regulatory choice. The net profitability for such firms from a 
regulation, and thus the firms' preferences over instrument choices, 
is shaped by the stage of firm activity to be regulated and the 
structure of the market within which the firm competes. 
3.4 ~Model of Administrative Agency Choice Under Uncertainty 
Joskow suggests a model of administrative agency behavior 
wherein agencies operating under a considerable degree of flexibility 
of discretion, "seek to minimize conflict and criticism appearing as 
'signals' from the economic and social environment in which they 
operate, subject to binding legal and procedural constraints imposed 
by the legislature and the courts. The agencies' organizational 
structure, regulatory instruments, and operating procedures are chosen 
so as to achieve this goal".35 
These "signals", according to Joskow, come from actors such as 
consumers, public interest groups, and politicians pursuing their 
interests. In minimizing conflict, the agency achieves an equilibrium 
"which satisfactorily balances the conflicting pressures from the 
external environment" and exhibits "a well established organizational 
structure and regulatory procedures and instruments that are well 
defined and used repetitively and predictability".36 
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As indicated earlier, models of administrative agency behavior 
typically assume the regulator to be the top official in a regulatory 
organization (the administrator or commissioner), who in his/her basic 
preferences is similar to other bureaucrats. The behavior of the 
regulator is then determined by the constraints of the organizational 
setting and his/her reward opportunities, which he/she pursues 
rationally. We will continue in this tradition, modelling the 
administrator/commissioner in a fashion similar to Joskow (see also 
Dodd and Schott, 1979). However, the approach we employ has 
implications for the organization of administrative agencies as well. 
General models of bureaucratic behavior with a similar focus 
have been developed by Downs(1967), Tullock(1965) and Niskanen(1971, 
1975) which we discussed earlier, and variations of this general 
framework have been applied to the study of regulatory structure 
and/or choice (DeAlessi, 1974; Eckert, 1973; Hilton, 1972; Noll, 1971; 
Noll, Peck and McGowan, 1973) 
Congress' domination of the bureaucracy can be summarized 
through an examination of the Constitutional powers granted Congress 
(Dodd and Schott, 1979). Congress may create or destroy agencies, and 
it determines whether the agency is to be located in the executive 
branch or is to be independent of it. The latter is one of the key 
powers of Congress regarding administrative organization, for it 
enables it to create a highly autonomous bureaucracy. In addition, 
Congress has the power of the purse, and in this way it exercises its 
main control over the administrative branch. Congress has the power 
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to define exactly what the agency may or may not do. Finally, the 
Constitution gives Congress the power to assist in certain 
presidential appointments. Thus Congress has virtually complete 
authority to structure the administrative branch and determine where 
formal lines of accountability shall be placed. 
Much of the time however, most members of Congress have strong 
incentives to get along with the various parts of the federal 
bureaucracy. But conflict does occur. When conflict occurs the 
harshest punishment Congress can administer in settling the problem is 
to dismantle an existing program. For example, Congress dismantled 
the Area Redevelopment Administration (ARA) in 1963, even though it 
had only been authorized in 1961. The ARA was encouraging industries 
to relocate in redevelopment areas despite clear provisions in the law 
to the contrary. In the eyes of those congressmen from districts 
losing such industries, the ARA was engaging in "piracy" (Ripley, 
1972). Congress can also redefine the jurisdictional authority of a 
regulatory agency so that it no longer has the power to make annoying 
decisions in a particular area. , This was the case with the Federal 
Trade Commission when it first sought to regulate cigarette 
advertising, children's television, and funeral homes. 
Returning to our model of agency behavior, agency personnel, 
whether political appointees or civil servants, are assumed to be 
goal-directed people choosing courses of action under a substantial 
amount of uncertainty. The agency is surrounded by other 
organizations-- the Congress, groups, the executive and the courts--
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that can affect the abilities of agency members to attain their goals. 
Agency members and, collectively, the agency itself will therefore 
engage in activities designed to reduce the conflict generated by its 
policy decisions. 
As described by Ferejohn, 
The most important characteristic of agency environments is 
that they are structured by the nature of American constitutional 
government. Agencies are assembled and given legislatively 
defined missions through the normal legislative processes and 
they must return to Congress, the OMB and the President for 
reauthorization and appropriations at periodic intervals. And 
since the Congress, in particular, is designed to be fairly 
sensitive to organized interests those groups inside or outside 
the government which may be adversely affected by the proposed 
activities of an agency will generally have access to various 
congressional bodies which can affect the operation of the 
agency ••• 
The general point is that every agency is located in a 
context that permits the appeal of specific agency decisions by a 
variety of parties and that, in some cases, the very existence of 
the agency itself can be called into question by certain groups. 
For this reason if an agency head wishes to achieve programmatic 
or personal goals he or she must be aware or the neces;ity of 
maintaining the capacity to make effective decisions.' 
The administrator is assumed to align his/her preferences with 
those of the agency. The administrator seeks to formulate policy but 
with a realization that groups external to the agency will be affected 
by such actions and will seek a redress of such effects in Congress. 
Influential groups in the agency's environment are those with a voice 
in the agency's oversight committee, but other groups possess 
influence as well. The administrator recognizes the power of such 
groups and takes their preferences into account. 
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The administrator's preferences over agency policy, pb, are 
assumed to be representable by a utility function, Ub. The 
administrator is further assumed to know the preferences of the groups 
• in his/her environment (and their bliss points p . ) and assigns 
J 
weights, w., to each in accordance with their potential influence over 
J 
agency policy. 
Ferejohn, in discussing the structural/organization responses 
38 
of administrative agencies , proposes a relation between the 
external influences to the agency, discussed above, and the 
informational responses of the agency. Ferejohn hypothesizes that the 
agency will structure its decision making process so as to encourage 
the access of groups interested in the policy in question. This 
structure will enable the administrator to define accurately the 
• groups' preferences, p. and the weights to assign to each, w .• This 
J J 
informational structure enables the administrator to anticipate the 
amount of potential conflict to the agency's policy and instrument 
choices and thus enables the administrator to reduce such conflict and 
its adverse effects on the agency's fortune. 
Define the conflict, V, anticipated by the administrator over 
a choice of agency policy, pb, and instrument, qb, as a function of 
the sum of the weighted differences of the changes in net benefits for 
each group in the agency's environment, 
where 
V = V(I wj[NBj(pb,qb) 
J 
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V is the conflict anticipated for each choice of pb 
and qb and 
Po·~ is the status guo before agency action. 
The anticipated conflict function, V, is assumed to be increasing and 
well-behaved so that the function is increasing in the weighted sum of 
differences of the groups' net benefits. 
Define the probability that the agency's choice of policy and 
instrument will not be nullified as 
b b pr = pr (V,9). 
The probability pr is increasing and well-behaved in V and is a 
function of the actions of the courts, taken as the random variable, 
9. This probability is determined, in part, by the policy and 
instrument status quo, p0 and q0 • These status quo points reflect the 
most recent choices of the agency and the legislature over policy and 
instrument. 
The administrator is constrained in his/her policy and 
instrument choice by the guidelines imposed in the legislative 
mandate. Formally, 
b pb e p (p) 
qb e Qb(q) 
where p and q are the policy and instrument choices of the 
legislature. Pb is the constraint set for the agency choice over 
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policy, similar to the constraint set defined earlier for the 
legislative choice. The agency's choice of policy is constrained by 
the policy mandate, p, chosen by the legislature. Qb is similarly the 
constraint set on the agency's choice of instrument.39 
That the ability of an agency to choose one or the other 
method of implementing policy may be tightly circumscribed by its 
statutory authorization and by the law governing the area is well 
understood. Changes in the interpretation of the authorizing 
legislation or in more general areas of law by the courts have indeed 
changed the ability of agencies to select certain instruments to 
implement policy. 
The administrator is further constrained in the choice of 
policy and instrument in that the cost of administering the choice 
pair, COSTb(pb,qb), must not exceed the budget for administration 
b granted the agency by Congress, BUDGET • This budget is a function of 
how well the agency averts conflict relative to its choice pair: 
The power of the purse is the primary resource Congress 
possesses for the oversight of bureaucratic behavior. Groups 
antagonized by an agency's actions will seek a redress of grievances 
with the proper oversight committee. As such, the amount of conflict 
generated from an agency's decisions will influence the determination 
of the agency's budget. 
The agency administrator is therefore assumed to act as if 
he/she were an expected utility maximizer where the expectation is 
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over the actions of courts, 
MAXIMIZE EUb = prb(V,9)Ub(pb,qb) + b(V, b [1- pr 9)]. u (p0 ,~> 
b b SUBJECT TO COST (pb, qb) S. BUDGET • 
b b SUBJECT TO pbeP (p) and qbeQ (p). 
The above model of agency behavior captures the influence of 
the agency's environment on its choice of policy and instrument. This 
expected-utility model of agency behavior will enable us to define 
refutable hypotheses concerning instrument choice by agencies and 
complete the three sector equilibrium model of policy and instrument 
choice. 
3 .S Summary 
We have sought to develop a model which captures the important 
elements of instrument and policy choice in a workable framework for 
discussion. The three sector model provides such a framework. It was 
presented in such a fashion as to coordinate the often loosely 
associated current trends of thought on policy choice and to provide a 
description of the policy process. The description provided a 
behavioral framework with which to examine instrument choice, though 
as suggested, the model necessarily captures the choice of policy as 
well. 
In that the presentation and development of the model 
organized and summarized the diverse literature on policy choice and 
explicitly identified the often ignored relationships between the 
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various organizations and actors which influence policy choice, the 
modelling was a worthwhile task. That the model provides an 
explanation of such choice, in a fashion which addresses several 
diverse literatures, and that the model provides predictive hypotheses 
which are readily testable on observed data of such choice, leads me 
to provide the model as a central facet of the discussion of 
instrument choice about which we are concerned. 
As discussed in the previous chapter the theoretical 
literature on regulatory choice does not address the problem of 
instrument choice and too simplistically addresses the problem of 
policy choice to be applied to such a subtle problem. The three 
sector model of policy and instrument choice, summarized formally 
below, captures the relationship between utility maximizing 
legislators, net benefit maximizing groups and, expected utility 
maximizing bureaucrats, as well as the impact of the institutions of 
choice on the outcome of the process. To summarize, 
for legislator i; 
MAXIMIZES ui < PROB i, POLICYi > 
pi e P(C,J,A) 
qi e Q(pi) 
for group j; 
MAXIMIZES NBj (POLICYj I INSTRU.MENTj) 
L. 
J 
SUBJECT TO ILL . < B. 
J J J 
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for agency b; 
MAXIMIZES 
Pb e Pb(p) 
b 
b b b b pr (V,9)U (pb) + [1 - pr (V,9)]U (p0 ) 
qb e Q (q) 
SUBJECT TO 
This formulation explicitly considers the influence of 
interest group lobbying upon the choice of policy and instrument by 
the legislature and the administrative agency and the influence of 
each governmental branch's actions upon the other. The formulation 
further allows us to capture and identify the institutional structures 
and arrangements which have an impact on policy outcomes. Indeed, 
much institutional structure is implicitly built into the behavioral 
assertions of the model. 
The legislative choice of regulatory instrument has been 
suggested to be a tradeoff between the instrument which maximizes the 
interest group casework opportunities for the congressman (command and 
control) and the instrument which maximizes the rents available from 
satisfying the preferences of involved interest groups. The level of 
such rents is in turn (for business interests) influenced by the stage 
at which the regulation is effective and the market structure of the 
industry being regulated. 
The bureaucratic choice of regulatory instrument is one which 
simultaneously satisfies the mandate and guidelines of the Congress 
and the courts and minimizes the conflict in its external environment 
surrounding the choice of such instrument. We shall explore these 
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conditions in the next chapter. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 3 
1. Recall I define policy as the goal or objective of the 
governmental action and the instrument as the technique or method 
used to implement the chosen policy. The instrument may be a 
command and control. informational. incentive-based. or public 
provision variety. See chapter 1 for examples and a general 
discussion. 
2. Stigler (1971) and Bauer. Pool and Dexter (1963). 
3. Alexander Hamil ton. John Jay. and James Madison. The 
Federalist (New York: Random House). 
4. For good bibliographic references to this extensive 
literature see Harmon (1978) or Ornstein and Elder (1978) 
5. For a good bibliography see Harmon (1978). 
6. See mainly; Clapp (1963). Fenno (1966. 1973). Hinckley 
(1971). and Matthews (1960). 
7. Fiorina (1977) p. 41. 
8. Fenno (1973). pp. 1. 
9. On the professionalization of Congress see Fiorina. Rhode. 
and Wissel (1975) and Price (1975). 
10. See Fenno (1973). 
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11. For a good summary of norms of behavior see Ripley (1978). 
For an excellent discussion of the formal rules of behavior see 
Oleszek (1978). 
12. The process through which policy passes before the 
legislature can be characterized as a three stage process. The 
first stage, agenda formation, establishes which issues and in 
what order such issues will appear before the legislature. In 
the second stage, the decision stage, the legislature considers 
for enactment the various policy alternatives on the agenda; in 
the third, the legislature, almost exclusively through the 
committee system, implements and manages ongoing policies and 
programs which were previously enacted. For an excellent survey 
see Oleszek (1978). 
13. See Shepsle (1979). 
14. Arrow (1963). 
15. Fenno (1973). 
16. Sheps1e (1979) p. 31. 
17. ibid pp. 33-34 
18. ibid pp. 35 
19. ibid p. 38 
20. ibid pp. 47 
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21. See appendix B for a proof and discussion of equilibria 
with conference committees. 
22. For a general discussion of the median voter hypothesis see 
Downs (1957) or Buchanen and Tullock (1962). 
23. Such problems would include the Arrow paradox. However, I 
shall assume, for simplicity, that there does exist an 
equilibrium to the electoral voting game. 
24. See Fiorina (1977),see also Clapp (1963), or Fenno (1977, 
1978). 
25. The usage of the terms case-by-case and universal/generic 
in this manuscript do not conform with the conventional usages of 
these terms. Case-by-case herein will be used to describe 
instruments which are applied a case at a time, i.e. by firm, by 
chemical, by product, whereas the conventional terminology 
describes case-by-case as regulation by firm only. The usage we 
employ reflects the fact that a case may extend beyond firm 
boundaries. 
26. An equivalent statement concerning the concavity of RENTSi 
in p. or q., that I will employ later, is that RENTS is strictly 
1 1 
concave in d(p.,x) and d(q.,y), where d(-) is the Euclidean 
1 1 
distance between the arguments and x and y are the maxima of the 
functions. 
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27. Kramer (1972). 
28. ibid pp. 171. 
29. ibid pp. 173. 
30. The proof follows trivially from the definition of the 
median. 
31. See Harmon (1978) or Ornstein and Elder (1978) for 
extensive bibliographic references. 
32. Schattschneider (1960). 
33. On this line see Salisbury (1969). 
34. Net Benefit= BENEFITS(POLICY,INSTRUMENT) -
COSTS(POLICY,INSTRUMENT) 
35. Joskow (1974) p. 297. 
36. ibid. 
37. Ferejohn (1981). 
38. ibid. 
39. We could just as soon let the Congress choose pb and Qb 
instead of having the Congress choosing p and q and assuming the 
agency constraint set is fixed about p and q. This could be 
modelled by changing the relevant choices for the legislator from 
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p. and q. top . (upper policy choice) and p.d (lower policy 
1 1 1U 1 
choice) (both elements in Rm and q. and q.d ei. We would then 
1U 1 
be able to define the social choice functions 
POLICYu, POLICYd, INSTRU!lliNTu, and INSTRU!lliNTd in the same manner 
as before for the functions POLICY and INSTRUMENT (follows if we 
assume, as we have already, that the issue dimensions, in this 
case pu, and pd, are separable). 
The choices q. , and q . d would then define the acceptable 1U 1 
range of choices for agency action, Qb, similarly p. and p.d 
1U 1 
We could then define the functions. 
POLICY = POLICYu x POLICYd and 
INSTRUMENT = INSTRUMENTu x INSTRU.MENTd. 
and examine interest group behavior. We will examine such a 
simple addition to the model in chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4. Instrument Choice 
4.1 Introduction 
The development of a formal model of policy and instrument 
choice provides us the logical rigor for deriving refutable hypotheses 
through standard comparative statics techniques. The comparative 
statics of the model are outlined in appendix A. The relationships 
implied by these comparative statics are employed in this chapter to 
define hypotheses about instrument choice. 
The formal development of the policy process in the previous 
chapter is revealed here to provide us with a handle for capturing the 
institutional impact on policy and instrument choice. The description 
of the legislative choice equilibrium and its functional relationship 
to the institutional structure and arrangements is captured, through 
the choice functions and constraint sets constructed in the model, as 
a set of parameters describing the impact of such institutions on the 
choice of instrument. 
Several aggregate/summary parameters will also be introduced 
in order to describe more readily the "system" changes in parameters 
which influence policy and instrument choice. 
4.2 Instrument Choice 
A number of the propositions suggested by the analysis are 
derived directly from the partial derivatives from the comparative 
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statics in appendix A. Most of these propositions are straight-
forward and need little explanation, and so we will offer them in 
summary form and dispense with the individual discussions of each 
hypothesis. We will however discuss them collectively after 
presenting them. 
These propositions are admittedly fairly obvious hypotheses. 
That the model predicts such obvious propositions in such a 
straightforward manner is encouraging and adds to the general 
acceptability of the model developed in chapter 3. On the other hand, 
we hope to offer a series of powerful and non-obvious propositions, 
derivable from the model, in the pages to follow. 
Hl. (Interest Group Preference Effects).! 
A change in an interest group's preferences (ideal point) over 
instruments, for a given policy choice, generates a like-
directional change in the legislative instrument choice (ceteris 
paribus). Proof: Recall q is the legislature's instrument choice 
and q. is legislator i's instrument choice, and q*. is group j 's 
ideal 1 point. Groups have preferences over outcome~. POLICY x 
INSTRU~lliNT, and by separability have preferences over INSTRUMENT. 
We know, 
aqjaq. > o 
1 
(this follows from the definition of the function INSTRU~lliNT) and 
aq.faq• . > o 
1 J 
(see A.14) 
thus, by continuity, 
aqfaq•. > o. QED. 
J 
H2. (Interest Group Wealth Effects). 
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An increase in the budget of an interest group (c.p.) generates a 
change in the legislative instrument choice,for a given policy 
choice, so as to decrease the distance between the legislative 
choice and the group's ideal point. Proof: Recall L. is the 
matrix of lobbying rents paid by group j, B. is the iroups budget 
constraint, and L .. are the rents paid by gloup j to legislator 
J1 i. 
aL./aB. > o 
J J 
(see A.17) 
act(q.,q* .>/aL .. < o 
1 J J 1 (see A.13) 
aqfaq. > o 
1 
by continuity, 
ad(q,q*.>/aB. < o. QED. 
J J 
Similar hypotheses concerning agency choice will be offered 
without proof (as the proofs are similar and can be discerned from 
appendix A) : 
H3. (Agency-Group Preference Effects). 
A change in an interest groups' preferences (ideal point) over 
instruments (policy) generates a like-directional change in the agency's 
instrument choice (c.p.) 
H4. (Agency-Group Wealth Effects). 
An increase in the budget of an interest group (c.p.) generates a 
change in the agency instrument (policy) choice, so as to decrease 
the distance between the agency choice and the group's ideal point. 
Each of these hypotheses, though intuitively familiar, offer 
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explicit and important relationships between observable phenomena and 
the choice of instrument to implement a chosen policy. Each 
hypothesis offers us at least a partial explanation of instrument 
choice and enables us to predict changes in instrument choice when 
offered evidence of a change in a parameter related to such choice. 
These hypotheses suggest the influence of group preferences on 
the choice of instrument (and policy) for both the legislature and 
bureaucracy. The wealthier groups, through a greater ability to 
lobby, have a proportionately greater influence on policy than their 
poorer brethren. Lowi (1969), implicitly observing these very same 
relationships, suggested that this "interest group liberalism" 
observed in the above hypotheses was a great danger to American 
democracy. Government, according to Lowi, had systematically 
abdicated to private groups its power over the direction of public 
policies. He sought a solution to this problem which he felt 
necessitated a return to more local authority over policy choices and 
to unambiguous and definite delegations of authority to agencies (as 
opposed to broad mandates). 
What the modelling has bought us here, in this regard, is an 
explicit account of the root of "interest group liberalism" from which 
we may be able to conjecture upon remedies to this perceived problem. 
The roots of "interest group liberalism" according to Lowi is the 
broad delegation of authority granted agencies by the legislature. 
This combined with the perception that non-elected officials hold no 
public interest leads Lowi to the conclusion that the choice of policy 
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has been abdicated to private interests. 
Indeed, however, as the present model indicates, the roots lay 
primarily in the legislature. Interest group liberalism is alive and 
well in our legislature, and in response to such liberalism in the 
legislature it is alive and well in the bureaucracy. The problem is 
more a result of the professionalization of the legislature in the 
twentieth century with its associated premium on the continued tenure 
of office for the legislators, and the design of the Constitution, 
with its focus on interest group' access rather than of the inherent 
narrow-mindedness of the objectives of bureaucrats. 
That agencies are primarily responsive to the preferences of 
the groups in their environment for their choice of instrument is a 
direct result of the formulation of agency behavior. Simplifying the 
model of agency behavior, we observe that the administrator will 
choose instruments which minimize the weighted sum, 
This however, is not a result of the preferences of the administrator 
or the venality or incompetence of such as suggested by others, but 
rather, according to this model, is a response to pressures from 
Congress. Thus the path of interest group liberalism lead directly to 
the legislature and the objectives of legislators. With this 
observation, the suggestions by Lowi for correcting the perceived 
problem of "interest group liberalism" miss their mark. 
It is also the case that the 'interest group liberalism' 
hypotheses (H3 and H4) for administrative agencies imply the capture 
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hypothesis discussed in chapter 2. If we assume that there exists 
only one important interest in the agency's environment (i.e. w. > 0 
J 
and wk = 0 for all j ~ k) then it is clear from the "interest group 
liberalism" hypotheses that the choice of policy and instrument will 
closely approximate the preferences of the interest group. 
The capture hypothesis is seen here to be a function of the 
behavioral incentives given agencies (assumed here) by Congress. The 
influences within Congress which leads that institution to be captured 
thus lay the groundwork for the incentives given agencies to be 
captured. That we observe capture in administrative agencies is 
therefore not the driving point, for we should observe capture in both 
the agency and the appropriate subcommittee(s) of Congress as well. 
Recall from chapter 3 that command and control instruments 
generally provide the greatest interest group casework opportunities 
for the congressman. It is easily derivable therefore that, all else 
equal, the legislature will prefer to implement policies through 
command and control instruments. Though the first four hypotheses and 
this result begin to explain the predominance of command and control 
instruments observed for federal regulation, a complete picture is not 
yet available. 
Indeed, the first four hypotheses captured the intuition of 
the previous literature on the choice of policy and instrument. The 
next five hypotheses, concerning (respectively) the influence of the 
market structure of the industry to be regulated, the stage of the 
firm's activity which is to be regulated on the instrument choice, the 
101 
effects of group preferences in aggregate on instrument choice, the 
choice of the definition of policy by the legislature, and the choice 
to delegate (both substantive and procedural) by the legislature, will 
present powerful explanatory and predictive tools for our examination 
of instrument choice. The latter three hypotheses in particular tie 
together some of the loose ends of previous work on legislative choice 
which we discussed in chapter 2. 
When the group(s) to be regulated take the form of a business 
association, it was suggested in chapter 3 that the stage(s) at which 
the regulation is to affect the firms' activity and the market 
structure of the industry to be regulated are of primary influence to 
the instrument choice. The impacts on the net profits (and therefore 
on the lobbying rents for the legislator) of each firm are shaped by 
such forces. Thus, under specific market structures one particular 
instrument may generate greater rents for the legislator than others, 
as the preferences of the regulated firms will be better served. 
R5. (Stages of Firm Activity). 
Assuming the group(s) to be regulated is composed of profit 
maximizing firms and that the market structure of the industry to 
be regulated is such that the production technologies of the 
constituent firms differ, then the instrument employed to 
implement regulations at the pre-production or production stages 
will be a command and control instrument. Proof: 
In this proof we will construct a set of individualized 
taxes to meet a specific policy goal and to not redistribute 
profits in the industry. It will then be shown that such taxes 
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can be approximated by a command and control mechanism (again by 
construction) and that such a mechanism is preferred by the 
industry (and thus by the legislature) to a universal tax (i.e. 
lump sum, etc.). The proof is fairly robust to most (but 
admittedly not all) changes in the assumed policy goals. 
Let us examine the form of an individualized tax scheme 
based upon the characteristics of each firm in the regulated 
industry. We want such a tax to not redistribute profits between 
the firms and to achieve some overall goal. Assume each firm 
produces two commodities: good X and bad Y. Assume also that 
each firm has a production technology different from any other, 
i f (L . ,K.) 
1 1 
gi(K . )=Yi.J. J.(K) yJ. T g . = 
1 J 
for all i, j. 
Assume also that the production function for good X, f, 
is a function of capital, K, and labor, L, while the function g, 
representing the production of Y the bad, for simplicity is a 
function of capital only, K. 
Assume the profits of each firm can be written as 
pX - wL -rK = pf(L,K) -wL- rK. 
Assume there are only two firms. The problem can be set 
up as follows: 
Maximize fi 1 
subject 
Assume also that there is a limit to the amount of bads 
which the industry can produce (N) in a given time period. If so 
we can effectively limit the commodity (goods and bads) space to 
a feasible region. If Y < N then all sets are convex in the 
region of feasibility (see Starrett, 1972). 
We are therefore maximizing the profits of firm 1 subject 
to the constraints that the maximizing does not alter the ratio 
of profits before regulation, B, 0 < B < 1, and subject to an 
overall goal of limiting industry bads to Y. It should be stated 
that the proof is not robust to all changes in the 
characterization of the problem, and/or to all changes in the 
goals to be accomplished, but there is a very wide range of such 
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characterizations and goals to which the proof is robust. The 
robustness follows in that the proof is one of construction and 
thus we can construct such individualized tax schemes for a very 
wide variety of characterizations. 
The first-order conditions for a constrained maximum are, 
an 1 1aK1-A.Bafi 1 1aK1 +'faY11aK1 = 0 
an 21aK2-t..afi 2 1aK2+'faY21aK2 = 0 
- -
a n 1 1 a L1- A.B a n 1 1 a L1 = o 
an 21aL2-t..an 21aL2 = o 
n 2 - Bll 1 = o 
y1 + y2 - y = 0 
However, solving the maximization of profits problem 
individually for each firm results in the following first-order-
conditions, 
aii 11aK1 = par
11aK1 - r = 0 
an 1 1aL1 = 0 










an 21aL2 0 10 
It is evident that we must tax both labor and capital for 
both firms in order to satisfy the first-order-conditions of the 
joint problem. The taxes would look like, 
t 1 k AB(aillaK1 - r) - 'fag11aK1 
t 2 k = -t..(a~laK2 - r) - 'fag21aK2 
t 11 AB(af1 laL1 - w) 
t 21 = -t..(a~ laL2 - w) 
12 
where t 1 is the tax on the capital inputs of firm 1, etc. fne tax formulas expressed in (12) show that there exists 
an individualized tax scheme which will accomplish any overall 
goal (of the type assumed) and will not distort the profit shares 
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in the industry. Also (12) implies that there does not exist 
universal taxes which will accomplish the stated goals and not 
redistribute profit shares . 
Universal taxes are the only variety of tax mechanisms 
which are Constitutional and given the imperfections of 
information facing real-life regulators are the only variety of 
tax mechanisms which are feasible . Examples of universal taxes 
are lump sum taxes or head taxes. 
This result is generalizable ton firms, and as stated 
previously to a very wide variety of goals in that the proof is 
by construction and thus we can construct taxes, t, for any such 
goal. 
Claim: Any individual tax scheme can be approximated by 
a command and control scheme. 
The proof is again by construction and would be 
constructed in the following manner: The application of the tax 
scheme would change the input decisions of the regulated firms 
from their initial values (L10 , ~O' K10 , and K20 ) to the new 
regulated values (L1 , ~, K1 , and K2 ). The command and 
control regulation c~uld fhus Kccomplisfi the stated goal and not 
redistribute profits by restricting the input decisions of the 
firms to be the regulated input decisions of the firms after 
application of the taxes defined above. 
Thus, there exist command and control mechanisms, for any 
goal, which do not distort wealth (profits) in the regulated 
industry. The following two assumptions provide the framework 
for the proof of the proposition: 
Assumption 1 - The firms in the regulated industry 
possess differing production technologies (we already assumed 
this above), 
Assumption 2 - All the firms in the regulated industry 
possess equal profit shares (indeed this can be weakened to 
disallow the case of an industry composed of one monopolist and 
an assortment of atomic firms). 
We can exclude the use of informational mechanisms and 
public provision mechanisms for the regulation of the production 
activities of firms. By the proof above a majority of firms in 
the industry (indeed, all but one firm in the industry) will 
oppose any universal mechanism proposed; however, there exists an 
infinite number of individually based command and control 
mechanisms which will be prefered by this majority to any 
universal tax . By hypothesis Hl, and hypothesis H6 (to be 
proven) the legislative choice will therefore approach a command 
and control mechanism. QED. 
This is a non-obvious and useful result of the model of 
regulatory choice developed in chapter 3. It should be noted that the 
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instrument choice for regulating the sales activity of a firm, without 
further assumptions, can take any form. 
The result follows directly from the assumptions as stated and 
the comparative statics of the model as described in appendix A. 
Intuitively, the proof is as follows. First, we can exclude public 
provision and informational instruments as being non-applicable to the 
problem of regulating production. Public provision regulates firm 
behavior through competition from the public sector and therefore will 
not influence a competitive firm's choice of productive inputs. 
Informational mechanisms regulate behavior by recharacterizing the 
inputs to production but do not change relative prices. However, an 
incentive-based (tax) mechanism is applicable but, by virtue of the 
heterogeneity of production technologies of firms in the industry, 
such a mechanism will create price distortions and redistribute wealth 
between regulated firms. Those firms suffering a net loss in 
profitability will lobby Congress against such an instrument choice 
and will negate the lobbying rents acquired by the congressman from 
those firms who are gaining profitability (and favor the choice). 
On the other hand, command and control mechanisms applied 
case-by-case do not necessarily impart such distortions. The losing 
firms will therefore prefer a command and control instrument to each 
incentive-based instrument proposed. Indeed, all firms are potential 
gainers, as no a priori losers are a necessary consequence of a 
command and control instrument choice and the lobbying rents to the 
congressman are strictly positive from all firms. The lobbying rents 
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to each legislator will thus be correspondingly higher for a command 
and control instrument inducing the legislature's preferences for 
command and control to implement production regulations. 
Of course an exception to H5 is when the incentive-based 
instruments employed to regulate production induce cross-industry (or 
cross-sectional) subsidies which outweigh the losses due to price 
distortions (if any) for a substantial majority of firms (this results 
from establishing a different maximization problem with different 
objectives then the one assumed). It can be argued that such is the 
case in much of agricultural price regulation. Farmers participating 
in the USDA's programs are subsidized according to the levels of 
production for their various crops. Though the price distortions 
adversely affect the small farmer the program is generally well 
received by farm groups and is maintained by both the Congress and the 
USDA. 
Similarly, if the firms in the regulated industry possess 
similar production technologies (i.e. we violate assumption 1) then 
Congress may indeed impose an incentive-based mechanism for the 
implementation of regulatory policies toward such firms. Under such 
circumstances an incentive-based mechanism would not induce a 
redistribution of wealth between firms in the industry and such a 
mechanism could therefore be preferred by all firms in the industry to 
an equivalent command and control mechanism. Indeed, an incentive-
based mechanism in such a case may induce cross-industry (or cross-
sectional) subsidies which greatly benefit the regulated industry. 
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In order to develop hypothesis H6 we need to first define a 
few aggregate parameters. Let x. be the rent maximizing choice of 
1 
instrument for legislator i (i.e. x. maximizes RENTSi). 
1 
Define also 
q'i as the~ priori preferred instrument for legislator i (i.e. q'i 
maximizes FOi -- as suggested in chapter 3 this will be, if feasible. 
a command and control variety method). 
With these definitions in hand we can establish the hypotheses 
relating the aggregate characteristics of groups to the choice of 
instrument. 
H6. (Legislative Responsiveness to Groups' Homogeneity of Preferences 
Over Instruments). 
A change in a group's ideal point over instruments which 
increases the homogeneity of the preferences of the groups 
involved in the decision process generates a change in the 
instrument, for a given policy, towards a command and control 
mechanism. Proof. 
The terms homogeniety and heterogeneity reflect the degree of 
cooperation or conflict between groups interested in the 
instrument choice. We could imagine that groups, given their 
decision-calculi, have rank orderings over instrument, for a 
given policy. Greater homogeneity would therefore reflect a 
greater agreement between these rank orderings for interested 
groups. Let us define a measure of homogeneity, 
H = [ d(q',q*.) 
J J 
(1) 
(The assumption of separability enables us to construct this 
function) where q' is the median of the ideal points, q* .• for 
the involved groups. Notice x. can therefore be interpr~ted as a 
weighted median of group prefe~ences for legislator i (i.e. his 
rent maximizing choice). 
Second, note that a change in a group's ideal point q*. from 
J 
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q*. to q*' · which increases homogeneity implies H decreases, H' ( 
H. J J 
Note that 
ax.jaq*. ( lq*.-q*'·l 
1 J J J 
(2) 
(i.e. change x. ( change q* . ) 
1 J 
for x. in the Pareto set defined by the groups' ideal points (see 
A.--)! 
Note also that 
This follows from the definition of x. and the result that 
1 
aL . . jad(q . ,q* . ) < 0 (see A.19) J 1 1 J 
(3) 
(4) 
This reflects an implicit assumption that interest groups in this 
model are myopic and do not see the effects of a change in group 
heterogeneity. 
Now there exists a personal "contract curve" 
q'. for legislator i. Legislator i's choice of 
an
1
element of this curve. 
between x. and 
1 
qi will always be 
Thus the change in q* . to q*' · implies a change in x. to x'. 
which entails a change ii this p~rsonal contract curve. 1 1 
Now 
and 
(see A.15) implies 
Thus 




(see A.15) implies the legislator's choice of q. will slide up 
1 his/her personal contract curve towards q' . (i.e. 
ad(q'.,q.)jad(q',q* . >>o>. 1 
By1 1 J 
aqjaq. > o 
1 






In other words, the less the diversity of interest groups 
active in the decision process the greater the likelihood the 
legislature will choose a command and control instrument. This result 
is a non-obvious and powerful implication of the framework established 
in chapter 3. Command and control instruments will be chosen when the 
interest group preferences over the choice are homogeneous. Interest 
groups under such conditions do not see the choice of instrument, for 
a given policy, as a zero-sum game. Legislators, then, can have 
continued risk-free influence over the distribution of benefits, given 
the general case-by-case nature of command and control instruments, 
and can thus continue to be benefited electorally for their influence. 
On the other hand, when interest group preferences over 
instruments are heterogeneous, the legislator will prefer to not be as 
closely associated with the continued choices of the agency (as such 
choices will draw a great deal of opposition at all times) and will 
therefore prefer a universal instrument be employed. The legislator, 
in such an instance, trades off the potential influence (and thus 
potential rents) he might still hold over regulatory outcomes, through 
a case-by-case method, against the potential electoral loses such 
choices might bring in such a highly charged interest group 
environment. The legislator collects what rents he can at the time of 
passage and then disassociates himself with the choices of the agency. 
The legislator thus passes the "hot potato" of regulatory choice to 
the agency. 
The following hypothesis captures the universalistic component 
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of legislative choice as described by Fiorina (1981) and the observed 
tendency of legislatures to divide or fragment policy choices so as to 
define a distributive/logrolling choice process (Fenno, 1966, 1973; 
Ferejohn, 1974; Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1975; Fiorina, 1975, 1977, 1981; 
Lowi, 1964; Ripley, 1978; Ripley and Franklin, 1976). 
H7. (Political Entrepreneurship). 
The legislature will seek to define the policy debate in a 
fashion so as to divide the policy into disjoint issue spaces 
over which the groups involved in the new choices of policies and 
instruments have more homogeneous preferences relative to the old 
larger policy choice. Proof: trivial. 
The implications for instrument choice of this hypothesis are 
clear. The definition of policies into fragmented subsets over which 
group preferences are more homogeneous leads to a greater application 
of command and control instruments by the mechanism discussed in 
hypothesis H6. 
A major consequence of this ability and the incentives to 
divide issues in a legislature already characterized by a high degree 
of fragmentation on policy choice (Fenno ,1966, 1969; Ferejohn, 1974; 
Lowi, 1964, 1972; Ripley and Franklin, 1976) is that most policies are 
either initially defined as distributive or, even if the initial 
definition places it in some other category, it is redefined over time 
as distributive. The division of policy in "homogeneous hunks" 
enhances this process and thus enables policies to be acted upon in a 
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universalistic fashion (Fiorina, 1981) wherein policies are logrolled 
for the various interests involved. 
Another consequence of this is the creation and maintenance of 
an ever expanding federal bureaucracy, as discussed by Fiorina (1977). 
Each set of groups is therefore represented by a different program 
office or agency in the federal bureaucracy. This enables benefits to 
be logrolled and casework to be easy and non-controversial. 
The choice of the legislature to delegate authority over 
policy choice has been studied by Fiorina (1981, 1982). Fiorina 
concluded that the legislature will delegate the choice of policy to 
the bureaucracy when the benefits from the policy are diffusely felt 
on groups in society while the costs are incident in a more 
concentrated fashion (the driving factor). That the choice to 
delegate instrument choice should concern us presently is implied by 
the "interest group liberalism" result for agencies discussed earlier. 
Agency choice of instrument is purely an aggregation of private 
interest preferences, and so a complete delegation of such choice by 
the legislature implies the potential for the dangers to which Lowi 
referred. 
H8. (Delegation of Substantive Authority). 
The greater the level of heterogeneity of group preferences for 
groups involved in the decision process the greater the 
delegation of substantive regulatory authority by the legislature 
to the agency. Proof: 
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Recallbfootnote 39 in chapter 3. Assume legislators are 
now choosing Q. and P .• Assume also that interest groups are now 
maximizing antfcipateA net benefits, 
Assume, 
with 0 < aj < 1 and aj is decreasing in D1 and o2 , and where o1 is the distance between p1 and p2 the boundary points defining POLICY, etc. 
We know from appendix A that (and the result follows from 
this simple comparative static) 
aL .. /ad(Q~.q*.> < o Jl 1 J (see A.18) 1 
We also know, by the definition of aj that 
2 
£hus, there are trade-offs to the l£gislator between 
making Q. large to satisfy (1) agd making Q. small to satisfy 
(2). ThUs, if His small then Q can be smlll and satisfy both 
(1) and (2), but if His large Qb will be larger to trade-off in 
favor of (1). QED. 
More simply, the legislature will delegate the choice of 
instrument (policy) to the agency when the groups to be regulated 
possess heterogeneous preferences. That the groups to be regulated 
possess heterogeneous preferences over the choice of instrument 
implies that the incidence of the costs of the regulation depend upon 
the instrument chosen and thus the hypothesis aligns with Fiorina's 
suggestions on delegation, i.e. blame shirking. This hypothesis also 
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suggests the legislature will delegate the choice of instrument to the 
agency when the choice cannot be divided (in a fashion as suggested in 
H7) and when the groups involved make the choice "too hot to handle". 
It should be noted that the delegation of substantive 
authority is constrained by Constitutionally and court defined limits 
on such ability for the legislature. These constraints defined the 
constrained choice sets for the legislature, P and Q, in the 
legislators' decision-calculi described in chapter 3. 
Delegation can also take the form of procedural delegation. 
Hypothesis H8 suggests a "hot potato theory" of substantive delegation 
(i.e. the delegation of policy and instrument choice). The delegation 
of operating procedures and due-process requirements are important to 
the efforts of the agency in fulfilling its substantive mandate. As 
such, procedural delegation is of concern here relative to the impact 
that procedural and due-process restrictions have on the structure of 
the agency and therefore on the choice of the agency. Furthermore, 
Congress can give an agency vast discretion over the choice of policy 
and level of instruments while simultaneously shackling it with strict 
and extensive procedural requirements which effectively thwart 
implementation. That the level of procedural delegation can influence 
the implementation of the regulatory policy irrespective of the 
instrument chosen makes an examination of such delegation relevant to 
the choice of instrument. It should be noted again that the ability 
of the legislature to delegate procedural authority is constrained by 
limites defined in the Constitution, the Administrative Procedures Act 
114 
and various court decisions. 
H9. (Procedural Delegation). 
The greater the heterogeneity of preferences for the groups 
interested in the regulatory choice then the greater the level of 
procedural and due- process requirements mandated. Proof: 
The result follows from the general model of chapter 3 
though I need to make the following 2 specific assumptions: 
Assumption 1 - In the general model let 
i i( RENTS =RENTS p . , q . , g . ) , 
1 1 1 
i i ( FO =FO q. , g. ) , 
1 1 
NBj=NBj(POLICYj,INSTRU~lliNTj,PROCEDUREj), 
where g. ts the extent of procedural guidelines mandated, J.eR+. 
PROCEDUREJ is the social choice function similar to POLICY 1 for 
procedural guidelines. 
The variable g. can be thought of as the monotonic number 
of constraints the legislature is to impose on agency decision-
making. We can think of g . in the following fashion: assume 
there exists a procedures ~pace in Rg, from which the legislature 
will choose a point z. We can define a mapping on Rg which maps 
each point in Rg to the number of constraints on the positive 
axis imposed by such a point, i.e. a specific g .• Note, this 
mapping need not necessarily be uni~ue-valued. 1 
Assumption 2 - Also, let FO be an increasing function of 
g., and let g* . = g*.(~) or equivalently g*. = g*.(H) with g* 
b~ing a monotoiically increasing function ofJH, wh~re g* is the 
group's ideal level of procedures, and f* is the matrix of policy 
ideal points, p*., for all groups, and H is the measure of 
homogeneity defiied in the proof to hypothesis H6. 
Assumptions 1 and 2 just allow us to examine procedural 
guidelines as a decision variable for legislators. Assumption 2 
derives the result. We can easily deduce, through comparative 
static techniques similar to those in appendix A that, 
agjag• . > o 
J 
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(as in hypothesis H1 for q and p) where g is the legislative 
choice of procedures. 
By assumption 2 we know 
Thus, by continuity, 
og*./aH > o 
J 
ag/aH > o. QED. 
In other words, the legislature will not delegate the choice 
of operating procedures and due-process requirements to the agency 
when the groups involved in the choice possess heterogeneous 
preferences. For the case of economic regulation, the concordance of 
interests for the groups involved enables the legislator to work 
closely with such groups in the development of the agency's policy 
under the act and thus flexible regulatory procedures serve to enhance 
the oversight committee members' influence on policy in this area. 
For the case of environmental, health and safety regulation, the large 
diversity of interests for the groups involved prohibits the 
legislator from profitably working closely with any one group and thus 
strict and lengthy regulatory procedures enable the oversight 
committee members to let the agency take the heat from representing 
the diversity of groups interested in the agency's policy choices. 
We can now suggest a comprehensive framework for the analysis 
of instrument choice. This framework, suggested primarily by 
hypotheses H5 to H9, is derivable from the model of regulatory choice 
as developed, and provides us with a powerful analytic tool for the 
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analysis of regulatory instrument choice. 
In regulating the production choices of firms in an industry 
characterized by heterogeneous production technologies we should 
generally observe the Congress employing a command and control 
instrument. However, if the production technologies of the firms in 
the regulated industry are very similar, or if the Congress subsidizes 
the industry through the general revenue fund and such subsidies are 
large relative to the losses due to the price distortions of the 
incentive mechanism, then the Congress may indeed implement the 
regulatory policy, at a production stage, through an incentive 
mechanism. 
In considering the regulation of other organizations or in 
considering the regulation of firm activity at other than the 
production stages the Congress will attempt to divide the regulatory 
policy, if the groups interested in such policy do not possess 
homogeneous preferences over the regulatory choice, into sub-policies 
over which the groups interested in the policy possess more 
homogeneous preferences. Such a definition of issues by the Congress 
will serve to reduce controversy and will enable the Congress to 
distribute benefits to a larger number of groups which will in turn 
increase the electoral benefits (lobbying rents) showered by such 
groups upon the congressman. 
If the regulatory policy under debate induces an interest 
group environment wherein the groups interested in the policy possess 
homogeneous preferences over the regulatory choice, or if the 
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regulatory policy can be divided to create such an environment, then 
the Congress is more likely to choose a command and control instrument 
to implement the policy. On the other hand if the environment is 
charged with interests each with conflicting preferences over the 
regulatory choice and the policy cannot be divided, then the Congress 
will generally choose an incentive-based or informational mechanism 
with which to implement the regulatory policy. 
Further, if the interest groups involved in the decision have 
conflicting preferences then Congress is more likely to delegate 
substantive authority to the agency while prescribing procedural and 
due-process requirements which restrict the agency's substantive 
choices than if the interest groups were characterized by a greater 
concordance of preferences. 
Recalling the pattern of instrument choice in Table 1, the 
regulation of the productive stages of firm behavior in both the 
environmental regulatory acts (Clean Air Act and the Water Pollution 
Control Act) and the health and safety regulations (Safe Drinking 
Water Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 
Consumer Product Safety Act, Federal Hazardous Substances Act, and 
Occupational Safety and Health Act) are indeed implemented via a 
command and control mechanism, as suggested by H5.3 Further, the 
regulation of marketing and sales in the highly controversial health 
and safety area is implemented exclusively through informational 
mechanisms. 
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Economic regulation on the other hand is generally not 
characterized by the controversy evident in environmental and health 
and safety regulation. The private interest origins of economic 
regulation (e.g. Civil Aeronautics Act and the Federal Communications 
Act), and the single sided nature of the interest group environment 
induces Congress to favor command and control instruments for 
regulating the behavior of firms as indicated in H6, and as observed 
in Table 1. 
Further, upon closer examination the 'new' regulation 
(environmental, health and safety) is generally much more detailed 
then the 'old' (economic) regulation. This detail is a proscription 
of operating procedures and due-process requirements by Congress. The 
hypotheses developed suggest the proscription of such detail is a 
result of the multi-sided interest group environment coincident with 
the new regulation. We shall examine many of the programs of the new 
regulation in much greater detail in chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
4.3 Discussion 
What has been developed in this chapter is a series of 
propositions which, in sum, capture the influence of interest groups 
and institutions on instrument choice. That interest groups and 
institutions have an impact on instrument choice is not surprising. 
That they have an impact which is generalizable is indeed powerful. 
We have suggested in chapter 3 that changes in the 
institutional structure induce changes in the instrument choice. What 
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we would presently like to do is map out the paths through which such 
changes occur. That the changes in the institutional structure induce 
changes in the admissible choice set for the legislature and the 
agency was suggested in chapter 3. Further, that such changes in the 
admissible set induce changes in the legislative choice is readily 
acceptable. However, a change in institutions, as should be suspected 
given the insights of Madison, induces changes in the behavior and 
composition of the interest groups involved in lobbying Congress. A 
change in institutions changes the access points for group lobbying 
pressure and changes the costs of lobbying for the groups. These 
changes may affect groups differentially and as such will affect the 
outcomes of the policy process differentially. 
This fact does not escape the attention of legislators and 
interest groups. Changes in the institutional structure of Congress 
are often hotly debated (Davidson and Oleszek, 1977) as groups with a 
stake in the proposed changes lobby vehemently their point before 
Congress. In 1973 the House created a Select Committee on Committees 
to study the House committee structure and to make recommendations. 
The report of the Committee proposed some substantial changes. But 
then members whose own personal position or, in some instances, whose 
policy positions seemed threatened, mobilized to oppose a number of 
specific clauses in the plan. Lobbyists for various organizations and 
interests felt that change would jeopardize their close and productive 
relationships with existing committees also began to push against 
specific sections of the bill. Consequently, a much watered-down 
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version was adopted by the House in late 1974.4 
A similar experience was repeated in the Senate two years 
later. 5 The end result was more a devolution of authority in both 
cases than a reorganization of jurisdiction. Limits were placed on 
the number of assignments and chairs any member could hold, though 
some shifts of jurisdiction did occur. Though not formally a part of 
the model developed in chapter 3, the choice of structure by the 
legislature can be generally discussed given the framework of 
discussion presented. That the choice of structural arrangements is 
made so as to satisfy the legislative goals presented by Fenno has 
been argued strongly (and naturally so) by Fenno (1973) and to an 
extent by Ferejohn (1974). 
The rise and fall of group pressures in the life cycle models 
of regulatory choice may indeed be explained (in-part) by changes in 
the institutional structure. Changes in the institutional structure 
precipitate changes in the access of the groups involved (and vice-
versa) which, together with the induced changes in the choice set of 
the legislature and the agencies, induce changes in the policy 
outcomes. We shall examine empirically this possibility in later 
chapters. 
It is interesting to consider that the formulation here 
implies the predictions of the political cycles model of Weingast 
(1978) and the life cycle models of Bernstein (1955), Cary (1967), 
Jaffe (1954), Redford (1952) and Downs (1967). The similarity to 
Wiengast's political cycles hypothesis can be easily discerned. 
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Wiengast modelled the policy choice as a legislative choice wherein 
legislators choose policy in accordance with the preferences of their 
electoral constituency and interested factions. As the electoral 
potential of a topic (policy) cycles, the influence of the interest 
groups waxes and wanes. For this reason the policy chosen by the 
legislature can fluctuate between the wishes of the electorate 
(consumers) and of the interest groups (producers). 
The mechanism of the political cycles hypothesis here however 
is different. Though indeed the preferences of the legislator's 
electoral constituencies influences the determination of policy for 
the legislator, other factors are more important. As has been 
suggested, the legislature has a full chest of tools with which to 
take advantage of political cycles. The legislature can formally 
change the policy which is newly topical (as suggested by Weingast) or 
it may, more subtly, change the structure of the oversight or decision 
processes in the legislature, and/or (as we will see in chapter 5) 
induce the bureaucracy to change its structure to accommodate these 
new groups. As has been (or will be in chapter 5) suggested, such 
changes in structure will influence the course of policy and may be 
obtained with very little effort on the part of the legislature and 
with very little adverse publicity which could lead to a falling out 
of interest groups. The changes in policy however would be real and 
the impacts felt by the new groups. 
Further, a change in the structure of the decision process in 
the legislature and bureaucracy would indeed amount to a form of group 
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entrepreneurship by the legislature in that changes in the structure, 
as discussed, change the costs of lobbying for various interest 
groups. By lowering the costs of lobbying for a topical group (or 
raising it later) the legislature can include the new groups into the 
decision process and induce a political cycle. 
The similarity to the life cycle hypotheses follows in a 
similar manner, if we assume political cycles are linear and not 
circular. Indeed, the capture hypothesis discussed earlier captures 
the essence of the life cycle literature upon assuming linear cycles. 
The entrance and exit of new groups will induce the agency's capture 
or revival. 
Thus we can catalog the impact of institutional change on 
policy and instrument choice, or rather the paths by which changes in 
the institutions influence policy outcomes. Such a cataloging can 
give us some empirical leverage in the analysis of instrument choice. 
First, a change in institutions will affect policy by altering the 
choices available to the legislature and the bureaucracy. Changes in 
committee assignments or jurisdiction can exclude choices of action 
for the legislature (and subsequently for the agency) or can expand 
the substantive areas over which policy can be debated. 
Second, changes in the institutions change the access and 
costs of lobbying for groups interested in public policy. Such 
changes often redistribute or intensify the influence of various 
groups before the legislature. The clearest examples of such 
institutional changes are the regulations of lobbying activity. The 
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central pieces of legislation in this area is the Federal Regulation 
of Lobbying Act of 1946, passed as a part of the general Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946 {Title III) {Ornstein and Elder; 1978). 
With the knowledge that the institutions of choice were 
designed to aggregate the preferences of groups, it is no mystery that 
the preferences of groups should matter in the choice of policy. What 
I have sought is a set of generalizations about the influence of 
groups which are derivable from first principles of behavior for the 
actors involved in the choice of policy. What we have observed is 
that the goals of the various actors in the policy process and the 
incentives and constraints imposed by the institutions of choice lead 
to predictable "system" behavior which enables us to simplify our view 
of the world and focusses our attention on a few key aspects of the 
process. 
Interest group preferences matter, changes in their 
preferences lead to predictable changes in the policy outcome. This 
is not a sinister result, though the consequences as suggested by 
Schattschnieder {1960) may be sinister. That groups with better 
access to the policy process, or wealthier groups, have their 
interests served much more precisely is an accepted consequence of the 
formulation of the problem, and is in line with the previous 
examinations of the lobbyist problem, as discussed. 
This is where the traditional literature left off. The fact 
that interest groups influence policy in proportion to their "power" 
does not answer the question of why the government chooses any 
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particular policy instrument (or for that matter why the government 
chooses the policy it does). As we have seen, the answer to this 
question is complex and involves a series of relationships between 
goals of institutional actors and the institutional structure and 
consequent incentives and constraints for behavior. 
The key to instrument choice is the influence of groups, in 
aggregate, upon the decision process. Whether Congress is facing a 
homogeneous set of preferences for the groups involved in the decision 
or not, is a powerful implication of the framework developed. Indeed 
this suggests we need only ascertain a preference ordering over 
instruments for the groups involved and we can predict the instrument 
to be chosen. That we can explain why this should be the case, in a 
model of individual decision-making by the institutional actors, makes 
these implications all the more compelling. 
It is interesting to note here that the problem of policy 
choice is similar in many respects to the problem of instrument 
choice. As indicated in many of the hypotheses presented here, groups 
will influence the policy outcomes of the legislature and the 
bureaucracy differentially according to their wealth, power, or 
access. The legislature will seek to redefine policies in order to 
logroll specific benefits to more groups and will delegate the policy 
choice to the bureaucracy when the policy cannot be redefined and when 
there exist too many non-complementary preferences exhibited by the 
groups involved. Changes in the institutions will affect the choice 
sets of legislators and bureaucrats and will alter the relationships 
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between groups relative to the policy decision process. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 4 
1. The propositions developed herein which relate group 
preferences to the policy and/or instrument choice are concerned 
only with groups with positive access. That is, the number of 
access points for the group in not null. This caveat is a result 
of the assumption that the cost to lobbying for groups without 
access is infinite. 
2. The movements characterized are relative to the origin of the 
instrument 
space R1• 
3. On this point see Dorfman, et. al. (1980), also see "Decision 
Making for Regulating Chemicals in the Environment," National 
Academy of Sciences (1975) and '~ecision Making in the 
Environmental Protection Agency," National Academy of Sciences 
(1977). Further, the case studies in chapters 6 through 10 will 
illustrate this point as well. 
4. See "Hansen Reorganization Plan Adopted," Congressional 
Quarterly 
Weekly Report (October 12, 1974);2896-2898. 
S. See Southwick (1977). 
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Chapter 5. Operational Hypotheses. 
5.1 Introduction 
The discussion in chapter 2 revealed that the diverse 
literature on regulatory choice did not have much to say about the 
choice of regulatory instruments. The model drawn out in chapter 3 
and the analysis in chapter 4 have sought to provide a theory of 
instrument choice, as well as policy choice. 
However, several subsidiary questions concerning the choice of 
policy and instrument remain which the literature described in chapter 
2 also does not satisfactorily examine. We would like to address, 
briefly, two of the more important questions here. First, can we make 
generalizations about the organization and structure of administrative 
agencies and about the impact that such structural choices have on 
policy? Second, what are the effects of policy and instrument choices 
and the process by which they are chosen upon American society? 
But first, the model of chapter 3 and the analysis of chapter 
4 will be employed to seek systematic reasons for the failure of 
federal environmental, health and safety regulatory programs. Along 
the way we will define a set of operational hypotheses and discuss the 
techniques to be employed to test these operational hypotheses. 
5.2 Operational Hypotheses 
Various pieces of federal legislation attempt to regulate 
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hazards associated with chemicals, food additives, drugs, consumer 
products, pesticides, airborne and waterborne pollutants. This 
legislation spans many decades and varies in the kinds of regulatory 
mechanisms created and in the degree of discretionary authority 
granted to regulatory officials. The stated goals of this legislation 
are to identify and prevent significant health and environmental 
hazards before they become widely dispersed throughout our society and 
economy. Despite their seemingly broad and straightforward 
congressional mandates, however, most such laws have not been 
effectively implemented. 
The track record of federal programs in this area speaks for 
itself. The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) developed only 
3 mandatory safety standards in its firstS years. The Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has issued approximately 10 
workplace exposure standards in its 11 year history. The Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) has sought to ban only 3 food additives as 
carcinogens in 20 years. And the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has issued very few airborne carcinogen standards and banned 
only 9 pesticides in its 10 year history. EPA's Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TOSCA) • intended to be a "gap-filler" and improve on this 
dismal federal record, has been especially disappointing; EPA has 
issued only 6 regulations significantly controlling a toxic hazard 
under TOS CA. 
Despite wide differences in the statutory authority, program 
history, bureaucratic structure, political clientele, and political 
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origins of these programs, they share an apparent inability to develop 
an effective strategy for controlling even known hazards, let alone 
preventing new ones. 
Conventional explanations of these failures are as varied as 
the programs themselves . The Clean Air Act, as amended, has not been 
implementable because the act prohibits the use of cost-benefit 
analysis for such determination. The regulation of pesticides under 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act is stalemated 
because the agricultural committees in each chamber of Congress, who 
have jurisdiction over EPA's Office of Pesticides Programs, are 
generally opposed to the regulation of important pesticides by EPA. 
On the other hand, it is argued that the Office of Toxic Substances 
(OTS) has failed to implement TOSCA because the cost-benefit analyses 
necessary to promulgate a regulation under TOSCA are too strenuous, 
lengthy, and expensive. Though there exists some evidence to support 
each of these contentions, no satisfactory explanation exists which 
systematically explains the failure of the entire class of 
environmental, health and safety regulatory programs. 
The model developed in chapter 3 relates the incentives and 
influences of American governmental institutions to the choice of 
regulatory instruments and levels of substantive and procedural 
delegation by the legislature. The form of the legislation and the 
subsequent style of implementation and administration are a necessary 
consequence of the structure of these institutions of choice. 
The model of chapter 3 and the hypotheses of chapter 4 can 
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therefore present us with a possible explanation for this failure to 
regulate. We will need to make two assumptions concerning factors 
relative to an "as if" generalized environmental, health and safety 
issue. First, there is a great diversity of interest groups with a 
stake in the resolution of the issue. More specifically, there is a 
great diversity of preferences among interest groups with a stake in 
the issue (see Ripley and Franklin, 1976). Second, the firms to be 
regulated under the legislation possess a great diversity of 
production technologies (we will examine evidence on the structure of 
the regulated industries in the case-studies). 
The hypotheses derived in chapter 4 suggest the type of 
regulatory instruments, and the procedural and substantive discretion 
which we might expect given the conditions assumed above. We would 
expect Congress to delegate broad substantive authority to the agency 
and to specify the imposition of command and control instruments for 
the implementation of regulations at the production stages of the 
regulated firms, and to impose incentive-based or informational 
mechanisms for the implementation of regulations at other stages of 
the regulated firms' activities. 
Further, we would expect Congress to specify in great detail 
the procedures necessary for the promulgation of regulations under the 
agency's broad authority; the agency will be granted little 
discretionary authority over its own procedural requirements. 
Given the general validity of the assumptions above, the model 
of regulatory choice suggests a systematic explanation for the general 
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failure of environmental, health and safety regulatory programs. The 
politics and institutions of the American democracy provide incentives 
to legislators and bureaucrats for an over-reliance on command and 
control mechanisms for the implementation of environmental, health and 
safety policies. Such mechanisms are generally employed on a case-
by-case basis which in itself magnifies the costs and length of 
regulatory procedures and limits the scope of regulatory programs 
(Breyer, 1982 and Stewart, 1975). Further, incentives for a broad 
delegation of substantive authority are coupled with incentives for 
mandating specific, detailed and lengthy regulatory procedures for the 
promulgation of regulations in these programs. 
The requirements that regulations be implemented via command 
and control mechanisms developed through extended and convoluted 
decison procedures sufficiently stifle the regulatory activities 
mandated under this class of problems. Few regulations will be 
forthcoming under such conditions. 
The reliance on command and control mechanisms together with 
the lack of procedural discretion are not necessary conditions for the 
failure to regulate, and neither is sufficient by itself to 
precipitate the failure of such programs. Lack of procedural 
discretion combined with an incentive-based mechanism, which can be 
broadly applied to the production stages of firm activity, can provide 
significant regulation of the agency's jurisdiction. Though the 
development of the regulation will be expensive in terms of time and 
money, once in place it can provide expansive and complete regulation 
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of the agency's jurisdiction. Likewise , complete procedural 
discretion combined with command and control mechanisms can swiftly 
lead to the promulgation of vast numbers of regulations. 
It should be noted that if we violate the first assumption 
above the characteristics of the problem resemble the characteristics 
often ascribed to economic regulation; Wherein a narrow set of 
interests seek redress from market competition through government 
regulation. The hypotheses in chapter 4 suggest that under such 
assumptions, Congress will uniformly mandate command and control 
instruments for the implementation of regulatory policies at all 
stages of firm activity. Further, though the substantive discretion 
of the agency in such a case will be narrow, the procedural discretion 
granted the agency will be relatively wide. Such a situation, as 
suggested, could lead to a great amount of regulatory activity. 
The failure of environmental, health and safety regulatory 
programs can therefore be attributed to the politics and institutions 
of the American democracy and to how these institutions influence the 
form and content of the authorizing legislation in this area. In the 
next five chapters we will examine evidence from a variety of federal 
regulatory programs and will focus such evidence on the hypotheses of 
chapter 4 and on the argument as to the failure of environmental 
regulation just discussed. 
The operational hypotheses to which the case studies will be 
addressed are exhibited in Table 3. Column One of Table 3 outlines 
the expectations we just established concerning the form of 
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environmental, health and safety regulatory legislation, i.e. 
Congress will delegate broad substantive authority and will specify 
the imposition of command and control mechanisms for the 
implementation of regulations at the production stages and incentive-
based or informational instruments for the implementation of 
regulations at other stages of the regulated firm's activities. 
Further, Congress is expected to specify extensive and detailed 
regulatory decision procedures for the promulgation of regulations 
under this authority. Column Two outlines the expectations 
established for the form that economic regulation should take: 
Congress will delegate narrow substantive authority, command and 
control instruments, and broad procedural discretion. 









Type of Regulation 
Environmental, Health 
and Safety 
command and control 




command and control 




As mentioned, the evidence to be employed to test the 
operational hypotheses is drawn from federal legislative case studies. 
We will examine the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Consumer Product 
Safety Act, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the Civil 
Aeronautics Act, and briefly, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
Act and the Federal Energy Administration Act. Two of these acts, the 
aeronautics and drug acts, were passed in 1938, while, the remaining 
sample is drawn from legislation of the 1970's. 
The evidence available from such case studies is suitable to 
test the operational hypotheses (derivable from the general hypotheses 
of chapter 4) established in this section. The evidence available is 
not, however, suitable to test the hypotheses of chapter 4 directly in 
all instances. Though evidence will be given to justify the 
underlying assumptions (as to the diversity of interest group 
preferences and homogeneity of production technologies) made to 
translate the hypotheses of chapter 4 to the operational hypotheses 
here, such evidence is admittedly circumstantial and does not capture 
the full richness of the model's predictions. 
In order to test the hypotheses of chapter 4 in a rigorous 
manner it would be necessary to examine qualitatively information 
regarding the truthful rank-ordering of preferences for interest 
groups, legislators, voters and bureaucrats. Further information as 
to the level of campaign contributions forthcoming from lobbying 
groups and with regard to the changing electoral fate of each 
legislator would be important as well. An examination of agency 
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budgetary line-items as well as extensive evidence on the structure of 
the regulated industries are necessary as well in order to fully 
examine the hypotheses of chapter 4. However, such evidence is either 
impossible to attain or exists for only a few recent years and thus 
complete time-series on such evidence would not be available for any 
of the regulatory legislations examined herein. 
However, the evidence available in the legislative case-
studies will enable us to examine the operational hypotheses developed 
here in a systematic fashion. The legislative case-studies will 
present evidence on the course of regulatory legislation and will map 
the contours and boundaries of preferences for legislators, groups and 
bureaucrats over the proposed legislation. Such evidence together 
with evidence reflecting the nature of the interest group environment 
(homogeneous or heterogeneous) will be employed as proxies 
(instruments) for the preferences of legislators, groups and 
bureaucrats over the proposed legislation. This evidence will reflect 
the amount of conflict between groups over the choice of legislation 
and will therefore accurately reflect the underlying variables which 
we cannot observe. 
Extensive evidence on the form of the regulatory legislation 
enacted will be examined in order to test the predictions of the 
model, and the operational hypotheses established here. The 
legislative case-studies employed herein can therefore provide a 
substantial test of the operational hypotheses and the model of 
regulatory choice. 
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5.3 Administrative Agency Structure 
The purpose of this section is to suggest and justify some 
simple extensions and relaxations of the model of administrative 
agency behavior presented in section 3.4 and to show the implications 
of such an exercise for the development of policies and instruments by 
administrative agencies. Specifically, we shall be relaxing the 
assumption that the administrator has perfect knowledge of all groups' 
preferences. 
The expected utility maximizing model developed in section 3.4 
implies a general caution towards action by administrative agencies. 
But how will agencies structure themselves in order to satisfy their 
environment and produce 'good public policy' given their mandate from 
Congress? 
The administrator, in order to satisfy these often 
contradictory goals, must define a decision structure which produces a 
division of labor, rules of procedure and process, and proper 
incentives for behavior for agency personnel which will, in aggregate, 
lead to the maximization of his/her expected utility. 
The tightknit subgovernmental interactions between agencies, 
interest groups, and congressional subcommittees have been well 
documented (Cater, 1964; Davidson, 1977; Dodd and Oppenheimer, 1977; 
Fenno, 1966, 1973a; Ferejohn, 1974; Goodwin, 1970; Griffith, 1961; 
Lowi, 1973; Ripley and Franklin, 1976) However, the interaction can 
often become quite charged if the agency pursues a controversial 
course of action (Ripley, 1972, 1978; Fritschler, 1969). The agency 
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must structure its decision process in such a fashion as to avoid 
antagonizing important elements in its environment, such as powerful 
interest groups with access to Congress. That Congress is willing and 
able to act if the agency commits an impropriety is made clear by the 
recent examples of congressional intervention in FTC regulatory 
decisions concerning the regulation of children's television. 
Congress holds the power of life or death in the most 
elemental terms throughout the existence of any agency. The power to 
terminate, either by refusal to renew authorization or refusal to 
appropriate funds, is firmly lodged in Congress and nowhere else. 
That agencies are thus structured in the image of their creators is 
not an unexpected consequence of the relationship between Congress and 
the bureaucracy. The agency must structure its decision process in 
order to allow access to potentially affected groups who, if adversely 
affected by the agency's actions, may appeal the agency's decisions to 
Congress. The agency therefore would like to develop a decision 
process which accounts for the preferences of important groups in its 
environment and which allows easy access for such groups to the 
decision process so as to facilitate expression of their preferences. 
Indeed, a very sensible strateg~ for our administrator in 
his/her choice of structure can be shown to be to divide labor within 
the agency in accordance with the major interest groups in its 
environment. This 'mirroring' proposition suggests, in general, that 
the administrator will structure the agency in such a fashion as to 
mirror the major influences in its external environment. Each set of 
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major influences within the agency's environment will therefore be 
represented by a program office within the agency. 
Each program office will decide upon policy taking into 
account the impact of its decisions on its environmental jurisdiction. 
As to the decision process internal to the program offices, two 
general propositions have been suggested by Ferejohn (1981) which are 
similar to the mirroring proposition above. Ferejohn suggests that 
the agency will design its decision review process so that it will 
locate potentially controversial decisions in such a way as to permit 
them to be modified to take account of opposition. He further 
suggests that the agency will choose policies which narrow the scope 
of impact on such decisions. The mirroring proposition insures an 
abundance of access points for groups interested in the agency's 
decisions and thus provides the agency with a number of locations 
wherein it can determine the preferences of the interested groups and 
thereby locate potentially controversial policies. 
Thus the joint impact of the jurisdictional mirroring 
proposition here and Ferejohn's informational structuring principle is 
to identify, through multiple access points to interested groups, the 
preferences of groups in the agency's environment. Through such, 
agencies can identify policies within the agency's mandate which are 
not likely to create significant conflict from external organizations. 
The impact of all this on policy and instrument choice is that 
we will have large bureaucratic agencies, wherein the decision review 
process is extremely slow paced and the eventual decisions are almost 
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always non-controversial. Indeed, controversial actions will in all 
likelihood be deferred indefinitely. 
One interesting impact of such structuring is that the 
development of the individual jurisdictional fiefdoms within the 
agency will insure a great deal of conflict within the agency as it 
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battles out choices in a mirror of its environment. Such a situation 
can only serve to lengthen the decision process and exclude 
controversial policy choices. Agencies with large substantive 
mandates which involve a large number of interest groups will, by 
implication, be larger bureaucracies and slower decision makers than 
agencies with smaller substantive mandates. 
The impact on policy and instrument choice is clear. 
Controversial policies will rarely, if ever, be chosen by the agency. 
In general, the structuring propositions discussed above serve to 
heighten the influence of the powerful interest groups in the decision 
process and to insure them a better distribution of benefits from the 
actions taken. 
5.4 Impacts and Effects 
What are the distributional effects of the policy and 
instrument choice process described here? In simpliest terms, 
interest groups, especially wealthy, powerful, or well-connected 
groups, possess a disproportionate share of influence over the policy 
process. We have discussed how the institutions of choice and the 
incentives of actors working within these institutions serve to 
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heighten the influence of groups. Above all the structure of the 
legislature and of the bureaucracy serve to reinforce the intentions 
of the framers for government by minorities. That the legislature 
redefines controversial policies in order to make them more 
particularized and thus more easily palatable serves the interests of 
the legislature and also serves the interests of organized interest 
groups. The incentives induced to agency behavior from Congress lead 
agencies to structure themselves and choose policies which do not 
antagonize important groups in their environment. That agencies are 
de facto 'captured' by the groups they regulate is a necessary 
consequence of the incentives Congress gives them. 
Thus, from beginning to end, from origins to administration, 
the effect of the policy process is to distribute benefits to 
organized interest groups. This does not exclude the possibility of 
public interest representation. It merely suggests that organized 
private interests generally hold the key to policy decision. That the 
impact and effect of the decision process is to provide 
disproportionate influence and distribute disproportionate benefits to 
organized and powerful interest groups is not surprising given the 
intentions of the framers to establish a government of the minority. 
What is surprising is the subtle ways in which the influence of 
interests groups has been extended over time through conscious choices 
of Congress. Congress has structured its decision processes and has 
given incentives to the bureaucracy which induces the bureaucracy to 
structure its decision processes to enhance the access of organized 
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interest groups in the development of policy. Indeed, the choice of 
policy and particularly the choice of instrument, together with the 
influences on agency structure and decisions, have insured that 
Congress is the primary beneficiary of the system of choice. 
The devolution of power to the subcommittees and laterally to 
an ever larger number of members in each chamber, along with the 
continued expansion of the federal bureaucracy has been linked to the 
longevity of congressional careers in the twentieth century by Fiorina 
(1978). It has been suggested here that the choice of policy and 
instrument, and the structure of the congressional decision processes 
and agency decision processes have served to influence the tenure of 
congressional careers as well. 
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Chapter 6. The Toxic Substances Control Act 
6.1 Introduction 
In chapter 5 we established operational hypotheses regarding 
the form of environmental, health, safety and economic regulatory 
legislation (see table 3). In this chapter we will examine the 
legislative history of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TOSCA). The 
evidence uncovered by this case study will address the assumptions and 
expectations of these operational hypotheses. In particular, we will 
evidence the diversity of interest group preferences surrounding the 
choice of regulatory form and the diversity of production technologies 
endogenous to the chemical industry. We will further show that the 
form of the toxic substances legislation is indeed consistent with the 
expectations derived from the model of regulatory choice: that is, 
that EPA will be delegated broad substantive and narrow procedural 
discretion; that EPA will be mandated specific instrumentality to 
implement policies under TOSCA; and that these instruments will be 
command and control mechanisms at the production stages and 
incentive-based or information mechanisms at the non-production 
stages. 
6.2 The Origins of TOSCA 
The list of substances causing cancer or serious health 
problems was long and growing longer by 1970. But with the exception 
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of drugs, food additives, and pesticides, the federal government had 
no power to regulate chemical compounds before they were introduced 
into commerce. Indeed, it seemed that federal agencies could do 
little more than react to the damage already inflicted by heretofore 
unknown toxic chemical hazards. 
It was clear to Russell Train, new chairman of the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ), that the government needed to gain 
authority to require manufacturers to test their new chemical 
substances for potential adverse health effects before manufacture and 
distribution commenced. Authority to regulate such chemicals, if such 
tests indicated a potential risk to health or the environment, was the 
only solution to the growing danger from uncontrolled chemical use. 
In the spring of 1970 the Council therefore, began drafting a bill to 
accomplish these purposes. It would not be until the fall of 1976, 
however, that a Toxic Substances Control Act would finally be signed 
into law. The entire 6-year history of the act, the final composition 
of the legislative enactment, and the eventual problems of 
implementation serve to illustrate how the nature and institutions of 
the American democracy influence the course of legislation. 
The first CEQ draft, begun in early 1970, was completed and 
circulated for comment by December of that year. The proposed bill 
was intended to fill the existing gap in federal regulatory authority 
over chemicals, and the draft vested in the EPA an authority over 
chemicals similar to the FDA's authority over new drugs. 1 EPA, in the 
bill, was to be given the authority to require notification and 
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testing of chemicals before they were to be marketed, and to regulate 
chemical substances which were potentially hazardous to health and the 
environment. 
The toxics bill was to be included with a wide range of 
environmental proposals to be sent to Congress as part of President 
Nixon's environmental message. But the struggle to develop an 
administration bill to send to Congress would prove to be tortuous and 
costly for CEQ. The newly resurgent Department of Commerce, 
fulfilling its function to represent the interests of business, 
immediately registered its adamant opposition to the premarket 
notification and testing provisions of the CEQ draft. 
It is interesting to note that the formal structure for 
determining industry preferences was already in place. An advisory 
group called the National Industrial Pollution Control Council, 
established by President Nixon earlier that year, convened corporate 
chairmen and presidents to "advise" the administration on matters 
related to industrial pollution. The Council quickly conveyed their 
"advice" on the CEQ bill to Maurice Stans and James Lynn in Commerce. 
Commerce then dutifully echoed the concerns of the chemical industry 
that the premarket notification and testing provisions of the draft 
bill might adversely affect the technological growth of the chemical 
industry in much the same way that the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act has (it was claimed) inhibited technological growth in the drug 
industry. 2 
It is of further interest to note that the electoral 
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requirements specified in the Constitution have similar impacts on 
both the executive and congressional decision structures. The formal 
structure of executive decision making, wherein all concerned federal 
agencies must read a proposed bill and submit comments to the Office 
of Management and Budget (which then arbitrates disagreements between 
these concerned agencies) serves to decentralize decision-making and 
provides access and influence to organized interest groups (in this 
case largely to the chemical industry) •3 It was argued in Chapter 3 
that the decentralization of congressional decision-making has largely 
these same consequences. 
The negotiations that winter between EPA, CEQ and Commerce 
were long and heated and led to several concessions by CEQ and to a 
series of new and substantially weakened CEQ draft bills. But the 
central issue of premarket notification and testing could not be 
resolved at the OMB level. The issue was to be resolved in the Oval 
Office, by Nixon, who eventually sided with Stans and Commerce against 
the premarket notice and testing provisions. However, the new draft 
bill, without these provisions, was not completed in time for the 
President's environmental message of February 8, 1971 but was sent to 
Congress 3 days later. 
6.3 Two Years of Neglect 
The first two years of congressional debate on the toxic 
substances legislation were characterized by the quiet of neglect. As 
we discussed in chapter 3, the framers of the Constitution intended 
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the legislative decision structure to serve as a forum for interest 
group preference aggregation for the development of policy. The 
congressional response to the Constitutional structure was to heighten 
the decentralization and fragmentation suggested therein, principally 
through the development of a system of standing committees and 
subcommittees and through rules of procedure and behavior developed to 
facilitate the smooth functioning of the system. It was further 
suggested that these institutional arrangements are derived from the 
goals of congressmen and are designed to serve their purposes. 
Within this decentralized decision framework inventive and 
conscientious members can construct a network of procedural roadblocks 
to detour and delay almost any proposed legislation. Such was to be 
the glory of Congressman Harley 0. Staggers (D.-W.Va.), chairman of 
the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. Staggers 
introduced the freshly gutted administration bill to the House in 
March, 1971, and the bill was referred to his committee for 
consideration (HR5276). There, with the aid of a massive organized 
lobbying effort by the chemical industry and an all but absent 
administration forestalled by other pressing matters, the bill laid 
idle in committee while Staggers refused to assign it to a 
subcommittee for consideration. Staggers instead allowed two of his 
subcommittee chairmen, John Moss (D.-Ca.) and Paul Rogers (D.-Fla.), 
to squabble over jurisdiction. It was not until eight months later 
that Staggers finally gave jurisdiction to Moss's Consumer Protection 
and Finance Subcommittee, and it would not be until May, 1972 that 
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hearings on the bill were finally held in the House. 
In the Senate the influence of Constitutional requirements is 
not as strong as in the House. The longer term in office for Senators 
and the smaller size of the Senate offer different incentives for the 
establishment of institutional arrangements and decision structures. 
The dance of legislation (and the outcomes of the process) in the 
Senate is often much different than in the House. In the upper 
chamber, Senator Philip Hart (D.-Mich.) introduced the administration 
bill in April, 1971 (S1478). The bill was unceremoniously referred to 
the Senate Commerce Committee wherein it was immediately revised. The 
result was re-introduced by Senator William Spong (D.-Va.) in July 
that same year. The Spong bill was much like the original CEQ draft, 
resurrecting the premarket notification and testing provisions and 
adding language to make the act a Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(FFDCA) for chemicals. Provisions of the Spong bill further allowed 
for citizen petitions and civil suits of the EPA and other alleged 
violators of the act, and gave EPA powers to protect against imminent 
hazards. 
But opposition to the bill was increasingly strong in 
contradiction to public support which was all but absent. In the 
manner of the classic legislative debates described by Schattschnieder 
(1960), the business lobbying organizations, principally the 
Manufacturing Chemists Associations (MCA) and the Synthetic Organic 
Chemical Manufacturers Association (SOCMA), committed their immense 
resources to the legislative battle against feeble and unorganized 
•t• 4 oppos1 1on. 
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Environmental interest groups, though supportive, had 
chosen to invest their scarce lobbying resources in the fight for 
other legislation, leaving TOSCA to its own course. Indeed, the major 
environmental support forthcoming during the early years of TOSCA was 
quiet pressure circuitously applied from the EPA, the CEQ, and a 
number of Senate environmental subcommittee staffers. None the less, 
a great divergence of preferences were represented before Congress in 
the debate over toxic substances legislation, as was assumed in the 
preconditions for the operational hypotheses. 
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TABLE 4 
Major Lobbying Groups: TOSCA 
Hajor Business Lobbyist Organizations 
Air Transport Association 
of America 
American Farm Bureau Association 
American Gas Association 
American Iron and Steel Institute 
American Mining Congress 
American Paper Institute 
American Petroleum Institute 
American Public Power Association 
American Public Works Association 
American Water Works Association 
Association of ~!etropolitan 
Sewerage Agencies 
Atomic Industrial Forum 
Automobile Manufacturers Association 
Edison Electric Institute 
Electric Power Council 
Independent Petroleum Association 
Lead Industries Association 
Manufacturing Chemists Association 
National Agricultural Chemical 
Association 
National Association of 
Electrical Companies 
National Association of 
Manufacturers 
National Association of Secondary 
Materials Industries 
National Coal Association 
National Coal Policy Conference 
National Farmers Union 
National Grange 
National Petroleum Refiners 
Association 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
Waste and Wastewater Equipment 
Manufacturers Association 
National Solid Waste Management 
Association 
Synthetic Organic Chemical 
Manufacturers Association 
Major Environmentalist Organizations 
American Forestry Association 
Sierra Club 
National Audobon Society 
Nature Conservancy 
National Parks and Conservation 
Association 
Izaak Walton League of America 
Wilderness Society 
National Wildlife Federation 
Wildlife Society 
Natural Resources Council of America 
Wildlife Management Institute 
Conservation Foundation 
Sport Fishing Institute 
Resources for the Future, Inc . 
Citizens Committee on Natural Resources 
National Recreation and Parks 
Association 
Environmental Action 
Friends of the Earth 
Zero Population Growth 
AFL-CIO 
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Spong had little hope but for a compromise bill. Out of the 
bill came the certification provision, replaced by a section allowing 
the production and distribution of a new chemical to go forward 
unless, during the notification period, EPA moved to promulgate a test 
rule or to ban or restrict the chemical. 
This compromise, a small change in language, had immense 
implications for the implementation of the act. The certification 
provisions of the FFDCA allow the FDA to virtually 'sit' on new drug 
applications, many times for a number of years, without appproving the 
manufacturer's application, and thus by law the marketing of the drug 
could not proceed. The new language inserted into TOSCA was designed 
to specifically avoid just this problem, by allowing the chemical 
manufacturing to begin if the EPA has not taken action against the 
chemical during a well specified period of time. 
''The certification provision died," claims Michael Brownlee, a 
Senate Environment Subcommittee staffer working with Senator Spong, 
because the environmental and organized labor groups weren't 
there to counterbalance the heavy industry pressure. 'We 
couldn't live with certification,' he says, 'it was a strategic 
retreat. That provision was just absolutely crapped on by 
everybody around except the environmental groups. But they were 
never tuned in at that point. The environmental groups hadn't 
done much lobbying on this bill. Or the organized labor groups 
either. They weren't geared up like they are now. It could have 
made a difference, but there was nobody around lobbying the 
senators who might have gone that way Jfavored certification). 
It was rather lonely around here then. 
The compromised bill was sent to the floor of the Senate in 
May, 1972 with William Spong acting as the floor manager. Events did 
not proceed smoothly on the floor either. On the floor, Senator 
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Howard Baker, Jr. (R.-Tenn.) proposed an important weakening amendment 
much favored by the chemical industry. EPA, in the Spong bill, had 
authority to require the testing of all new chemicals except those 
which posed no unreasonable environmental or public health threat. 
The Baker amendment proposed the testing of only those chemicals that 
EPA specifically found may pose an unreasonable threat to health and 
the environment. Such a change in language would severely restrict 
the testing authority of EPA and thus similarly constrict the 
regulatory authority granted EPA under the Spong bill. After much 
arm-twisting by Spong, the Senate narrowly rejected the Baker 
amendment. The compromised Spong bill then breezed to passage, 77-Q. 
Meanwhile, as the Spong bill was being passed in the Senate, 
the Moss subcommittee had just started hearings on the 
administration's bill in the House. Moss proposed a new draft which 
attempted to move the administration bill closer to the newly passed 
Spong bill, by including a very restricted premarket screening 
provision. The industry banner was then energetically taken up by 
Congressmen John McCollister (R.-Neb.) and James Broyhill (R.-N.C.). 
The two conservative representatives, with the full support of the 
chemical industry and Staggers, proceeded to keep the subcommittee in 
session by proposing a series of weakening amendments to the Moss 
bill. It was hoped that the bill would be tied up in the subcommittee 
long enough that no action could be forthcoming in this session of 
Congress. 
The bill eventually reached the House floor on October 13, 
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1972. With only 5 days left until Congress adjourned, Staggers, the 
floor manager for the bill, declared with a great deal of satisfaction 
that there was not enough time for a compromise to be struck with the 
Senate, and "that at this late hour, if this bill passes this House 
today, that there will not be any conference with the Senate.'~ In 
the rush before adjournment Staggers brought the amended Moss bill to 
the floor under a closed rule prohibiting amendments. The bill then 
passed the House , and the fate of TOSCA was sealed for this session, 
as the House bill, without the possibility of amendment, differed too 
widely from the Senate bill for a compromise to be reached in the 
short time available. Staggers' strategy had worked perfectly. 
Through the creative use of procedural contrivances, Staggers 
had successfully forestalled the toxics bill for the 92nd Congress. 
However, looking back, we can notice that the future of the bill was 
beginning to take shape. The Senate, responding to its broader based 
constituencies, allowed greater access to environmental, health and 
safety interests and the bills developed therein reflected these 
groups' greater influence. The House, restricted by the shorter 
tenure of office and its more narrowly defined constituencies, 
reflected much more closely the preferences of the chemical industry 
in its proposals. The next four years of legislative debate would 
reinforce these differences, and the strategies of the chemical 
industry during this period would play heavily upon this fact. 
6.4 Another Defeat 
154 
The 93rd Congress convened with the administration still 
immersed in a heated debate over the specific provisions of the new 
toxics legislation to be sent to Congress. The new administration 
bill, though somewhat tougher than the administration bill sent to the 
92nd Congress, was still without any premarked notification and 
testing provision. 
Senator Robert Byrd (D.-W.Va.) introduced the new 
administration bill to the Senate in February, 1973 (8426). Stronger 
backing by EPA personnel in testimony before the Senate Environment 
Subcommittee brought about a slight change in the administration's 
perceived position on premarket screening. Although the premarket 
screening provision advocated by the White House was weaker than even 
the House version in the Moss bill, the 93rd Congress marked the first 
time the administration and both chambers of Congress were seeking 
some form of premarket screening (the new House bill was similar to 
the old Moss-Broyhill-McCollister bill and contained a weak premarket 
screening provision (HR5087)). 
The swing towards a stronger toxics bill did not long escape 
the attention of the chemical industry. The industry echoed its 
desires that the legislation apply to only the use and distribution of 
chemicals and not to their manufacture, and did not strenuously seek a 
compromise. Instead, the industry worked hard in the ensuing months 
to weaken an already soft House version in the hope that, by creating 
a wide divergence between the House and Senate bills, it would be 
impossible to reconcile the House and Senate bills in conference. 
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John Tunney (D.-Ca.), the new sponser of the bill, recognized 
the jeopardy occasioned by the new industry strategy and scrambled for 
a compromise. The old dead Baker amendment7 was given new life and 
the premarket screening provision was amended. The earlier Spong 
bill, and the bill advocated by the EPA and the CEQ, had given the EPA 
broad categorical authority to require testing (and therefore possible 
regulation) of all new chemical substances before the chemical could 
be marketed this so-called certification provision was similar in-
effect to the FDA's authority over new drugs. The compromise worked 
out by Tunney is similar to the final bill to be passed in 1976. This 
new compromise language allowed for EPA to a priori require testing 
only of new chemical substances which are on the EPA's inventory list 
of dangerous chemicals (the clairvoyance provision). and to require 
testing of other new chemicals on a case-by-case basis. 
EPA could therefore not. a priori, require testing of the 
hundreds of thousands of new chemicals produced each year over which 
EPA had little or no information about their health and environmental 
effects. EPA could only proceed against these chemicals on a case-
by-case basis, something which would eventually emerge as one of the 
largest stumbling blocks to EPA in its efforts to regulate toxic 
substances. 
With this new language the Tunney bill was passed by the 
Senate in July, 1973. At about the same time in the House, Broyhill, 
McCollister and newcomer Samuel Young (R.-111.) pushed through a 
series of amendments weakening the House version and widening the gulf 
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between the two chambers' respective bills. The most important of 
these amendments, strongly supported by industry, was a provision 
prohibiting EPA from taking action under TOSCA if a remedy was 
available under any other federal law, an approach relegating TOSCA to 
a backseat position and guaranteeing that virtually any action taken 
under the act could be tied up in court for years. This provision, in 
substantially the same form, found its way into the final version of 
the act passed in 1976. 
The story of the toxics legislation in the 93rd Congress is 
thus all over but for the crying. The House bill was passed in July, 
1973 (HR5356), and a conference was called to reconcile the 
differences between the House and Senate versions. The industry 
strategy had worked well however, as the two versions differed by 
substantial margins and compromise would prove difficult. However, 
time was more than adequate for a compromise to be reached; the 
conferees had a full eighteen months to reach a compromise on the two 
bills before the 93rd Congress adjourned. The conference committee 
met three times in 1973 without success. Staggers, who held the key 
vote on the House committee missed several meetings, thus hopelessly 
deadlocking the committee throughout these sessions. As chairman of 
the conference, Staggers then refused to call another meeting for 
almost a year. Without the support of the administration, and with 
only the passing support of environmental and health groups, TOSCA 
died again in 1974. 
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6.5 Toxics Legislation 
Like the change of seasons. the winter and spring of 1975 saw 
both the industry and the Ford administration soften and then retrench 
their positions on the toxics legislation. But the once solid front 
of the industry hard-line was dissolving. Several smaller firms began 
to seek some form of mild regulation in preference to the uncertainty 
associated with the increasing number of court suits relative to their 
unabated toxic hazards. Further, labor groups were becoming more 
active and vocal in their support of the toxics legislation. These 
labor groups employing their extensive resources "educated" a number 
of legislators and helped to balance the influence of the chemical 
interests in the toxics debate. 
The prospects for passage of a toxics bill in the 94th 
Congress thus appeared somewhat brighter. In the summer of 1975. the 
Senate Commerce Committee began considering Tunney's new offering 
(S776). However. opposition to the bill by committee member Vance 
Hartke (D.-Ind.) forced a deadlock on the committee. Tunney. in order 
to get the bill voted out of committee, then drafted a new compromise 
bill with Hartke, moving the Senate bill closer to the House version. 
The redrafted Tunney bill then easily passed the committee and the 
Senate in March. 1976. 
Meanwhile, William Brodhead (D.-Mt.) introduced toxics 
legislation similar to the Tunney bill to the House. In committee the 
Brodhead bill was to incorporate a number of weaker provisions 
contained in a bill sponsored by Robert Eckhardt (D.-Tx.). The 
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Brodhead-Eckhardt bill would fare, well being approved by the House 
subcommittee in December, 1975. Much of the success of the toxics 
legislation this session was due, in part, to the elections of 1974, 
which had dramatically altered the profile of the subcommittee, 
increasing the 5-4 Democratic majority to 6-2, and ousting 
conservative Democrats and Republicans alike in favor of new, younger 
liberals. 
However, Staggers, again, using his position as chairman of 
the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, delayed action on 
the bill by refusing to schedule committee review of the bill before 
May 15, 1976. This strategy not only bought time for industry to 
retrench and focus its efforts on the House, but also allowed the 
important deadline for which new legislation authorizing spending must 
be reported to the floor to pass without action on TOSCA. 
Finally, after the drafting of yet another compromise, the 
House bill was passed and for the first time the House-Senate 
conference met with House and Senate toxics bills similar enough in 
content and language for a compromise to be reached. The recent 
kepone disaster and the perception that Jimmy Carter, who was 
suspected to favor a strong toxics bill, seemed destined for the White 
House, brought the industry to a more compromising stance. President 
Ford signed the bill into law on October 11, 1976. 
The final compromise which precipitated the bill's passage was 
a new provision requiring that EPA seek a district court order when it 
desired a chemical firm to conduct more extensive testing of a new 
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chemical substance. This new requirement assuaged the industry's 
fears that EPA would capriciously require more extensive testing and 
guaranteed EPA would not easily require the testing of new chemicals. 
The history of the toxics legislation indeed tells the story 
of the American legislative system and serves to illustrate the model 
developed in Chapter 3. The emphasis on interest group 
representation, the institutional incentives which differentially 
influence Congressmen and Senators to seek the fulfillment of these 
represented groups' preferences, and the institutional decision 
structures of each chamber borne from these differing incentives each 
colored and metamorphized the form of the toxics legislation. 
6 .6 Noble Language and False Teeth 
EPA inherited broad substantive discretionary authority to 
regulate toxic hazards, but the implementation of such authority has 
proved to be next to impossible. In seeking to exercise the authority 
granted EPA under TOSCA the agency has been stymied by a seemingly 
endless maze of procedures specified in the act for the promulgation 
of a regulation. In this section we will take a closer look at TOSCA 
and will attempt to draw evidence in support of the hypotheses 
developed in chapter 4 and the contentions discussed in chapter 5. 
Given the diversity of interest group preferences advanced 
before Congress in the debate over TOSCA and given the wide range of 
production technologies in the chemical industry (see Backman, 1964) 
the operational hypotheses established in chapter 5 offer clear 
160 
expectations for the form of the toxics legislation. Briefly, TOSCA 
should grant broad regulatory authority and narrow procedural 
authority to EPA, and should specify command and control instruments 
for the implementation of regulations at the production stages and 
either incentive-based or informational mechanisms for the 
implementation of regulations at other stages of the chemical firm's 
activities. In this section we shall closely examine the Toxic 
Substances Control Act to identify the substantive and procedural 
authority defined therein and the regulatory instruments specified. 
The policy of Congress in legislating authority to EPA is 
described, in quite noble language, in subsection 2(a)(2) of the act, 
Adequate authority should exist to regulate chemical 
substances and mixtures which present an unreasonable risk of 
injury to health or the environment, and to take action with 
respect to chemical substances and mixtures which are imminent 
hazards. 
The scope of regulatory authority granted EPA was broadly 
defined in subsection 6(a) of the act, 
If the Administrator finds that there is a reasonable 
basis to conclude that the manufacture, processing, distribution 
in commerce, use, or disposal of a chemical substance or mixture 
or that any combination of such activities, presents, or will 
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment, the Administrator shall by rule apply one or more of 
the following requirements to such substance or mixture to the 
extent necessary to protect adequately against such risk using 
the least burdensome requirements. 
Broad regulatory discretion was granted EPA under TOSCA in 
three other sections as well: Section 4 establishes and sets forth 
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EPA's authority to require testing of new chemicals; Section 5 
establishes and sets forth EPA's authority to require premanufacturing 
notices for new chemicals; and Section 7 sets forth the provisions and 
authority that EPA has to control imminent hazards. 
This broad delegation of regulatory authority was coupled with 
broad discretion over the choice of regulatory instruments. The act 
mandates a broad set of regulatory mechanisms employable to carry 
through the policy goals of the act. A major set of these instruments 
is defined in subsection 6(a), 
Section 6(a) 
(1) A requirement (A) prohibiting the manufacturing, 
processing, or distribution in commerce of such substance or 
mixture, or (B) limiting the amount of such substance or mixture 
which may be manufactured, processed, or distributed in commerce. 
(2) A requirement -- (A) prohibiting the manufacture, 
processing or distribution in commerce of such substance or 
mixture for (i) a particular use or (ii) a particular use in a 
concentration in excess of a level specified by the Administrator 
in rule imposing the requirement, or (B) limiting the amount of 
such substance or mixture which may be manufactured, processed, 
or distributed in commerce for (i) a particular use of (ii) a 
particular use in a concentration in excess of a level specified 
by the Administrator in the rule imposing the requirement. 
(3) A requirement that such substance or mixture or any 
article containing such substance or mixture be marked with or 
accompanied by clear and adequate warnings and instructions with 
respect to its use, distribution in commerce, or disposal or with 
respect to any combination of such activities. The form and 
content of such warnings and instructions shall be prescribed by 
the Administrator. 
(4) A requirement that manufacturers and processors of 
such substance or mixture make or retain records of the processes 
used to manufacture or process such substance or mixture and 
monitor or conduct tests which are reasonable and necessary to 
assure compliance with the requirements of any rule applicable 
under this subsection. 
(5) A requirement prohibiting or otherwise regulating 
any manner or method of commercial use of such substance or 
mixture. 
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(6) (A) A requirement prohibiting or otherwise 
regulating any manner or method of disposal of such substance or 
mixture. or of any article containing such substance or mixture. 
by its manufacturer or processor or by any other person who uses. 
or disposes of. it for commercial purposes. (B) A requirement 
under subparagraph (A) may not require any person to take any 
action which would be in violation of any law or requirement of. 
or in effect for. a State or political subdivision. and shall 
require each person subject to it to notify each State and 
political subdivision in which a required disposal may occur of 
such disposal. 
(7) A requirement directing manufacturers of processors 
of such a substance or mixture (A) to give notice of such 
unreasonable risk of injury to distributors in commerce of such 
substance or mixture and. to the extent reasonably ascertainable. 
to other persons in possession of such substance or mixture or 
exposed to such substance or mixture. (B) to give public notice 
of such risk of injury. and (C) to replace or repurchase such 
substance or mixture as elected by the person to which the 
requirement is directed. 
As suggested by this excerpt from subsection 6{a). Congress 
was very specific with regard to the regulatory instruments EPA could 
employ to implement policies under TOSCA. EPA can implement 
regulations pertaining to the production activities (manufacture. 
processing and distribution) of chemical manufacturers only through 
command and control mechanisms (prohibitions and limitations). as 
specified in subsections 6(a)(l). 6(a){2). 6(a)(5). and 6(a)(6). 
Congress also clearly mandated largely informational mechanisms for 
the regulation of other activities as detailed in subsections 6{a)(3) 
' 
and 6(a)(7) (warnings and instructions and public notice). 
This specificity with regard to regulatory instruments was an 
attempt by Congress to require EPA to take substantial action on toxic 
hazards. It was felt that by specifically mandating such a broad 
range of instruments EPA could approach a wide range of problems using 
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methods which would not only lead to swift resolution but would also 
pass tests of validity in court. In any case the pattern of 
instruments specified fits precisely with the predictions of the 
model. 
Along with these predominantly command and control mechanisms. 
extensive procedural and due process requirements were detailed (in 
sections 4. s. 6. 9. 19. 20 and 21) for the exercise of the broad 
regulatory authority granted EPA under the act. Sections 4. s. 6 and 
9 of the statute. though defining who has what rights before EPA. are 
primarily concerned with defining EPA regulatory decision-making 
procedures. Figure 2 details the lengthy procedures specified in the 
act that EPA is required to follow for the promulgation of a 
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Under the regulatory procedure defined in sections 4, 5 and 6, 
a manufacturer must submit notice of intent to manufacture a new 
chemical substance 90 days prior to manufacture, and upon such notice, 
and within the time frame specified in the act, EPA can take one of 
four courses of action: EPA can allow the manufacturing processing 
and distribution in commerce of the new chemical to proceed without 
further testing; EPA can obtain a court order to require more testing 
pursuant to a test rule developed in section 4 (notice the procedures 
necessary to develop a test rule, outlined in parts 4 and 5 of figure 
2, are very extensive in their own right); EPA can propose a 
regulation for the chemical which, if challenged, is subject to court 
review and necessitates the fulfillment of the numerous due process 
requirements of section 6 (part 6 figure 2), or finally, if the 
chemical presents an imminent risk of serious and widespread injury, 
EPA can obtain a court order to seize the chemical and then begin its 
rule-making activity. 
This lengthy and tortuous procedure, outlined in Figure 2, 
guarantees that all interested parties will have numerous points of 
access and influence in EPA decision-making under TOSCA. Such access 
points are boxed in Figure 2. This extensive and labyrinthine 
procedure detailed by Congress for the promulgation of a regulation 
under TOSCA has two otherwise noteworthy ingredients. First is the 
explicit time limit for taking action under the act (90 days). Second 
is the requirement that a test rule be developed for each new chemical 
substance submitted for manufacture. The effect of the time limit is 
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to insure that action will not be taken in a vast majority of cases. 
In less than a dozen instances has it been necessary for EPA to abide 
by the procedures specified in the act, as it can rarely respond in 
time. Manufacturing and distribution of chemicals are allowed to 
proceed without EPA action. 
The test rule requirement reinforces the mandated ineptitude 
of the Office of Toxic Substances (OTS). EPA, under Section 4, must 
devise a test rule requiring and specifying tests of each new chemical 
substance. Such tests are used to generate information about the 
health and environmental effects of the new chemical. Each test rule 
is in itself voluminous and requires many months, even years, to 
develop. The costs in time and resources to the agency are enormous. 
Few chemicals can be tested and therefore few chemicals will be 
subject to eventual EPA regulation. 
As was seen in Figure 2, even if EPA goes to the time and 
expense of devising a test rule to require testing, has the tests 
done, evaluates the test results and finally proposes a regulation, 
there is still little guarantee that the regulation will ever have the 
force of law. All decisions by EPA under TOSCA are subject to an 
almost endless round of hearings and court appeals. If this were not 
enough, these are not the only obstacles presented by the act. 
Sections 20 and 21 enfranchise all citizens, through the use of 
citizen petitions or civil suits, to require enforcement of TOSCA by 
EPA (or reversal of action). Section 19 further specifies that all 
actions by EPA under TOSCA are subject to judicial review in a federal 
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district court. Though it is quite possible that all actions taken by 
EPA under TOSCA would be subject to court review without section 19 it 
is noteworthy here that Congress specifically enfranchised all 
interested parties (not just those adversely affected by a ruling) to 
have the right of bringing a court review. Further, unlike many other 
regulatory acts, court review of EPA decision-making is possible at 
may junctures before a final ruling is made. 
EPA is further required to closely coordinate its activities 
with other federal health and safety programs. As each of these 
programs has its own legislative mandate, decision-making structure, 
congressional oversight committees and clientele groups, each 
interaction required of EPA magnifies the decision-making procedures 
and the number of interested parties involved in any rule-making under 
TOSCA. 
In subsection 4(e) EPA is required to develop a priority list 
of chemicals for the promulgation of test rules under section 4 (this 
is in essence the Tunney-Baker comproruise).8 However, the membership 
of the committee is not EPA's sole domain, only one member of the 
eight member committee is appointed by EPA, as specified in subsection 
4(e){2)(A), 
Section 4(e)(2)(A) 
(2)(A) The committee established by paragraph (1)(1) 
shall consist of eight members as follows: 
(i) One member appointed by the Administrator from the 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
(ii) One member appointed by the Secretary of Labor from 
officers or employees of the Department of Labor engaged in the 
Secretary's activities under the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act on 1970. 
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(iii) One member appointed by the Chairman of the 
Council on Environmental Quality from the Council or its officers 
or employees. 
(iv) One member appointed by the Director of the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health from 
officers or employees of the Institute. 
(v) One member appointed by the Director of the National 
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences from officers or 
employees of the Institute. 
(vi) One member appointed by the Director of the 
National Cancer Institute from officers of employees of the 
Institute. 
(vii) One member appointed by the Director of the 
National Science Foundation from officers or employees of the 
Foundation. 
(viii) One member appointed by the Secretary of Commerce 
from officers or employees of the Department of Commerce. 
Much of the language and intent of the McCollister amendments 
was also carried through to the final bill9 , as evidenced in 
subsections 9(a) and 9(b) which clearly puts TOSCA in a back-seat 
position relative to other federal programs for enforcement: 
Section 9(a) 
(a) Laws Not Administered By the Administrator -- (1) 
If the Administrator has reasonable basis to conclude that the 
manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or 
disposal of a chemical substance or mixture, or that any 
combination of such activities, presents or will present an 
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment and 
determines, in the Administrator's discretion, that such risk may 
be prevented or reduced to a sufficient extent by action taken 
under a federal law not administered by the Administrator, the 
Administrator shall submit to the agency which Administers such 
law a report which describes such risk and includes in such 
description a specification of the activity or combination of 
activities which the Administrator has reason to believe so 
presents such risk. 
Section 9(b) 
(b) Laws Administered By the Administrator -- The 
Administrator shall coordinate actions taken under this Act with 
actions taken under other federal laws administered in whole or 
in part by the Administrator. If the Administrator determines 
that a risk to health or the environment associated with a 
chemical substance or mixture could be eliminated or reduced to a 
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sufficient extent by actors taken under the authorities contained 
in such other federal laws, the Administrator shall use such 
authorities to protect against such risk unless the Administrator 
determines, in the Administrator's discretion, that it is in the 
public interest to protect against such risk by actions taken 
under this Act. 
Together the procedural specifications, due process 
guarantees, and inter-agency cooperation provisions serve to extend 
the decision-making process in the Office of Toxic Substances and to 
enlarge the set of interest groups enfranchised to have a voice in 
agency decision-making. This ultimately precludes EPA from exercising 
the broad regulatory authority granted under TOSCA. 
In response to these extensive procedural requirements EPA has 
itself, as hypothesized in chapter 5, created a labyrinthine structure 
for the development of regulations under the act. The procedural 
requirements for action under TOSCA, as devised by EPA, take a full 
6400 pages in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). In contrast, as 
will be examined in chapter 10, the procedural requirements for the 
CAB to approve a new airline tariff are described in only 800 pages in 
the CFR and consist primarily of filing requirements. 
This evidence, then, strongly supports the operational 
hypotheses established in chapter 5 and thus serves to support the 
model of regulatory choice posited earlier. The specification that 
command and control instruments be employed to implement production 
regulations and that informational mechanisms are required to 
implement policies at other than the production stages of the 
regulated firm tinder TOSCA (subsection 6a) strongly support hypotheses 
H5 and H6 (as well as table 3). Further, the broad substantive 
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authority granted EPA (subsections 2a and 6a) and the extensive 
procedural guidelines required of EPA in TOSCA (especially sections 4, 
5 and 6) are quite in line with hypotheses H8 and H9. 
It should be noted, before we conclude our discussion of 
TOSCA, that an alternative explanation exists for the procedural 
specificity by Congress in TOSCA. It has been argued that Congress 
had originally written TOSCA in a manner so as to facilitate its 
implementation. The extensive procedural specificity in the act was a 
means of insuring that EPA would indeed implement the intent of 
Congress and was also an effort by Congress to preempt the courts from 
defining the due-process procedures necessary for promulgating a 
regulation under TOSCA (in order to reduce uncertainty and ease 
. 1 . ) 10 1mp ementa t1on • Such an argument can explain the specification of 
due-process enfranchisements in sections 19, 20 and 21 and also many 
(though not all) of the requirements of public hearings and comments 
in sections 4, 5, 6 and 7. However, such an argument cannot explain 
the specification of a priority list in sections 4(e) nor the 
specification of a test rule in section 4, as neither is required 
(neither by the courts nor by Congress) in similar rule-making 
procedures for the FDA (as we will see in chapter 8). Further, post-
hoc evidence on the dismal record of EPA's implementation of TOSCA 
generally refutes the underlying argument that Congress wished TOSCA 
to be implemented. 
However, it is generally true that the model of regulatory 
choice developed herein ignores the role of the courts and the 
176 
influence that the courts wield in legislative decision-making. An 
examination of congressional strategies vis-a-vis the courts, though 
outside the scope of the present analysis, might prove fruitful in the 
explanation of various aspects of the choice of regulatory form. 
Thus, though the final verdict on toxic substances regulation 
in the U.S. has yet to be passed down, the jury is in on TOSCA. The 
dysfunctional regulatory instruments and decision-making procedures 
specified in the act for the development and implementation of toxic 
chemical regulation renders EPA inert and inefficacious in the pursuit 
of such regulation. Inasmuch, toxic chemicals will continue to pose a 
serious and widespread health problem for which relief is under 
existing law unattainable. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 6 
1. Briefly, FDA has certification authority over new drugs, as 
no new drug may be marketed without FDA certification. We will 
discuss this further in chapter 8. 
2. On the decline in technological growth see Peltzman (1973). 
3. For similar (electoral coalition building) reasons to the 
legislature, the executive possesses a decentralized decision 
structure to allow access to interested groups to executive 
decision-making. 
4. Backman (1964) in examining the structure of the chemical 
industry found that "the structure of the chemical industry, in 
one respect, is similar to that found in many other mass 
production industries; namely several large companies and a 
number of smaller ones ••• (and further that) the development of 
such large companies often reflects the technology of an 
industry" (p. 18). The high concentration of capital assets in 
the largest firms, together with the small size of the numerous 
yearly new entrants (p. 9) reflects a wide diversity of 
production capabilities and technologies in the chemical 
industry. 
5. Randall and Solomon (1978). 
6. ibid p. 121. 
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7. The Baker amendment requires manufacturers to test 
automatically only those chemicals that EPA had listed in advance 
as likely to pose unreasonable risks. 
8. Baker had twice previously attempted to amended the toxics 
legislation with an amendment that requires manufacturers to test 
automatically only those chemicals that EPA had listed in advance 
as likely to pose unreasonable risks. The compromise was to 
establish the priority list for testing; thus EPA was to give 
priority consideration to the chemicals on the list but the list 
was not to be the limit of EPA testing authority. 
9. McCollister had previously attempted to pass amendments to 
the toxics legislation to put enforcement of TOSCA in a backseat 
to other health and safety legislation; the compromise struck was 
to do so at the administrator's discretion. 
10. See "Decision Making in the Environmental Protection 
Agency," National Academy of Sciences, 1977, and Aidala (1979). 
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Chapter 7. The Consumer Product Saf~ Act 
7.1 Introduction 
The Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), enacted quickly and 
quietly in 1972, established the five-member Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC). Much like the Office of Toxic Substances within 
the Environmental Protection Agency, the CPSC has had difficulty 
developing regulations under its mandated authority; in its first 5 
years of existence it issued only 3 mandatory safety standards. As a 
consequence the CPSC thus regularly comes under attack from Congress, 
consumer groups and the OMB for its failures to develop regulations. 
Why the CPSC has failed to significantly regulate consumer product 
hazards is intimately related to the history and form of its enabling 
legislation. As will be seen, the story is much the same as TOSCA. 
We will employ the analysis of this chapter to consider again 
the assumptions and expectations of the operational hypothesis as to 
the regulatory form of environmental, health and safety legislation. 
Such an effort will again enable us to probe the validity of the model 
of regulatory choice developed earlier. 
7.2 Legislative History 
In June, 1970 the National Commission of Product Safety, an 
advisory commission to the President created by Congress in 1967, 
recommended the creation of an independent consumer product safety 
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agency. The new agency would be vested with broad discretionary 
authority over the entire range of consumer products, and all existing 
consumer legislation would be transferred to the agency. In 1971, 
President Nixon (recommendations aside) proposed legislation to 
establish a new division within the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare to set standards for products, and to regulate consumer 
products not otherwise already covered by specific federal laws. 
Nixon, articulating the mood of manufacturers, sought to establish an 
agency which was subject to direct executive and, therefore, industry 
influence. Throughout the year the Senate Commerce Committee held 
extensive hearings on the Admininstration bill (S1797), from which a 
new draft, developed and sponsored by Chairman Warren Magnuson (D.-
Wa.) and Frank Moss (D.-Ut.) (S983) emerged. The Magnuson-Moss bill 
restored a great many of the recommendations made by the advisory 
committee, including the creation of a strong independent consumer 
agency. 
As was the case in the development of TOSCA, the influences of 
differing Constitutional requirements and institutional structures 
differentially affected the form and substance of the consumer bills 
emerging from the Executive, the Senate, and the House. The Nixon 
administration advocated a weak version of the Commission's report and 
sent such proposed legislation to Congress. In Congress, the 
differential impact of the Constitutional requirements on each chamber 
again left an indelible mark on the legislation developed. The Senate 
would again seek stronger legislation, while the House would seek a 
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much milder regulatory authority. 
In the Senate however, three different committees -- Commerce, 
Labor and Public Welfare, and Government Operations -- claimed 
jurisdiction over various titles of the bill. The Senate Commerce 
Committee subsequently reported the Product Safety Commission bill 
(S3419) to the floor in April, 1972. As reported, the bill contained 
three titles. Title 1 established the CPSC and defined the duties of 
the commissioners. Title II transferred into the commission the 
functions of several existing product safety laws (including those 
administered by the FDA). Title III specified the extensive 
procedures by which the CPSC would promulgate safety standards. The 
measure was then referred by the Senate to the other two committees 
claiming jurisdiction. In June an amended version of the Magnuson-
Moss consumer bill passed the Senate by a vote of 69-10. 
Upon passage of the Senate bill, the House Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce Committee reported its version of the Product Safety 
Act (HR15003) to the floor. The House draft, as was also the case in 
the toxics legislation, was much narrower in scope than the Magnuson-
Moss bill and did not provide for the transfer of functions to the 
CPSC by the FDA. It was not until September, however, that the House 
finally passed the CPSA. 
Interest group lobbying was not intense. Opponents of the 
bill, such as the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, General 
Mills, American Cyanamid, Procter and Gamble, and the Grocery 
Manufacturers of America, sought merely to limit the proposed agency's 
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scope and to assign its jurisdiction to the Secretary of HEW (as 
represented in the Nixon administration's draft). Sponsers of the 
bill, largely an array of local consumer groups and Nader 
organizations sought strong regulatory authority vested in an 
independent agency. 
The House-Senate conference acted quickly, reaching a 
compromise which was adopted by both chambers in mid-October. The 
conferees agreed on a compromise that was much closer in substance to 
the narrower House version than to the measure passed by the Senate. 
In this respect the history of the Consumer Product Safety Act is much 
unlike the history of the Toxic Substances Control Act, as the CPSA 
moved quickly to resolution in Congress. However, the form of the 
enabling legislation is very much similar to TOSCA, specifying 
inflexible regulatory instruments and procedures for the 
implementation of the act. The Commission thus shares with EPA a 
similar history of failure to fulfill its legislative mandate . 
7.3 The Consumer Product Safety Act 
The Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) transferred authority 
for a number of federal consumer programs to the CPSC: The Federal 
Hazardous Substances Act of 1960, as amended; the Poison Prevention 
Packaging Act of 1970; the Flammable Fabrics Act of 1953, as amended; 
and the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968. 
In this section we will examine the provisions of the Consumer 
Product Safety Act in order to identify the substantive and procedural 
1~ 
authority defined and the regulatory instruments specified therein. 
The operational hypotheses of chapter 5 clearly define the form the 
CPSA should take: broad regulatory authority in conjunction with 
narrowly prescribed procedural authority to be implemented through 
command and control mechanisms for production regulations, and 
incentive-based or informational mechanisms for non-production 
regulations. 
The act established an independent five-member commission 
authorized to collect injury information and to promulgate mandatory 
safety standards for consumer products. The regulatory authority 
granted the CPSC under the act is largely detailed in section 7: 
Section 7. (a) The Commission may by rule, in accordance 
with this section and section 9, promulgate consumer product 
safety standards. A consumer product safety standard shall 
consist of one or more of the following types of requirements: 
(1) Requirements as to performance, composition, contents, 
design, construction, finish, or packaging of a consumer product. 
(2) Requirements that a consumer product be marked with or 
accompanied by clear and adequate warnings or instructions, or 
requirements respecting the form of warnings or instructions. 
Any requirement of such a standard shall be reasonably necessary 
to prevent or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury associated 
with such product. The requirements of such a standard (other 
than requirements relating to labeling, warnings, or 
instructions) shall, whenever feasible, be expressed in terms of 
performance requirements. 
Subsection 7(a)(1) describes the Commission's authority to 
regulate, through command and control mechanisms, the production of 
consumer products under the jurisdiction of the act. Subsection 
7(a)(2) describes the Commission's authority to regulate, through 
informational means, the sale and use of consumer products. This 
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simple, though broad, discretionary authority over the wide range of 
consumer goods produced in (or imported into) the United States is 
obstructed with extensive and convoluted procedures explicitly 
designed to maximize the participation of public and industry groups 
in the Commission's decision-processes. Section 7 of the CPSA 
particularizes the offeror process which is at the heart of the 
decision procedures for the CPSC rule-making. The procedures defined 
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There are several important features of the procedures 
specified for CPSC rule-making . Most notable is the fact that the 
CPSC can take little independent action (an unusual situation for an 
'independent' regulatory commission) and is virtually dependent upon 
organized interest groups to take the initiative to offer to write 
safety standards on proposed product hazards. Under the act the CPSC 
merely identifies which products should be considered for mandatory 
standards, and which hazards associated with these products are to be 
addressed. The writing of the standards is solicited to outside 
contractors (usually the industry to be regulated itself) through the 
offeror process (CPSC can undertake the development of the standards 
only if no qualified offeror is forthcoming). The CPSC merely acts as 
a broker in the regulatory process, assigning priorities and 
publishing notices. 
The inflexibility and case-by-case nature of the regulatory 
instruments prescribed and the labyrinthine and debilitating nature of 
the regulatory procedures specified leave the CPSC with a great amount 
of regulatory authority but no way to exercise it. Indeed, as 
previously mentioned, in its first 5 years the CPSC issued only 3 
mandatory safety standards: for swimming pool slides, architectural 
glass, and matchbook covers. Another of the effects of the procedural 
guidelines mandated by Congress has been to expand the length of time 
necessary for the development of safety standards. Although by law an 
offeror was to take only 330 days to develop a proposed standard, the 
average for the 3 standards developed prior to 1978 was 834 days. 1 
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Neither the number of standards developed nor the length of time to 
develop them is indicative of regulatory success. 
The evidence relating the legislative choice of regulatory 
form to characteristics of the interest group environment for the case 
of the Consumer Product Safety Act clearly favors the operational 
hypotheses of chapter 5 and thus supports the model developed in 
Chapter 3. The CPSC's broad substantive authority together with its 
extensive regulatory procedural requirements, as detailed in section 
7, along with the specification that command and control instruments 
be employed to regulate the production, and that informational 
instruments be employed to regulate the sale of consumer goods 
strongly support the operational hypotheses of chapter 5 as outlined 
in Table 3. 
The inability of the CPSC to fulfill its legislative mandate 
has led to an unrelenting stream of criticism for the Commission by 
consumer groups, business groups, Congress and the OMB. But the 
procedures specified for rule-making in Section 7 guarantee the CPSC 
will not soon improve upon its dismal record. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 7 
1. From the Federal ~egulatory Directory 1981-1982. 
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Chapter 8. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 
8.1 Introduction 
Federal regulation of food quality and drugs has spanned 
nearly eight decades and has its roots in the Progressive Movement. 
Each of the major pieces of legislation pertaining to the regulation 
of food and drugs were enacted well before the health and safety acts 
examined in the previous chapters; the Food and Drug Administration's 
primary authority with respect to the regulation of new drugs was 
drafted and enacted during the New Deal era. Regulation of this 
period, such as the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 to be discussed in 
chapter 9, was principally economic in scope. the implementation of 
the food and drug act suffers from maladies similar to those evidenced 
in TOSCA and in the CPSA. The similarities in scope, form, and 
substance of health and safety acts as such TOSCA and the FFDCA, 
passed nearly 40 years apart, offers compelling evidence for the model 
and hypotheses developed earlier. 
8.2 The History of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
Federal jurisdiction over foods, drugs and cosmetics rests on 
three major pieces of legislation: the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 
1906; the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938; and the 
Kefauver Drug Amendments of 1962. 
The Progressive Era reform movement responsible for the 1906 
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act was orchestrated and championed by the head of the Department of 
Agriculture's Bureau of Chemistry, Harvey W. Wiley. As early as 1897 
Wiley was lobbying Congress, arranging hearings and soliciting grass-
roots support for the regulation of foods and patent medicines. In 
support of his cause, Wiley worked in close association with many of 
the popular muckraking journalists of the time, providing them 
information, and using the popular response to such journalism as 
leverage in the legislative process. 
A wide assortment of interest groups, borne to this era, led 
the fight for the act of 1906. Professional associations such as the 
American Medical Association and the American Pharmaceutical 
Association joined with progressive reform groups, including the 
Grange and Consumer's Union, and with a variety of women's 
organizations, such as the National League of Women Voters, to lobby 
for the passage of the food and drug legislation. 1 The opposition to 
the act was similarly diverse in membership. Grocers, bakers, 
confectioners, retail druggists, packers, advertisers, and farmers 
each opposed certain provisions of the act. On the forefront of the 
opposition, however, were the pat ent medicine manufacturers 
represented by the Proprietary Association. The Proprietary 
Association would later re-emerge as FDA's nemesis in the struggle for 
the 193 8 act. 
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TABLE 5 
Major Lobbying Groups: FFDCA 
Maj o r Business Lobbyist Organizations 
Advertising Federation of America 
American Bakers' Association 
American Dru g Manufacturers 
Association 
American League of Medical Freedom 
American Newspaper Publishers 
Association 
American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Associated Grocery Manufa c turers of 
America 
Associated Manufacturers of Toilet 
Articles 
Association of National Advertisers 
Drug Institute of America 
Heinz Company 
Institute of Medicine Manufacturers 
International Apple Association 
Joint Committee for Sound and 
Democrati c Consumer Legislation 
National Advisory Council of Consumers 
and Producers 
National Association of Retail 
Druggis ts 
National Broadcasting Company 
National Dru g Trade Conference 
National Liberties Association 
National Publishers Association 
National Wholesale Druggists 
Association 
Proprietary Association 
United Med icine Manufacturers 
of America 
Major Health Lobbyist Organizations 
American Association of Colleges of 
Pharmacy 
American Association of University 
Women 
Ameri can Home Economics Association 
Ameri can Medical Association 
American Pharmaceutica l Ass oc iation 
Consumers' Research 
Consumers Union 
General Federation of Women's Clubs 
National Association of Boards of 
Pharmacy 
National Congress of the Parent-
Teachers Association 
National Lea gue of Women Voters 
People 's Lobby 
Pure Food League 
Grange 
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The 1906 act was primarily concerned with the misbranding of 
drug products and the adulteration of packaged foods. Indeed, the 
Food and Drug Administration's authority over drugs extended only so 
far as to insure that the labelling of drugs not be "false and 
fraudulent . " FDA was granted no authority to regulate the manufacture 
or distribution of drug products. Furthermore, FDA's authority with 
respect to the labelling of drugs did not extend to other promotional 
materials. Thus, the deceptive promotion and production of worthless 
and often hazardous drugs remained largely unchecked. 
By 1933 the serious shortcomings of the 1906 act had long been 
in evidence. The law did not cover cosmetics, a new and booming 
business. It did not provide for adequate control over patent 
medicines. It was vague and ambiguous in its language regarding the 
adulteration of food, and did not provide for remedies against false 
advertising. At this time Walter Campbell, Chief of the Food and Drug 
Administration and Rexford Tugwell, the new Assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture, decided to seek revisions to the old food and drug law. 
However, food and drug legislation was still a political hot potato. 
No active congressional sponsor of the bill was readily forthcoming. 
As would be the case almost 40 years later for TOSCA, a man of strong 
conviction, Senator Royal Copeland, was needed to come forward and 
volunteer to take sponsorship of the bill. The ensuing legislative 
debate would occupy much of his time during the last six years of his 
life. 
The groups lobbying over the New Deal legislation were much 
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the same as those involved in the 1906 legislation. As at the turn of 
the century, muckraking exposes, such as Arthur Kallet's and F.J. 
Schlink's 100,000,000 Guinea Pigs2 , turned the stomachs of millions of 
readers and generated some amount of public awareness for the problems 
associated with the 1906 act. But the FDA did not underestimate the 
degree of public apathy for the new legislation: Apathy was the 
keyword, not only at the grass-roots level but also in the halls of 
Congress. Until Copeland stepped forward to take sponsorship of the 
Tugwell bill in May, 1933, the new legislation drafted in the FDA was 
a lonely orphan. With the strong trade associations lobbying hard 
against the legislation, prospects for enactment appeared bleak to 
Copeland and his compatriots at FDA. 
Copeland introduced the Tugwell bill to the Senate in June, 
1933. The new bill was much stronger than the 1906 act, and proposed 
greatly expanded government control of patent medicines. New 
labelling requirements, calling for the disclosure of all medicinal 
ingredients and directions for use, were coupled with authority to 
regulate advertising. The Tugwell bill also granted the FDA the 
authority to regulate and/or prohibit the manufacture and distribution 
of drugs and allowed for FDA inspection of drug manufacturing 
facilities. 
The food industry also came in for new regulation, as the 
Tugwell bill required that 
(food) labels must disclose all ingredients in order of 
predominance by weight. The government would gain the right to 
establish identity standards for quality and fill of containers. 
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A product was misbranded if it failed to meet those standards. 
The definition of adulteration was broadened to apply to products 
containing poisonous substances in excess of tolerance levels set 
by the Secretary of Agriculture. Inspectors were authorized to 
make checks of establishments in which food, as well as drugs and 
cosmetics, was manufactured or held. Where this "privilege" was 
denied, injunctions might be sought by the government to deny a 
company the right to engage in interstate shipment of goods. 
Provision was further made for a system of voluntary factory 
inspection services at the owner's expense, but under such 
~ongitions that manufacturers would almost be forced to accept 
1t. 
As expected, the food industry was not pleased by the new Tugwell 
bill. The mildest reaction came from the food industry, which though 
hardly happy with the Tugwell bill, concentrated on severing the food 
provisions from the remainder of the act. Many in agriculture and 
food processing agreed with the need (naturally enough) for stricter 
regulation of the drug and cosmetic industry, as long as the stricter 
provisions did not apply to food products. 
In the long fight for the 1906 law support came from articles 
in popular magazines and newspapers. But in the midst of the Great 
Depression, such was not to be the case for the Tugwell bill. The 
bill was attacked as being anti-recovery and anti-NP~. and never 
received the full support of either the public or President Roosevelt. 
The Tugwell bill died a quiet and expected death in 1933, never 
reaching the floor for debate. The early efforts of women's and 
consumer groups, though supportive, were not terribly effective. 
Without strong public support the trade associations could quietly 
keep the bill pigeonholed in committee. 
In January, 1934, however, Royal Copeland introduced a new, 
revised bill to the Senate (S2000). The Senate's response was 
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underwhelming. Copeland redrafted the bill and introduced the new 
draft one month later (S2800). This new Copeland bill won tacit non-
disapproval from periodical publishers and the food packers, as the 
concessions made by Copeland in S2800 mollified their most strenuous 
objections. The proprietary industry, though, was more than able to 
meet the challenge represented by the new Copeland draft. The 
leadership of Congress in the 1930's was no less adept in the use of 
congressional procedures to stifle new controversial legislation than 
Harley O. Staggers was to be forty years later. A number of 
congressmen brought to the attention of President Roosevelt and 
Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace that the FDA's travelling 
chamber of horrors was in violation of the Deficiency Appropriations 
Act of 1919 (even though the act had not been so enforced for the 
previous 14 years) as the Congress had not appropriated funds for the 
exhibit. Wallace, in response, ordered Tugwell to keep the exhibit on 
display only at the FDA in Washington. 
FDA had employed the chamber of horrors to great advantage, 
"educating" the public in the problems of the 1906 act. With the 
sidelining of the travelling show FDA was relegated to be more or less 
a spectator for much of the rest of the congressional debate. The FDA 
had provided the major support for the new food and drug legislation, 
and thus without either the FDA or a strong undercurrent of popular 
support, Copeland was left to his own resources. 
Several new offerings, in competition to the Copeland bill, 
were proposed by each side of the debate. Most notable was the 
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McCarran-Jenckes bill in the House, which was 
in many ways not unlike Copeland's offering. The "ringer" was 
that enforcement was highly complicated and provisions existed 
for an almost endless round of appeals. 4 
The trades sought, in the McCarran-Jenckes bill, to bury the FDA under 
a legislated mountain of red tape. The opponents to a strong food and 
drug bill recognized early that the impact of such ponderous and 
exaggerated decision-making requirements would successfully prohibit 
the FDA from fulfilling any legislative mandate. Again in 1934, the 
decision-making institutions, designed to fulfill the needs of the 
legislator, did so, by again squelching the food and drug legislation 
quietly in committee. 
Copeland introduced another revised version of the act in 
January, 1935. He had again made concessions in his draft to the 
trades: 
Previous prov1s1ons for voluntary factory inspection were gone. 
The list of diseases for which advertising claims were prohibited 
had been shortened. Labelling demands on proprietary medicines 
were more lenient. No longer did the labels have to bear the 
designation as pallative rather than cure. Manufacturers could 
file formulas with the Secretary of Agriculture and thereby 
escape the label disclosure of contents. By court order FDA 
could be restricted in misbranding seizures to three actions on a 
single product. The Senator had also resisted consumer pres~ure 
to reestablish multiple grading standards for food products. 
The new proposal also contained many of the extensive procedural 
specifications of the McCarran-Jenckes bill. It thus had the effect 
of mollifying still more of the opposition. Advertisers, cosmetic 
manufacturers, druggists and grocers were now lukewarm to the proposed 
legislation. Each new draft, by making concessions to organized 
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groups with access in the congressional decision structure, had 
decreased the size of the opposing coalition. Indeed, the decision 
institutions of Congress were fashioning a compromise path for the 
legislation which, in three years time, would lead to eventual 
passage. 
A number of differing acts, each different from the other and 
also vastly dissimilar to Copeland's bill, were introduced to the 
House in 1935. The strategy, as we have seen many times before, was 
to cause a rift so large between the House and Senate versions that 
compromise could not be reached. 
In March, 1935 the bill was reported out of the Senate 
committee, a milestone for Copeland. However, the new found tacit 
non-disapproval by the now numerous groups lukewarm to the new bill 
did not translate into much lobbying strength or support in Congress. 
To make matters worse, the militant consumer organizations were now 
divided over their support of the bill, some contending that it was 
now too weak. Neither strong grass-roots support nor, not 
surprisingly, support for the bill on the floor was to be found. The 
trades then attempted an end run, trying to strip the FDA of its 
advertising authority under the proposed act by instead granting such 
authority to the Federal Trade Commission. Jurisdictional fights are 
in fact usually fights over policy; here the much beleagured FTC was 
seen by the trades as being more responsive to industry preferences 
then was "Terrible Rex" (Tugwell) and the FDA. In fact the FDA did 
eventually lose its authority over advertising entirely. 
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When finally brought to the floor in April, 1935 the Copeland 
bill was subjected to a series of weakening amendments. Majority 
leader Joe Robinson, in order to prevent the stripping of the 
advertising control provisions entirely, brought up the District of 
Columbia appropriations bill. Having right of way on the floor, it 
thus allowed a still fairly intact Copeland bill (SS) to return to the 
calendar later. Including a provision which greatly weakened FDA's 
power to seize imminently dangerous products, the Senate bill reached 
the floor in late May and was passed without opposition. The 
indefatigable Copeland had won his first victory. 
With more than a year to go before adjournment the attention 
over a new food and drug bill turned to the House. There the bill 
languished in committee for over ten months while each side sought 
unsuccessfully to solicit the support of Roosevelt and the public. 
The trade, however, was by now divided over the bill, as many felt the 
new Copeland bill was now tolerable and feared that state and local 
action on the matter might be forthcoming. With women's organizations 
pressing hard and with a new corp of journalists raking of the muck, 
there was indeed much in terms of local action for the trades to fear. 
During 1935 and 1936, 92 laws pertaining to drugs were passed in 39 
states. The handwriting was on the wall. State legislatures, wherein 
consumer groups and women's organizations had more immediate 
influence, were ready to develop comprehensive legislation governing 
the whole drug field within each state. Many nostrum manufacturers 
were ready to accept federal regulation. 
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As a result, while the bill sat in the House committee Virgil 
Chapman, the bill's House sponsor, sought and received several 
amendments which served to strengthen the House version. However, as 
the bill went to the floor in June, 1936, the consumer groups, now 
jubilant over their newfound power, were divided on passage. Many did 
not want the much weakened Copeland bill to become law and were 
instead looking to the next year in the belief that a stronger bill 
could emerge in 1937. 
The Chapman bill eventually passed the House and compromises 
were struck in conference between the Copeland and Chapman provisions. 
The major compromise was to authorize the FDA to regulate all 
advertising matter relative to health and to authorize material 
related to food and cosmetics to be regulated by the FTC. Few groups 
on either side of the issue were pleased by this arrangement, however, 
and the House voted down the compromise. Again, no food and drug 
legislation would be forthcoming in this session of Congress. 
Upon the heels of this defeat both Copeland and Chapman 
introduced similar new proposals of the food and drug legislation (S5 
and HR300) respectively. 
Reaction of those concerned with food and drug matters centered 
immediately on three points. First was the advertising 
prov1s1ons. Here there was a difference between S. 5 and H.R 
300. Both placed regulatory powers with FDA, but Copeland's bill 
stipulated that control would be handled by injunction while 
Chapman's version provided for civil and criminal judicial 
penalties. The second point of interest was seizure prov1s1ons. 
H.R. 300 allowed multiple seizure where goods were deemed 
"imminently dangerous to heath" and so perpetuated the old 
Bailey-Copeland compromise. In S. 5 there had been a 
modification. The word "imminently" had been dropped from the 
201 
phrase. The third point of concern was the variation clause in 
both bills which allowed strength variations from official 
standards. Proprietary goods were not subject to adulteration 
charges so long as strength conformed to any standard printed on 
the label. For both fgods and drugs, however, full disclosure of 
formulas was demanded. 
With the propitious aid of President Roosevelt and .Majority 
Leader Robinson, the new Copeland bill quickly passed the Senate in 
March, 1937, and was sent to the House. In the House action was as 
swift. With the Copeland-Chapman bill still bottled up in the House 
Commerce Committee as summer faded into autumn, disturbing revelations 
of the nation's worst drug disaster emerged to give new emotion to the 
debate. Elixir Sulfanilamide-.Massengill had caused 73 painful and 
prolonged deaths by October, 1937. The total reached 107 before the 
drug could be completely recalled. Public attention thus focused upon 
the House, where the American version of representation had served to 
defeat the drug legislation for the last 4 years. 
It was the function of Royal Copeland and his House 
colleague Virgil Chapman, however, to bring the elixir disaster 
in an official way to the floor of their respective chambers. On 
November 16 and 17 the two legislators pressed resolutions 
calling for a report to the Congress on the drug tragedy by the 
Department of Agriculture. The resolutions passed each house 
unanimously. The USDA report was presented to the Congress on 
November 26. In thirty-four pages of text and documents it laid 
bare the whole shocking story, from the failure of Massengill to 
test his elixir for toxicity to the technicality under which the 
FDA was able to enter the case. By the time of the report the 
women's organizations and other proponents of a new drug law were 
publicly emphasizing the fact that even if S. 5 had passed into 
law the sulfanilamide tragedy would still have taken place. S. 5 
had no provisions to control new drugs entering the market. 
Equally shocking, though less publicized, was the fact that the
7 original 1933 bill, S. 1944, would have prevented the disaster. 
202 
By December, 1937 Copeland and Chapman introduced new, 
stronger bills, 83073 and HR9341, to the Congress. Each bill 
contained drug certification provisions, a requirement whereby new 
drugs must be certified as safe by the FDA before marketing would be 
allowed to proceed. 
The patent medicine lobbists fought diligently to get 
concessions from Copeland and Chapman and managed to strike a few 
compromises. The new bill then breezed to passage in the Senate. 
However, even in the midst of the Elixir Sulfanilamide episode the 
House failed to pass the Chapman bill in early spring, 1938. 
Opponents of the bill representing the interests of the trades, such 
as Congressman Clarence Lea, Chairman of the House Commerce Committee, 
still sought to vest all authority to regulate advertising in the FTC. 
Indeed, such eventually was the case, as the House moved to adopt the 
Lea measure in March. 
With the advertising issue resolved compromises concerning 
judicial review were easily struck and the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetics Act emerged from the nether world of congressional politics 
to be signed into law in June, 1938. 
8.2 The 1962 Amendments 
Senator Estes Kefauver, after conducting hearings before his 
Subcommitte on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, drafted amendments to the FFDCA designed to lower drug 
prices and improve drug safety, efficacy, and advertising. The 
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provisions aimed at lowering drug prices by reducing the length of 
patent protection for drugs were vociferously opposed by the industry, 
the AMA, and President Kennedy, and so were quickly and quietly 
deleted. The efficacy provisions aimed at formally authorizing the 
FDA to carry out practices that had been in effect for the previous 
two decades however, found little opposition. 
Kefauver introduced the bill in April, 1961 and by skillful 
exploitation of the thalidomide disaster he managed the efficacy 
amendments to enactment by October, 1962. 
8.3 The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
From the operational hypothesis concerning health and safety 
regulation we would expect, under the interest group environment 
identified in the case history, that Congress would grant the FDA 
broad substantive authority and narrowly prescribed procedural 
authority in the FFDCA. Further, we would expect the FDA to be 
mandated command and control instruments for implementation of 
regulations at the production stages and incentive-based or 
informational instruments for the implementation of regulations at 
other stages of the regulated firm's activities. In this section we 
will examine this act to see how well our expectations are borne out. 
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, as amended, provides 
the Food and Drug Administration and the Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare with broad discretionary authority over the 
regulation of foods, food additives, pesticide residues, drugs, 
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devices, animal drugs and cosmetics. The authority of the FDA, beyond 
its authority to prohibit the adulteration and misbranding of foods, 
drugs and cosmetics is outlined in Table 6. 
1. (Sec. 401) 
2. (Sec. 401) 
3. (Sec. 401) 
4. (Sec. 401) 
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TABLE 6 
Summary of the 
Regulatory Mandate of the 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
Establish common name for food products. 
Establish a standard of identity for food 
Establish standards of quality for foods. 
Establish standards of fill of container. 
products. 
5. (Sec. 406) Establish regulations limiting the quantity of poisonous 
or deleterious substances in food. 
6 . (Sec. 408) Establish tolerance levels for pesticides in or on raw 
agricultural commodities. 
7. (Sec. 409) Establish regulations limiting the quantity of food 
additives in foods. 
8 . (Sec. 409) Establish regulations limiting the varities of foods in 
which a food additive may be used. 
9. (Sec. 409) Set the manner in which a food additive may be added to 
or used in or on foods. 
10. (Sec. 409) Establish directions or other labeling or packaging 
requirements for food additives. 
11. (Sec. 505) Certify new drugs as safe for use. 
12. (Sec. 506) Certify batches of drugs containing insulin as safe for 
use. 
13. (Sec. 507) Certify batches of drugs containing antibiotics as safe 
for use. 
14. (Sec. 508) Designate an official name for any drug. 
15. (Sec. 512) Certify new animal drugs as safe for use. 
16. (Sec. 706) Establish tolerance limitations for color additives in 




17. (Sec. 706) Establish specifications as to the manner in which a 
color additive may be added. 
18. (Sec. 706) Establish directions or other labeling or packaging 
requirements for a color additive. 
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As Table 6 indicates, FDA can establish standards of quality 
and fill of container for food products, and can establish regulations 
limiting the quantity of poisonous or deleterious substances in food. 
Thus the FDA can establish 'filth levels' for hot dogs, 'rodent 
excrement levels' for flour, and mercury levels for swordfish. FDA 
can similarly regulate the levels of pesticides in raw agricultural 
commodities, and the quantity of food additives, such as cyclemates, 
in foods. 
New drugs must be certified as safe and efficacious for use 
prior to manufacture, as must new animal drugs. FDA further has the 
mandated authority to regulate color additives, such as red dye number 
2. 
With the exception of section 407, the authority of the FDA 
over foods, drugs and cosmetics is limited to the regulation of the 
production activities of firms producing such commodities, having had 
its authority over marketing transferred to the FTC prior to the 1938 
act. The broad discretionary authority the FDA has under the statute 
to regulate the production of foods, drugs, and cosmetics is also 
outlined in Table 6. It is noteworthy that the instruments explicitly 
mandated to the FDA to implement this authority are largely varieties 
of command and control mechanisms (certification, tolerance levels and 
limits, specifications, quantity limits). The authority outlined in 
items 10 and 18, however is explicitly informational. 
Interestingly, section 407 explicitly mandates FDA's authority 




(b) No person shall sell, or offer for sale, colored 
oleomargarine or colored margarine unless -- (1) such 
oleomargarine or margarine is packaged, (2) the new weight of the 
contents of any package sold in a retail establishment is one 
pound or less, (3) there appears on the label of the package (A) 
the word "oleomargarine" or "margarine" in type or lettering at 
least as large as any other type or lettering on such label, and 
(B) a full and accurate statement of all the ingredients 
contained in such oleomargarine, or margarine, and (4) each part 
of the contents of the package is contained in a wrapper which 
bears the word "oleomargarine" or "margarine" in type or 
lettering not smaller than 20 point type ••• 
(c) No person shall possess in a form ready for serving 
colored oleomargarine or colored margarine at a pubic eating 
place unless a notice that oleomargarine or margarine is served 
is displayed prominently and conspicuously in such place and in 
such manner as to render it to likely to be read and understood 
by the ordinary individual being served in such eating place or 
is printed or is otherwise set forth on the menu in type or 
lettering not smaller than that normally used to designate the 
serving of other food items. No person shall serve colored 
oleomargarine or colored margarine at a public eating place, 
whether or not any charge is made therefor, unless (1) each 
separate serving bears or is accompanied by labeling identifying 
it as oleomargarine or margarine, or (2) each separate serving 
thereof is triangular in shape. 
However, this broad discretionary authority over the 
production of foods, drugs and cosmetics, as in the case of the Toxic 
Substances Control Act and the Consumer Product Safety Act, is coupled 
with a great amount of procedural and due process specificity. The 
complex and convoluted procedures specified for the regulation of 
pesticide residues, food additives, and new drugs are readily evident 
in figures 4, 5 and 6, and need little elaboration. That the FDA is 
indeed encumbered by these regulatory procedures and due process 
requirements should, by now, come as no surprise. 
Tests 
(Section 408 (d)) 
Application filed under 
FIFRA 
I (Section 408 (d)) 





Test data and 
information filed 
l 30 days 
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Figure 4 
FFDCA PROCEDURES FOR 
ESTABLISHING TOLERANCE LIMITS FOR 
PESTICIDES 
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Copy of objections 
serve to petitioner 
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parties may file 
for Judicial Review 
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Figure 5 
FFDCA PROCEDURES FOR 
REGULATION OF FOOD ADDITIVES 
Manufacturer conducts 
tests 
Section 409 (b)(l) 
Petition to Secretary 
proposing the issuance -----------------------~ 
of a regulation prescribing 
the conditions under which 
a food additive may be safely 
used. 
Petitioner files relevant 
information concerning additive 
as specified in Section 409 (b)(2) 
If requested manufacturing data 
must be submitted (Section 409 (b)(3)) 
and samples (Section 409 (b)(4)) 
j30 days 
Notice pu~lished 
190 days (90 day extension) 
Exemption 
by RULE 
{Section 409 (i)) 
Secretary may propose 
a regulation of a food 
additive on his own 
initiative 
(Section 409 (e)) 
30 days 
Secretary shall issue a REGULATION (----------------------------(Section 409 (c)) 
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FFDCA PROCEDURES FOR 
REGULATION OF NEW DRUGS 
Manufacturer conducts 
tests 
(Section 505 (a)) 
Application for new 
drug field 
(Section 505 (b)) 
Reports on safety, 
composition, use, quality 




Exemption by rule 
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In light of new 
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However, the failure to regulate in the case of the Federal 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act has had different consequences than 
similar failures under the Toxic Substances Control Act or the 
Consumer Product Safety. In the case of TOSCA the inelastic 
regulatory instruments and labyrinthine regulatory procedures serve to 
restrict EPA's regulatory activities; as a result few chemicals of the 
hundreds of thousands developed each year are subject to regulation. 
On the other hand, a similar set of regulatory instruments and 
procedures for the regulation of new drugs under the FFDCA, though 
similarly restricting the FDA's regulatory activities, have a much 
different market outcome. Without the test rule requirements and 
explicit time limits for action as specified for EPA decision-making 
in TOSCA, the FDA can "sit on" new drug applications indefinitely 
without taking action, and thus few new drugs are certified for 
production and use. 
Society is thus forced to forgo the potential benefits 
associated with many of these new drugs which cannot find their way 
out of the legislated FDA procedural maze. Similarly, the catacombs 
of EPA's legislated regulatory procedures insure that few of the 
potentially dangerous chemicals developed each year are subject to EPA 
regulation. Neither situation is an optimum as each presents a 
relative ali-or-nothing corner solution to the introduction of new 
products. 
The evidence presented in this section as to the form of the 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act fits well with the expectations of 
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the operational hypotheses of chapter 5 . The inflexible regulatory 
instruments and regulatory procedures of the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act encumber the FDA in a similar fashion to the encumberance 
of EPA under TOSCA and the CPSC under the CPSA. Thus, though enacted 
during the heyday of economic regulatory activity the FFDCA suffers 
maladies similar to the present day environmental, health and safety 
legislations. That the model of regulatory choice predicted the form 
of health and safety regulation across two generations of American 
regulatory history is indeed impressive. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 8 
1. Cooper (1966) in analyzing the structure of the 
pharmaceutical industries of England, the United States and 
several other countries gave evidence to the effect that the 
structure of the industry is characterized by a wide assortment 
of firms of varying sizes and profitability producing a wide 
range of products, and that the market positions of such firms is 
relatively unstable. As was the case for the chemical industry 
"in the U.S.A ••• the (drug) firms number over 1000. The Bureau 
of the Census in 1958 found the top four firms held 27 per cent 
of the market, the top eight 45 per cent, and the top fifty 87 
per cent" (pp. 62-63), again indicating a wide diversity of 
production capabilities and technologies. 
2. Kallet and Schlink (1933). 
3 • Jackson ( 19 7 0 ) p • 2 8 • 
4. ibid p. 68. 
5. ibid p. 76. 
6. ibid p. 135. 
7. ibid p. 167. 
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Chapter 9. The Civil Aeronautics Act 
9.1 Introduction 
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 established the Civil 
Aeronautics Authority and provided the Authority with jurisdiction 
over the economic and safety regulation of the airline industry. The 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 continued the functions of the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (the successor to the Authority), but created a 
seperate agency, the Federal Aviation Agency, to administer and 
establish safety standards for airline manufacture and operation. 
The Civil Aeronautics Act was drafted and enacted during the 
same period of time as was the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and 
fell under the jurisdiction of the same congressional committees. The 
form and substance of the act, however, differs in a systematic 
fashion from that of the FFDCA. An examination of the act will serve 
to underscore these differences. 
In this examination we will employ evidence from the 
legislative history to consider the operational hypotheses as to the 
regulatory form of economic legislation. Unlike the regulatory forms 
expected and witnessed in the previous 3 case studies, we would expect 
Congress to delegate narrow substantive and broad procedural authority 
to the administering agency, and to specify command and control 
mechanisms for the implementation of such authority under conditions 
of uniform interest group preferences. 
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9.2 Legislative History 
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 had its roots in several 
prior acts, e.g., the Air Commerce Act of 1926, which provided the 
Secretary of Commerce authority to regulate air safety, and the Air 
Mail Act of 1925, which provided the Postmaster General the authority 
to let contracts to private companies for the carrying of mail. First 
proposed in 1934, the Civil Aeronautics Act was drafted to aid the 
development of air transportation through entry restrictions and mail 
subsidies and for the development of federal air safety standards. 
The legislative history of the act is unique in that most of the major 
controversies arose on matters of administrative organization. 
Indeed, the debate over the bill centered largely around who was to 
have jurisdiction over air traffic; the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, the Department of Commerce, or a new commission. 
The major source of opposition to the bill was the Department 
of Commerce and the Postmaster General, who disfavored provisions for 
the establishment of an independent commission for the regulation of 
air traffic. Proponents of the bill, largely air carriers and 
airplane manufacturers (though both industries were in their infancy), 
worked unopposed with congressional sponsors in seeking the New Deal 
for the recovery of the airlines. 
The bill was signed into law in June 23, 1938, establishing 
(temporarily) an independent commission to oversee the regulation of 
air traffic. After 4 years of debate and study the bill was passed 
quietly in the shadow of the debate on the food and drug legislation. 
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The development of the bill and its subsequent oversight reflects the 
coming of age of the congressional subgovernmental triangle. The bill 
originated in the bureaucracy and was designed to serve its purposes. 
It provided subsidies to the airlines through entry restrictions. It 
offerred congressmen on the specific oversight committees in Congress 
expanded influence over the policy in this area. In short, no one was 
1 eft wanting. 
9.3 The Federal Aviation Act 
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 continued the existence and 
the economic regulatory functions of the Civil Aeronautics Board. In 
the act the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was granted authority to 
issue certificates of public convenience and necessity (i.e. to 
restrict entry), to issue permits to foreign air carriers, to approve 
tariffs (i.e. to set prices), to fix minimum mail loads, to establish 
rates of return for the transportation of mail, and to approve airline 
mergers. 
Thus, unlike the authority granted the health and safety 
agencies, wherein each agency has broad regulatory authority over a 
wide range of activities for a great many industries and segments of 
society, the CAB was granted a fairly narrow authority to regulate the 
economic activities of a specific industry -- the airlines. The 
authority of the CAB to carry out its functions is granted largely in 
Title IV through a variety of command and control mechanisms. Section 
401 specifies the CAB's authority over entry, 
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Section 401. (a) No air carrier shall engage in any air 
transportation unless there is in force a certificate issued by 
the Board authorizing such air carrier to engage in such 
transportation. 
Section 403 defines the CAB's price setting powers, 
Section 403. (a) Every air carrier and every foreign air 
carrier shall file with the Board, and print, and keep open to 
public inspection, tariffs showing all rates, fares, and charges 
for air transportation between points served by it, and between 
points served by it and points served by any other air carrier or 
foreign air carrier when through service and through rates shall 
have been established, and showing to the extent required by 
regulations of the Board, all classifications, rules, 
regulations, practices, and services in connection with such air 
transportation. Tariffs shall be filec, posted, and published in 
such form and manner, and shall contain such information, as the 
Board shall by regulation prescribe; and the Board is empowered 
to reject any tariff so filed which is not consistent with this 
section and such regulations. Any tariff so rejected shall be 
void. The rates, fares, and charges shown in any tariff shall be 
stated in terms of lawful money of the United States, but such 
tariffs may also state rates, fares, and charges in terms of 
currencies other than lawful money of the United States, and may, 
in the case of foreign air transportation, contain such 
information as may be required under the laws of any country in 
or to which an air carrier or foreign air carrier is authorized 
to operate. 
And, Section 406 describes the CAB's power to set prices for the 
transportation of mail, 
Section 406. (a) The Board is empowered and directed, 
upon its own initiative or upon petition of the Postmaster 
General or an air carrier, (1) to fix and determine from time to 
time, after notice and hearing, the fair and reasonable rates of 
compensation for the transport~tien of mail by aircraft, the 
facilities used and useful therefore, and the services connected 
therewith (including the transportation of mail by an air carrier 
by other means than aircraft whenever such transportation is 
incidental to the transportation of mail by aircraft or is made 
necessary by conditions of emergency arising from aircraft 
operation) ••• 
The authority granted the CAB is very similar in scope and in 
1 anguage to th~ autl1cri ty granted the Interstate Commerce Commission 
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in the Transportation Act of 1920 and the Motor Carriers Act of 1935. 
Such economic regulatory acts, born in similar interest group 
environments, share a similarity of purpose and statute. The specific 
authority vested in such acts enables Congress, in a quiet fashion, to 
deliver particularized benefits to specific industries, for the 
benefit of all concerned. 
Unlike TOSCA, FFDCA, and CPSA, however, the Federal Aviation 
Act and the Civil Aeronautics Act specified few procedural guidelines 
for the exercise of the CAB's rule-making authority. This flexibility 
of procedure enabled the CAB to respond quickly and easily to 
applications filed by air carriers and to approve thousands of such 
applications each year. The striking difference in the level of 
procedural discretion granted the CAB under the act, in relation to 
the health and safety acts, is evidenced in the following subsections 
and in figure 7; for the application for a certificate of public 
convenience, 
Section 401. (b) Application for a certificate shall be 
made in writing to the Board and shall be so verified, shall be 
in such form and contain such information, and shall be 
accompanied by such proof of service upon such interested 
persons, ~ the Board shall £y regulation require, (emphasis 
mine) 
and for an application for a permit, 
Section 402 (c) Application for a permit shall be made 
in writing to the Board, shall be so verified, shall be in such 
form and contain such information, and shall be accompained by 
such proof of service upon such interested persons, ~ the Board 
shall £y regulation require, (emphasis mine). 
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Figure 7 
CAB Tariff Procedure 
AIRLINE DOCUMENT MEETS 
PROPOSES--TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS CAB 
NEW AS SPECIFIED IN ------ WAIVER ?-----REJECT 
no TARIFF 14 CFR 221 no 
yes 
NEW TARIFF WITHIN 
BOUNDS ESTABLISHED 
UNDER SECTION 1002(d)(4) 
OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION no 
ACT OF 1958 AND SPECIFIED 
UNDER 14 CFR 399 ? 
I yes 
ACCEPT TARIFF 
14 CFR 399 





The simplicity of the regulatory procedures specified in the 
act for the establishment of airline tariffs is quite apparent in the 
above passage and in figure 7. The procedural requirements of the act 
largely specify that the application must be filed 30 days prior to 
enforcement and that the document must meet the technical requirements 
as determined by the Board. As developed in chapter 4, such 
procedural flexibility for the case of economic regulatory issues 
serves to enhance the influence of congressional oversight committee 
members in an area of policy that is vitally important to them. 
Another striking difference from the environmental, health, and safety 
programs is that the procedures, as established by the CAB, for the 
filing of tariff applications fill only 800 pages in the Code of 
Federal Regulations1 • Furthermore, these specifications pertain 
almost entirely to the technical requirements of the application 
document. 
The Civil Aeronautics Act and the Federal Aviation Act present 
examples of regulatory legislation which do not mandate rigid and 
extensive regulatory procedures for rule-making. The history and form 
of these economic regulatory acts, though vastly different from the 
three environmental, health and safety acts examined previously, is 
quite consistent with the model and hypotheses of earlier chapters. 
The quiet interest group environment described in the legislative 
history, together with the narrow substantive authority, broad 
procedural discretion, and command and control regulatory mechanisms 
specified in the act support the operational hypotheses of chapter 5. 
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Furthermore, these characteristics serve to enhance the ability of the 
CAB to carry out its mandated regulatory authority and insure a 
smoothly functioning subgovernmental triangle in this policy area. 
The economic regulation of the airlines is allowed to proceed quietly 
and unencumbered to the mutual benefit of the airlines, the 
bureaucracy and, of course, the Congress. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 9 
1. Section 14 of the CFR. 
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Chapter 10. Conclusion. 
10.1 Introduction 
We have developed a model of regulatory choice and have 
derived a set of refutable hypotheses which are well supported by the 
empirical evidence of the last 4 chapters. In this last chapter we 
will employ evidence from the legislative case studies, together with 
pieces of evidence from a number of other regulatory programs, to 
consider an alternative hypothesis to the model of regulatory choice 
developed herein. We will then summarize and apply the evidence 
obtained from the legislative case studies (and other sources) in an 
overall consideration of the model of regulatory choice. 
10.2 Alternative Hypothesis 
In chapter 2 we discussed a number of theories of regulatory 
choice. Few of the theories discussed therein addressed themselves to 
the choice of regulatory form. Two approaches to the choice of 
regulatory form were identified: the public choice approach (of which 
this study is one) and the incrementalist approach. In this section 
we will re-evaluate the incrementalist approach. 
In examining EPA's implementation of the Clean Air Act 
amendments, Ackerman and Hassler (1981) tender an incrementalist 
theory of congressional regulatory choice. 1 The incrementalist 
theory, in its most general form, seeks to explain the differences 
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between the scope, form, and the targets of regulatory legislation 
enacted in the 1930's and the 1970's. 
As have several others, Ackerman and Hassler observed that the 
regulatory legislation born of the New Deal, centering largely upon 
the regulation of market activities, possessed simple, yet vague, 
regulatory mandates and granted broad procedural discretion to the 
independent regulatory agencies established. In contrast, the 
regulatory legislation of the 1970's concerned more generally with 
non-market activities, was exceedingly complex, providing very 
specific policy mandates and extensive procedural requirements for the 
exercise of the authority granted. Incrementalist theory suggests 
that the differences in regulatory form between the 1930's and 1970's 
is due, naturally enough, to the incremental approach Congress pursues 
in choosing regulatory form. Indeed, Ackerman and Hassler posit that 
Congress, upon observing the defects inherent in the New Deal 
agencies, sought, when establishing the regulatory agencies of the 
1970's, to prescribe against such defects by specifically legislating 
detailed and specific regulatory authority. 
That the incrementalist theory enjoys wide acceptance is 
understandable. However, it will be suggested here that the stylized 
facts which the incrementalist theory sought to explain do not reflect 
the actual history of American regulation. 
Indeed, as we have seen in the previous 4 chapters a number of 
regulatory acts in each period do not fit the pattern expected by the 
theory. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, the 
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Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, the Federal Energy 
Administration Act of 1974, the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 
the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, the 
Motor Carrier Act of 1980, the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, and the 
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 (Table 7 indicates the extent to 
which the actual pattern is incongrous with the incremental theory's 
expectations) present anachronisms not explainable by the theory. 
Legislation 
Hepburn Act 
Pure Food and Drug Act 
Mann-Elkins Act 
Federal Reserve Act 
Federal Trade Commission Act 
Clayton Act 
Shipping Act 
Export Trade Act 
Transportation Act 
Merchant Marine Act 
Mineral Lands Leasing Act 
Federal Water Power Act 
Packers and Stockyards Act 
Filled Milk Act 
Securities Act 
Intercoastal Shipping Act 
Banking Act 
Securities Exchange Act 
Taylor Grazing Act 
Communications Act 

























































TABLE 7 cont 'd 
Federal Power Act 
Commodity Exchange Act 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act 
Northern Pacific Halibut Act 
Civil Aeronautics Act 
Natural Gas Act 
Wheeler-Lea Act 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
Federal Seed Act 
Transportation Act 
Wool Products Labeling Act 
Public Health Service Act 
Atomic Energy Act 
Agricultural Marketing Act 
Lanham Trademark Act 
Sockeye Salmon or Pink Salmon Fishery Act 
Reed-Bulwinkle Act 
Whaling Convention Act 
Cooperative Forest Management Act 
Tuna Convention Acts 
Fur Products Labeling Act 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
Flammable Fabrics Act 
Atomic Energy Act 






















































TABLE 7 cont' d 
Bank Holding Company Act 
Refrigerator Safety Act 
Federal Aviation Act 
Transportation Act 
Textile Fiber Products Identification Act 
Food Additives Amendment 
Federal Hazardous Substances Act 
Bank Merger Act 
Color Additive Amendments 
Drug Amendments 
Communications Satellite Act 
Bank Service Corporation Act 
Fair Packaging and Labeling Act 
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety 
Act 
Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act 
Highway Safety Act 
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act 
Bank Protection Act 
Construction Safety Act 
National Environmental Policy Act 
Rail Passenger Service Act 
Occupational Safety and Health Act 
Geothermal Steam Act 
Highway Safety Act 




















































TABLE 7 cent' d 
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting 
Act 
Poison Prevention Packaging Act 
Clean Air Act Amendments 
Drug Listing Act 
Marine Mammal Protection Act 
Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries 
Act 
Consumer Product Safety Act 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments 
Noise Control Act 
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act 
Federal Energy Administration Act 
Deepwater Port Act 
Safe Drinkwater Act 
Securities Acts Amendments 
Independent Safety Board Act 
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade 
Commission Improvement Act 
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory 
Reform Act 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
National Forest Management Act 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act 
















































TABLE 7 cont'd 
Toxic Substances Control Act 
Consumer Product Safety Commission 
Improvements Act 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
Food and Agriculture Act 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act 
Clean Water Act 
Airline Deregulation Act 
Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act 
Ocean Shipping Act 
Public Rangelands Improvement Act 
Natural Gas Policy Act 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act 
Financia l Institutions Regulatory and 
Interest Rate Control Act 
International Banking Act 
Shipping Act Amendments 
Pipeline Safety Act 
Infant Formula Act 
Household Goods Transportation Act 
Motor Carrier Act 
Staggers Rail Act 
Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resource Act 
Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act 
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act 


















































TABLE 7 cont'd 
Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, 





* E indicates th e act is an economic re gulatory or resource management act . 
H indi cates the act is an environmental, hea lth or safety act. 
indicates no classification. 
** y indicates the form of the legislation does not agree with the speculations of t he 
incrementalist view. 
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Though the regulatory legislation enacted during the 1930's 
generally was of the form of the economic regulation exemplified by 
the Civil Aeronautics Act (chapter 9), the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act of 1938 offers an important exception. The complex 
regulatory authority and the extensive decision-making procedures 
mandated by the act (as were detailed in chapter 8) suggest that the 
health and safety regulation of the 1930's is, contrary to the 
incremental theory, similar in scope and form to the health and safety 
regulation enacted in the 1970's. 
Similarly, the economic regulatory legislation enacted in the 
1970's is much the same as the economic regulatory legislation of the 
1930's. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 created 
a New Deal type independent agency to replace the Department of 
Agriculture's Commodity Exchange Authority established by the 
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936. The Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) was mandated simple but narrow regulatory authority 
by the 1974 act to regulate futures exchanges, approve futures 
contracts, and to establish requirements for the licensing of futures 
traders. Reminiscent of the economic regulatory agencies establised 
in the 1930's, the CFTC was granted broad procedural discretion, as 
exemplified in Section 204 for the licensing of futures traders: 
Section 204 
(2) Any such person desiring to be registered shall make 
application to the Commission in the form and manner prescribed 
by the Commission, giving such information and facts as the 
Commission may deem necessary concerning the applicant ••• 
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(6) The Commission is authorized, without hearing, to 
deny registration to any person as a commodity trading advisor or 
commodity pool operator if such person is subject to an 
outstanding order under this Act denying to such person trading 
privileges on any contract market ••• 
(4p) The Commission may specify by rules and regulations 
appropriate standards with respect to training, experience, and 
such other qualifications as the Commission finds necessary or 
desirable to insure the fitness of futures commission merchants, 
floor brokers, and those persons associated with futures 
commission merchants or floor brokers. 
On this same point, the Federal Energy Administration Act of 
1974 reorganized and consolidated a number of federal programs into 
the new Federal Energy Administration (FEA). The scope of FEA 
activity was defined in section 5 of the act in a straightforward 
manner: 
Section 5.(a) ••• the Administrator shall be responsible 
for such actions as are taken to assure that adequate provision 
is made to meet the energy needs of the Nation. To that end, he 
shall make such plans and direct and conduct such programs 
related to the production, conservation, use, control, 
distribution, rationing, and allocation of all forms of energy as 
are appropriate in connection with only those authorities or 
functions ••• 
The administrative provisions of the act, though allowing for 
public hearings, comments and judicial review of agency rulemaking by 
adversely affected parties, are relatively straightforward and simple 
and delegate a great deal of procedural discretion to the 
administrator. Section 7 on administrative provisions exemplifies the 
procedural discretion granted the agency, 
Section 7.(c) The Administrator may promulgate such 
rules, regulations, and procedures as may be necessary to carry 
out the functions vested in him ••• 
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Originally enacted in 1887, the Interstate Commerce Acts 
provide a unique test of the incrementalist theory in that the basic 
authority of the ICC was subject to revision during both the 1930's 
and 1970's. The legislation of the New Deal extended ICC jurisdiction 
to motor carriers and inland water carriers (The Motor Carrier Act of 
1935 and The Transportation Act of 1940 respectively) and delegated 
broad procedural discretion to the ICC for decision-making in these 
new jurisdictions. The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 extended 
ICC authority to rail passenger service in a manner similar to the 
amendments of the 1930's. The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory 
Reform Act of 1976, the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 and the Staggers 
Rail Act of 1980 reduced the regulatory authority of the ICC and 
streamlined and expedited ICC procedures for rail-related regulation. 
Similarly, as previously discussed, the basic authority of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission was defined in the Commodity 
Exchange Act of 1936 and amended by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission Act of 1974. It is interesting to note here that the 1974 
act created an agency reminiscent of the independent regulatory 
agencies of the New Deal, and granted the agency authority similar in 
form to the New Deal agencies. 
A number of other counterexamples to the observations of the 
incrementalist theory come readily to mind. The Securities Act 
Amendments of 1975 amended the authority of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) as originally detailed in the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934. The act of 1975 enlarged SEC oversight over 
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stock exchanges without similarly enlarging the SEC's decision-making 
procedures. The Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 extended, expanded 
and revised the subsidies, allotment and set aside programs 
established by earlier legislation without incorporating lengthy and 
detailed sections on administrative procedure. The anachronistic 
regulatory forms apparent in many of the regulatory laws enacted 
during both the 1930's and 1970's are in general discord with the 
basic observations that the incrementalist theory sought to explain. 
Thus, it would seem that only the most casual of examinations of the 
history of American regulation serves to find credibility in the 
incrementalist theory of congressional regulatory choice. 
10.3 Conclusion 
As was shown in chapter 2 the literature on regulatory choice 
all but ignored the choice of regulatory form. In Chapters 3 through 
5 we developed a public choice model, centered largely upon the 
legislature, which addressed the choice of regulatory form. In later 
chapters we considered the insights and hypotheses of the model in 
light of empirical evidence of the form of legislative case studies. 
The model developed explained evidence generated by the case studies 
extremely well. 
Given the diversity of regulatory forms exhibited in the case 
studies, it might be interesting to consider how accurately the model 
of regulatory choice devised herein fits the pattern of regulatory 
forms established by Congress in this century: to address this 
~8 
question, in this section, we shall briefly examine the hypotheses of 
chapter 4 in light of the overall picture of evidence painted by the 
case studies of the previous section and the last four chapters. 
Recall the hypotheses derived in chapter 4, which suggest the 
type of regulatory instruments, and procedural and substantive 
discretion, we might expect for environmental, health and safety 
regulatory legislation. We would expect Congress to specify in great 
detail the regulatory procedures necessary for promulgation of 
regulations under the agency's broad regulatory authority. We would 
also expect the agency to be mandated command and control instruments 
for the implementation of regulations at the production stages and 
incentive-based or informational mechanisms for the implementation of 
regulations at other stages of the regulated firm's activities. 
Similarly, the propositions developed in chapter 4 suggest 
that for economic regulatory legislation, Congress will uniformly 
mandate command and control instruments for the implementation of 
regulatory policies for all stages of firm activity. Further, though 
the substantive discretion of the agency in such a case will be 
narrow, we would expect that the procedural discretion granted will be 
relatively wide. 
The command and control and informational instrumentality and 
the interminable regulatory decision procedures of the toxics 
substances, product safety, and food and drug legislations (as 
discussed in chapters 6, 7 and 8) fulfill the expectations deducible 
from the model of regulatory choice for the case of environmental, 
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health and safety legislation. Interestingly, a number of other 
scholars examining environmental, health and safety regulations have 
borne witness to similar such forms of regulation as authorized under 
different enactments. Dorfman et.al. in studying EPA's Office of 
Pesticide Programs (OPP) administration of the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) (as amended), document well the 
regulatory instrument specified by the act and the labyrinthine 
decision-making procedures drawn by OPP from the act for the exercise 
of authority under the act (see also Aidala, 1979). Cornell, Noll and 
Weingast (1976) 2 described the convoluted processes by which the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration develop safety and 
health regulations under its authority granted in the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act (OSH Act). Thus, the form of the regulatory 
legislation of both FIFRA and OSH Act, as described in these studies, 
serve to offer further evidence for the model of regulatory choice 
developed herein. 
The specification of command and control instrumentality for 
the implementaion of narrow substantive authority and the delegation 
of broad precedural authority in the Civil Aeronautics Act (as 
discussed in chapter 9), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, 
and the Federal Energy Administration Act (as discussed briefly in the 
previous section) (for a detailed analysis of the Federal Energy 
Administration see Montgomery, 1977) fulfill the expectations 
deducible from the model for economic regulatory legislation. 
Thus, evidence drawn from a diversity of legislative case 
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studies, spanning the entire history of the American regulatory 
experience, offers an overall feeling of support for the model of 
regulatory choice proffered here . Though the evidence and techniques 
employed to test the propositions of the model ar e more casual in 
nature than might be hoped for (case studies), the evidence from such 
investigations strongly supports the model and its propostions. 
In sum then, we have developed a model of regulatory choice 
from which we can derive general hypotheses about regulatory 
instrument choice and legislative delegation of substantive and 
procedural discretion. These hypotheses are supported empirically by 
a series of case studies of federal regulatory legislation. 
We have, along the way, addressed a series of other questions 
aside from those we set out to discuss. We have suggested a model of 
agency structuring which, though simple, fits the available evidence 
provided in the legislative case studies. Most recently we examined a 
widely held alternative hypothesis and suggested that empirical 
support for this theory is available at only the most casual of 
levels. 
Probably the most important side issue discussed, at least the 
most interesting, is the failure of environmental, health and safety 
regulation. We discovered (or re-discovered) that the politics and 
institutions of the American democracy provide incentives to 
legislators and bureaucrats for an overreliance on command and control 
mechanisms for the implementation of this class of regulatory 
policies. Such mechanisms, by their very nature, are employed on a 
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case-by-case basis which, in itself, magnifies the costs and length of 
regulatory procedures. Further, incentives for a broad delegation of 
substantive authority are coupled with incentives for the mandating of 
very specific, lengthy and detailed procedural requirements for 
decision-making. The result, as we have witnessed for TOSCA, CPSA and 
the FFDCA, is slow suffocation by red-tape. 
So, where does this all leave us? We have, by this effort, 
acquired an initial understanding of the choice of regulatory form, 
what factors influence these choices, and what implications such 
choices have for policy implementation. Such a start should open new 
avenues of research and exploration and should enrich our 
understanding of the processes by which regulation is chosen. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 10 
1. See also Wilson (1980) and Stewart (1975) among others. 
2. See also Weingast (1978a). 
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Appendix A. Comparative Statics 
The technique of comparative statics allows us to define a functional 
form for each decision-maker's decision variable and to determine the sign 
of changes in these variables with respect to a change in a parameter, 
all else constant. First order conditions define the necessary conditions 
for a maximum of decision-maker's objective function. 
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the necessary (first order) conditions we can trace the influence of each 
parameter in each partial derivative and function in the necessary conditions. 
This will allow us to determine how changes in these parameters affect 
changes in the decision-variables. This will be done by solving the totally 
differentiated equations for the differential of the decision-variables 
(in this case dp. and dq.) and then examining the sign of the differentials 
l l 
with respect to the parameters of the model, all else constant. 
Totally differentiating A.l and A.2 and then simplifying yields, 
2 i 2 2 i 2 i 2 i 
a u ;a P . d P . + a u ;a P . a r d r + a u ;a P . a Ld 1 + a u ;a P . a q . d q . 
l l l l l l l 
2 . 2 . 2 . 
+ a u
2 ;a P .a JdJ + a u2 ;a P .a cdc + a u2 ;a P .a AdA 
l l l 
2 i 2 i 2 i m m 
+ a u ;a P . a s . . d s . . + a u ;a P . a n dB + a u ;a P . a P . d P . o 
l Jl Jl l l l l 
2i 2 z· 2· 
a u ;aq.dq. +a · u2 /aq.ardr +a u2 /aq.as .. dS .. 
l l l l Jl Jl 
2 i 2 i 2 i 
+a u ;aq.aBdB +a u ;aq.aLdL +a u ;aq.ap.dp. o 




ui;ap.ardr + a 2ui;ap.aLdL + a 2ui;ap.aJdJ 
l l l 
2 i 2 i 2 i 
+ a u ;a P .a cdc + a u ;a P .a AdA + a u ;a P .as .. dS .. 
l l l Jl Jl 
2 i 2 i m m 
+ a u ;a P .a BdB + a u ;a P .a P. dp. 
l l l l 
2 i 2 i 
n2 = a u ;a q .a rdr + a u ;a q .as .. dS .. l l Jl Jl 
2 . 
+ a u





Then, we can write A.3 and A.4 as, 
a 2ui ;a 2 2 i dpil r~::J p. a u ;ap.aq. l_ l_ l_ 2 i a 2ui ;a q~ dq. a u ;a q .a P. 
l_ l_ l_ l_ 
Solving 
dpi l [" 20i /<l q2 2 . 1 -d 1'1 /dp.dq.l 




ui ;a p ~ dq. d -a u1 ;a q .a P . -D 
l l l l 2 
where d is the determinate of the left-hand-side matrix of second 
order conditions, d is assume to be negative. 







2 i 2 2 i m [a u ;a q .a u ;a P .a P. J > o 
l 1 l 
We thus set all changes in parameters, dX, where X is a parameter, 















Recalling the characterization of the function RENTSi in chapter 
3, for simplicity, RENTSi is strictly concave in d(pi,x) and d(qi,y), 
where d(-) is the Euclidean distance between the arguments and x and y 
are the maxima of the function, we can thus determine that: 
C:l P. ;as. . < o 
l Jl 
max 
relative to p 
or more concisely then, we can conclude, from our assumptions concerning 
the form of the function RENTSi, that 
max ad (p., P ) ;as . . < o 
l J l 
(A.7) 
For this and the relationship for B. described in section 3.3 and the fact that 
J 
Clpmax /Clp-1: > 0 
J 




Cl d ( p . , p -1:) /Cl B . . < o 
l J J l 
Cl d ( p . , p -1:) /Cl B > 0 
l J 
(since Cl B/Cl B. > 0 -+ Cl d (p., p-1:) /Cl B. > 0) .. 
J l J J 
Also, from the characterization of RENTSi we know 











1 2 i 2 i 
-[(-au ;aq.ap.)(a u ;ap .aJ)J 
d 1 1 1 
Since Ui is continuous, twice differentiable, positive and monotone, 
and quasi-concave we know that 
for all p. 
1 
indeed, it is also evident that, given J is a matrix defining the committee 
jurisdiction, we can define the derivative of this matrix with-respect-to 
the function ui (i.e. each element of the matrix): 
Thus, 
aq./aJ > o. 
1 
for all p. ,J 
1 
Similarly we can deduce 
a q . /() C > 0 and a q . /a A > 0 . 
1 1 
Again, recall the characterization of the function RENTSi from chapter 3, 
i 
from this we know that there exists a qmax which maximizes RENTS · 
Since 





Similarly, since RENTSi is just the sum of the lobbying rents 




i by continuity of q , L .. we can deduce that 
J1 
ad(q.,q~)/dL .. <O 
1 J J 1 
Also, by 
then 





From our characterization of the function RENTSi it is directly obvious 
that 
From our characterization of PROBi and from the fact that q is not an i 
argument in the function POLICYi we can deduce 
Lastly , in a similar fashion as for dp., we can conclude that 
1. 
dq./d S .. > 0, dq./a B. > 0, relative to q~ 
1. Jl. 1. J J 
Recall the interest group's calculus: 
Maximi ze NBj(POLICYj(L.) , INSTR~lliNTj(L.)· 
J J L. 
J 
subject to S .L. 
J J 
< B . • 
J 
with POLICY(L.: f, ]L . [ ,J ,C,A), and INSTRUMENTj (Lj: ']Lj [ ,J ,C,A) 
J J 
S . (Access(J,C,p~,q~,r,r )) 




First-order-conditions for a maximum are: 








2 . 2 2 . 2 . 
a NBJ /aL . dL. +a NBJ /3L.afdf +a NBJ /31.3 ]L. dL. 
J J J J J J 
+ a
2NBj /aL.aJdJ + a 2NBj /aL.aCdC + a 2NBjaL.aAdA 
J J J 
2 . 
+ B.d /.. +/..dB.+ a NBJ/3L.af df 0 J J J q q = 
dB. L.dB. B. dL. 0 
J J J J J 
Define n1 and n2 in a similar fashion as was done for the legislator's 
problem. 
Then, rewriting yields 
3 2NBj /a 1: 




d -B2 < 0 j 
solving, 
r dLj 1 











B. r-nl J 












Assuming o S. /o Access < 0 
J 
(as in chapter 3) 
-+ o L. /o Access > 0 
J 
1 oL./oq. =-des.) [(L . ) as. / a r ar /aq.J 
J 1 J J J qq 1 
We can see 
as. /a r < 0 relative to q~ by assumption and 
J q J 
a L. /a q. < 0 relative to q~ or oL./od(q.,q~). 
J 1 J J 1 J 




C(jWj [NBj(pbqb) - NBj(p0 ,q00] 
First-order-conditions are 
o EUb /o pb Ao COSTb /o pb 0 
b b o EU /o qb Ad COST /o qb 0 
BUDGETb - COSTb = 0 
Let rb be the vector rb 
Then we can rewrite the agency's calculus as 





and the first-order conditions will become 
. 
b b 
a EU /arb - A.a COST /arb 0 
BUDGETb - COSTb = 0 
Totally differentiating, 
aBUDGETb/ac[ac;awjdwj + ac/arbdrb + ac/ar0dr0 J 
b 




n1 = a EU ;a rba r 0dr0 
n2 = a














aqb/aqj > o 
a ph/a P_j > o 
By continuity 
and 
arb/aw.aw./aB. > 0 




a qb/a I > 0 
a ph/a I > 0 
aqb/aBj > 0 relative 
a pb/aBj > 0 relative 
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The institution of the conference committee was designed to 
correct the decision-making predicament designed into the Constitution 
that identical legislation must pass each chamber before such policy 
can be enacted into law. Without such institutional strategies the 
policy process promises to be disequilibrating. 
Without further assumptions, or considerations of the 
institutionalized norms of behavior the existence of equilibria for 
the conference committee suffers the same unsatisfying characteristics 
of general two-person co-operative games. 
Shepsle's theorem on the existence of SIE for each chamber and 
the following assumptions are utilized for the general proof: 
V. The conference committee, as all other committees, is 
bound by jurisdictional constraints defined by the characteristics of 
the particular bill under consideration. The intersection of both 
chambers defined jurisdiction is non-null. 
VI. Let s! be the set of feasible alternatives for chamber i 
at times t defined by the chambers policy stand pi, given their 
jurisdictional constraints. Define St as the intersection of 
si for all i; 
st is the set of feasible policy choices for the conference 
committee . The conference committee is required by each chamber to 
(1) 
255 
reach a compromise and as such their jurisdiction is constrained 
beyong St forcing compromise. Only points p e Ct(St) ~ int St are 
feasible such that 
VII. The choice process by the committee, where each 
(2) 
chamber's representatives (as a unit choose a p e Ct, is repetitiv~. 




Where St is defined by the intersection ns~ which are a 
function of p!_1 • Thus each successive set policy choice (pt) defines 
a new feasible set, VIII. M(pt) = 0 (i.e. closed amendment rule) for 
each chamber i when (ph = ps = pc) the chambers both agree in 
conference. This assumption is along the lines of axiom R6 above. 
Proof: Existence of SIE for Conference Committee. p~ and p~ are known 
to exist (see Shepsle (1979)). Assumption V and VI imply that p~ will 
exist for each t (proof follows from Shepsle's proof). Since 
Q) 




Thus with assumption VII (closed rule) the equilibrium set for 
the legislature will consist of (pc, SQ) where pc is the conference 
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